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1.1 Social cleavages and political divisions
1.1.1 Class and religious conflict in Western democracies 
Understanding the relationship between society and politics is elemental to 
political sociology. Its aim is “to map variations in the relationship between social 
structures, political orientations, and political action, and to explain the patterns 
that arise” (Svallfors 2007: 1). The patterns of political alignment that proceed 
from structural divisions in societies are often referred to as social cleavages, and 
suppose to identify enduring conflicts within the electorate (Manza and Brooks 
1999). The link between social cleavages and political conflict may reveal itself in 
political action of various kinds by various actors. In democratic societies elections 
are an important mechanism for the expression of conflict between groups in 
society. Therefore the relationship between the social position of individuals and 
their voting behavior has received ample attention of political sociologists. In this 
thesis we study two traditional social divisions in the electorates of Western 
democracies: social class and religion. The central aim is to investigate 
cross-national and over-time variation in class and religious voting. We combine 
comparative analyses of 15 modern democracies in Western Europe, Australia 
and the United States since the 1960s, with detailed analyses of cleavage voting 
trends in the Netherlands since the 1970s. 
 Social cleavage research can largely be traced back to the junction of two 
sociological traditions on conflict in societies. One the one hand, there is the 
class-based tradition of power and politics that originated from Marxist theory on 
societal development. And second, Weber’s distinction between social class and 
status (Zuckerman 1975; Manza and Brooks 1999; Dalton 2008). In the Marxist 
sense of the word ‘classes’ are demarcated on the basis of the relation to the 
means of production. Based on their relation to property Marx’ class-centered 
model of history distinguishes between three fundamental classes in capitalist 
societies; capitalists who own the means of production and hire workers, workers 
who sell their labor, and petty bourgeoisie who own and use the means of 
production without hiring others (Knutsen 2007). The dominant classes seek to 
maintain the control over the means of production because of the political power 
associated with that control. Marx was therefore primarily interested in the 
emergence of a shared sense of class interests among the underprivileged 
working class to provide a basis for conflict with the ruling class (Knutsen 2007). 
 Weber has built on the Marxian legacy by expanding the potential lines of 
conflict in society beyond the capital/labor divide (Zuckerman 1975; Manza and 
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Brooks 1999). Weber’s theory is primarily concerned with life chances, access to 
scares goods and services (Pakulski and Waters 1996). Inequality is not simply 
associated with production, but also with social esteem and social closure. 
Economically defined ‘classes’ are distinguished from broader ‘status groups’, 
which are not reducible to economic relations alone (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007). 
Status groups are differentiated by prestige rankings and consumption patterns. 
According to Weber the degree of openness or closure of social groups can be 
determined on the basis of occupational mobility, educational access and the 
frequency of inter group marriages. Because the Weberian approach reaches 
beyond the conflict over the means of production it considers the class cleavage 
not to be the primary source for political conflict in a society, but rather as one 
among the many sources of conflict (Knutsen 2007). In Weber’s theory there is 
great emphasis on religious prestige, and the division in social chances and 
access to political power between dominant and subordinate religious groups. 
But, implicitly the Weberian approach suggests that there exists an unlimited 
number of potential cleavage bases (Zuckerman 1975). The notion that political 
conflict is related to a limited number of ‘structural’ cleavages, of which class and 
religious divisions are the most important, can be found in Lipset and Rokkan’s 
(1967) influential book Party Systems and Voter Alignments. In their famous 
introductory chapter Lipset and Rokkan laid the groundwork for our current 
understanding of the social-structural bases of politics. They specified a pattern 
of historical interaction in Europe between cleavages lines and the political 
behavior of parties and the electorate (Zuckerman 1975).
 According to Lipset and Rokkan the class cleavage is rooted in the Industrial 
Revolution, and is primarily concerned with the conflict between employers (owners) 
versus laborers (workers). The centrality of social class in political sociology is 
understandable given the fact that it is more uniformly decisive than the other major 
cleavages in the Lipset-Rokkan model (i.e. center/periphery, church/state, rural/
urban). As industrialization progressed workers increasingly railed against their low 
wages, poor working conditions and the insecurity of their contracts. To defend 
their interest labor unions and socialist parties emerged at the dawn of democracy 
in Western Europe. Because class divisions in the labor market were relatively 
uniform across nations, they moved the development of party systems in a common 
direction (Knutsen 2007). Other cleavage lines, such as religious divisions, were 
often interwoven with nation-specific conflicts shaping dissimilar party structures 
across countries. The variety of religious-based parties, in terms of their presence, 
strength and affiliation, is therefore far greater than of socialist parties.
chapter 1
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 The religious cleavage in Western Europe is more complex than the class 
cleavage. According to Lipset and Rokkan the religious divisions in politics 
originated from the interplay between the Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
(16th-17th century) and the national state-building revolutions (1789 and after) 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 37-41). The consequences of the Reformation were 
therefore not only religious, but also political in nature because the religious 
cleavages frequently interacted with the nation-building process (Knutsen 2004: 
98). In Northwest Europe, Britain and in Scandinavia Protestants were often allied 
to rising nationalist forces. In Southern and Central Europe, the Counter-Reforma-
tion strengthened the position of the Catholic Church and perpetuated its 
relationship with the old regimes. And the territories of The Netherlands, Germany 
and Switzerland were cross-but by the religious frontiers of Europe (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 37-41). The division between Catholics and Protestants, created by 
the Reformation and Counter Reformation therefore not only appears between 
people but also between nations. Once the new cleavage structures were settled, 
the French Revolution of 1789 was the catalyst for new religious conflicts across 
Europe. The secular and liberal movements, which emerged as the offspring of 
the French Revolution, forced both Catholics and Protestant to defend the 
privileges of the church in conflicts over the disestablishment of state religion, the 
introduction of religious freedom and the control of mass education (Knutsen 
2004; 98; Lipset and Rokkan 1976).
 The influence of social class on political divisions may be more universal in 
nature, but religious divisions are often considered to be more important. Early 
comparative studies emphasized the strength of religion as a determinant of 
political party choice. Rose and Urwin’s early examination in 1969 of sixteen 
Western democracies led them conclude that “religious divisions, not class, are 
the main social basis of parties in the Western world today” (Rose and Urwin 1969: 
12). And studying cleavage politics in four multi-cleavage countries Lijphart 
reached the same conclusion. He stated: ‘social class is clearly no more than a 
secondary and subsidiary influence of party choice, and it can become a factor of 
importance only in the absence of potent rivals such as religion and language’ 
(Lijphart 1979: 53). 
 Conflict along other cleavage lines sometimes interferes with the class 
cleavage in the labor market. This taps into the distinction between ‘horizontal’ 
cleavages that are related to economic and social divisions (e.g. occupation, 
income, and education) and ‘vertical’ cleavages (e.g. religion, language, and 
ethnicity) that divide societies along cultural criteria (Dogan 2004). By studying 
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social class and religion we capture the most potent distinctions of the two types 
of cleavages. The class cleavage is related to nearly all material concerns of 
voters in modern democracies, e.g. improvement of living standards, maintaining 
economic security, the distribution of economic rewards, income taxation, 
unemployment and inflation. Religion, on the other hand is related to a wide range 
of cultural issues; abortion, euthanasia, homosexual rights and other morality 
policies (Dalton 2008). 
1.1.2 Class and Religious Voting 
For a long time within political sociology, the relevance of social cleavages on 
voting remained uncontested. During the first half of the twentieth century scholars 
commonly assumed that there was a strong relationship between social group 
membership en party choices, especially in Western Europe. Political parties 
were considered to be the representatives of specific interest groups and members 
of these groups were expected to support political parties out of group interest. 
The working class is historically represented by political parties on the left, by 
socialists, communists and social-democrats. Politically, the conflict over the 
means of production is translated into a ‘democratic class struggle’ (Lipset 1960; 
Korpi 1983; Nieuwbeerta 1995) in which the working class, as opposed to 
members from other classes, supports parties that advocate the redistribution of 
wealth and strive for welfare state expansion. The bourgeoisie on the other hand, 
the self-employed and the owners of capital, support parties that reject government 
intervention and advocate a free-market based economy. Hence, traditional class 
voting predicts that while the working class is voting left-wing, the non-working 
class supports the right. 
 The association between religious groups and political parties is less clear-cut 
because of the diversity of religion within and between nations. Generally however, 
when scholars investigate the influence of religion on political alignment they 
assume that the voting behavior of ‘religious’ voters, whether in affiliation, 
commitment or belief, is substantially different from ‘secular’ voters because of 
their non-material interests. Historically, religious voters supported parties that 
defended their religious freedom in conflicts over the disestablishment of state 
religion and the secular versus religious control of mass education. Later, the 
conflict between religious and secular voters also involves other non-material 
interests. Religious voters, as opposed to secular voters, support parties that 
reject liberal political ideals about abortion, euthanasia or homosexual rights. The 
religion-vote association can be found under many different names and labels in 
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the literature, e.g.: denominational voting, religiosity voting, confessional voting or 
Christian voting. In this study we will use the most general term ‘religious voting’ 
to refer to all research investigating the influence of religion on party choice. 
 The archetypical perception of the relationship between social cleavages and 
party choice is subject to change. From the second half of the twentieth century 
most democratic societies transformed from industrial economies to advanced- 
or post industrial economies. Due to the decline of traditional industrial economies 
in Western countries the classical Marxist conflict over the means of production 
becomes increasingly unrelated to disagreement among voters. In recent decades 
something close to a ‘new conventional wisdom’ (Franklin 1992, Dogan 1995, 
Lane and Errson 1997, Dalton 2002; Elff 2007) emerged dictating the decline of 
social class a basis for party support in modern democracies. Clark and Lipset 
(2001) argue that class voting has declined in all Western-democracies for which 
data are available between the 1940s and 1980s (see also, Lipset 1960 1983). 
Based the first large-scale comparison of class voting using log-odds ratio’s 
Nieuwbeerta (1995: 195) concludes that ‘in many of the countries substantial 
declines in the levels of relative class voting occurred in the postwar period’. 
Nieuwbeerta found that the decrease in class voting was the largest in countries 
where the class-vote relationship had traditionally been high. Pakulski and Waters 
(1996), even proclaiming the ‘death of class’, write that ‘since the peak of class 
effects during the middle of the twentieth century, the significance of class as a 
basis for political identification and behavior and as a force for change has been 
declining’ (1996: 132). 
 This new consensus is sometimes also assumed with respect to the relevance 
of other traditional social divisions in politics, such as religion. Franklin et al. 
(1992) have assessed the influence of various attitudinal and social structural 
variables on voting in a series of sixteen country-specific analyses. They 
concluded that there was a widespread reduction of in the explanatory power of 
class and religion, on left-wing voting. Dogan (1995) reports that both class voting 
and religious voting have eroded in Western Europe (1992: 338). Similarly, Dalton 
(2002) writes that “there has been an erosion in the ability of social cleavages (and 
the social characteristics derived from these cleavages) to explain electoral 
choice. The weakening of class and religious alignments has been accompanied 
by an apparent erosion of long-term partisan commitment and enduring feelings 
of party identification” (2002: 338). 
 Despite this prevalent view cleavage voting remains one of the most debated 
topics in political sociology. As we will discuss later, some recent studies have 
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challenged the claims about the long-term, universal and unidirectional weakening 
of social cleavages on voting. In the next paragraph we will discuss the literature 
on class voting and religious voting studies over the last decades. We will focus 
on the differences and similarities in the two fields with respect to their theoretical 
and empirical evolution. 
1.2 Cleavage voting research
1.2.1 Three generations of class voting research
The association between social class position and left-wing voting is certainly 
one of the most widely studied relationships in cleavage voting research. Long 
before the introduction of modern election surveys around the 1960s scholars 
sought to investigate the relationship between social stratification and voting 
behavior. These early studies often relied on ecological inferences, i.e.: drawing 
conclusions about voters on the basis of aggregate information (Tingsten 1937). 
The introduction of election surveys signals the starting point of a gradual 
development process in class voting research. Over time there has been an 
evolution in four domains of the class voting literature: (1) formulation of research 
problems, (2) the content of the major hypotheses, (3) measurement procedures 
and (4) methods of data analysis. On the basis of these criteria Nieuwbeerta 
(1995) divided the history of this research area into three generations (cf. 
Nieuwbeerta 1995, Chapter 1: 3-15; and the summary by Knutsen 2007).
 The first generation of class voting research was conducted after the Second 
World War during the 1950s and 1960s. This generation gave attention to a broad 
range of research problems concerning the class-vote relationship. Research 
often relied on limited number of datasets and examined cross-tabulations of 
dichotomous (manual/non-manual) class measurements and vote choice. The 
Alford-index was a commonly used measure for the strength of the class-vote 
relationship (Alford 1963). Other illustrative examples for this generation of class 
voting research are the studies of Lenski (1970), Lipset (1983) and Korpi (1983). 
Explanations for variation in class voting were sought in social and political char-
acteristics of countries (see for example: Lipset and Bendix 1959; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). 
 In the late 1960s the second generation of class voting research replaced the 
simple analyses of cross-tabulations with more sophisticated analysis techniques. 
This generation is characterized by more detailed class schemas and the use of 
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linear regression. Researches primarily examined long-term trends in single 
countries and differences between countries in single periods (e.g. Franklin et al. 
1992). Hypotheses were mainly concerned with value-orientations explaining 
variations in class voting (Inglehart 1977, 1990).
 The third generation started in the mid-1980s. Scholars of this generation 
often deduced hypotheses from macro-micro-macro theory that concerned 
compositional explanations and class mobility explanations. Instead of linear 
regression techniques these studies employed logistic models to study interna-
tionally standardized class schemas, e.g. the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero 
(EGP) class schema. Researchers of this generation argued that absolute class 
voting measures based on percentages differences, such as the Alford-index, 
were sensitive to the marginal distributions and preferred the use of log-odds 
ratios instead (Heath et al. 1985). Until the mid-1990s third generation researchers 
had only studied class voting trends in single countries. 
 At that time Nieuwbeerta published his study the third generation had yet to 
live up to the expectations. He characterized the precision of hypotheses and 
empirical tests of his generation as ‘promising, but (…) still in its infancy’ 
(Nieuwbeerta 1995: 4). Nieuwbeerta (1995) positioned his study as the next step 
in the third generation of class voting research. To describe and explain 
cross-national and over time variations in class voting he constructed an 
innovatively large-scale dataset containing 113 surveys from 16 countries over 
the period 1956-1990. Using multi-level models he systematically assessed the 
effects of social and political characteristics of countries on the levels of class 
voting. Nieuwbeerta’s work was concerned with describing and explaining 
variation in the effect of class (manual/non-manual vs. EGP) on left-wing voting 
and in the effect of class mobilization on left-wing voting. Another important step 
in fulfilling the expectation for third generation was presented by Evans (1999) in 
‘The End of Class Politics?’ and by the authors who contributed to this edited 
volume. In a combination of large-scale pooled analyses and successive coun-
try-specific chapters this international group of scholars offered a state of the art 
investigation of class voting in comparative perspective.
 During the third generation Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) introduced a new 
measure to provide “a uniform metric for comparative and historical analyses 
based on suitable class and voting typologies” (1995: 814). This ‘kappa index’ is 
an aggregate measure of class voting strength, calculated using the standard 
deviation of the log-odds or predicted probabilities of all possible combinations 
of class categories and party outcomes. The kappa index allowed researchers to 
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consider more differentiated party measures than previous generations (e.g. Hout 
et al. 1995; Brooks et al. 2006). Knutsen (2006) has exploited this measure 
thoroughly in study of class voting in Western Europe which enabled him to test a 
large set of macro-level explanations for changes in, and the comparative strength 
of class voting using a more differentiated dependent variable than Nieuwbeerta 
(1995). Others (e.g. Pakulski and Waters 1996; Clark 2001; Houtman 2003) have 
criticized the kappa-index for two of its properties: First, as a summary measure 
the kappa index does not specify relationships, or directions thereof, between 
particular classes and parties. It is therefore not able to detect all changes in 
class voting. Second, all classes, regardless of their size contribute equally in 
calculating the average class voting effect (Knutsen 2006: 53). The third generation 
of class voting research also further explored the micro level explanations for 
variation in class voting. Some recent work has elaborated on first and second 
generation theories (Lipset 1959; Parkin 1968; Inglehart 1977;1990) on working 
class authoritarianism, middle class radicalism and value orientations by 
employing the methods of data collection, class measures and logistic/multi level 
models of third generation class voting research (e.g. Achterberg and Houtman 
2006; Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman 2007). 
1.2.2 A fourth generation of class voting research
Recently, a new generation of class voting research is evolving. Knutsen (2007) 
already announced the emergence of a new generation of class voting, but he 
ended his announcement with a question mark (2007: 460). Instead of signaling 
recent developments in class voting research, he – in line with his aforementioned 
large-scale comparison (Knutsen 2006) - primarily calls upon researchers to 
reconsider the dependent variable in class voting. We however argue that also 
the research problems and major hypotheses are shifting, and that the 
measurement procedures and analyses strategies are becoming more 
sophisticated. Below we will sketch the contours of what is becoming the fourth 
generation in class voting research. 
 Research problems: To begin with, there has been quite a debate about the 
decline of class voting in modern democracies. The study of Nieuwbeerta (1995) 
for the most part ended this debate. Many contemporary researchers are not 
concerned anymore with arguments about whether class voting has declined are 
or not. The current research problem is much more why the class basis of voting 
is declining (Evans 1999b: 6). 
 Major hypotheses: Although three generations of class voting researchers 
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have proposed many hypotheses on explanations for variation (over time and 
across countries) in the class-vote relationship only few have systematically tried 
to test these explanations (see Nieuwbeerta 1995, Chapter 4; Nieuwbeerta and 
Ultee 1999; Knutsen 2006). If these studies are the forerunners of a new generation 
of class voting research we may expect to see a stronger focus on factors 
interpreting patterns of class-alignment. The most common hypotheses for 
dealignment in the class voting literature generally fit two main categories. The 
first category of hypotheses is concerned with sociological factors related to 
changes in the size and composition of classes and the relative importance of 
class versus other cleavage lines. The second set of hypotheses use political 
factors that are related to party programs and the class basis of electoral appeals 
that parties make (Evans 2000; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Knutsen 2006). The 
latter category assumes that patterns in class voting reflect the outcomes of party 
behavior rather than changes in social structure. In section 1.3 we elaborate on 
the content of the major hypotheses fitting the two categories. Here we will discuss 
the increasing concern of third and currently upcoming fourth generation of class 
voting studies for hypotheses on political change. 
 Although previous generations of research tested hypotheses about the 
impact of political influences on the class-vote relationship, stringent tests of 
whether political factors influenced class voting remained largely underdeveloped. 
Since the late 1990s/ early 2000s there is an increasing concern for the extent to 
which political parties and changes in the party system have any autonomous 
effect on class voting. The third generation of class voting research was criticized 
for largely neglecting political factors. In reaction to Evans (1999) and his 
colleagues, Mair advised that in explaining variation in class voting “You need to 
look at politics as such: you need to look at the cleavage structure and how that 
changes: you need to look at the parties themselves – or blocks of parties – and 
how they interact (…) [Y]ou need to look at what competitors do; and you need to 
look at the institutional context in which this competition takes place. All these 
factors help to explain why social structure translates into politics differently from 
one country to another” (Mair 1999: 311). The implication of this approach is that 
in studying class voting scholars should combine the theories and methods of 
social stratification studies with those from political science. In some of the third 
generation studies researchers relied on the observation of discontinuity in the 
strength of class voting effects to infer a political influence. The studies of Evans, 
Heath and Payne (1991) and De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) for example 
contain hypothesis about marked discontinuities between different elections that 
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are consistent with party shifts instead of social change. The measurement of 
actual party positions, as is done in the studies of Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), 
Oskarson (2005), Achterberg (2006) and Elff (2009) is a quite recent novelty to 
the field of class voting research. 
 Measures: The first generation of class voting used a traditional two-class 
schema dividing manual workers from all other classes. In the second generation 
more detailed class measures were used, but different studies often relied on 
different classifications. The third generation typically employed standardized 
multi-category class measures suitable for over time and cross-national 
comparisons (Nieuwbeerta 1995). The EGP class schema, originally developed 
with respect to social mobility studies, nowadays is the most influential operation-
alization of social class in European sociology (Knutsen 2007). Like other 
established class schemas the EGP schema was constructed for countries with 
employment structures dominated by industrial occupations, often called the 
manufacturing sector. The employment structures of modern democracies are 
evolving from industrial to post-industrial. The new generation of stratification 
researchers have adjusted the EGP class schema to account for this transformation 
by distinguishing between separate classes within the expanding service class 
(Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004; Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2007a). 
Typically, these studies differentiate between a ‘new’ class of social and cultural 
specialists and an ‘old’ class of technocrats. Güveli et al. (2007a) for example find 
that the adjusted EGP class schema explains people’s political orientation 
substantially better than the standard EGP class schema. They conclude that the 
‘new’ classes of social and cultural specialists vote significantly more for leftist 
parties and differ substantially in their political orientation from the ‘old’ classes of 
technocrats.
 In proposing a new generation of class voting research Knutsen (2007) notes 
that the three previous generation of class voting all relied on a dichotomous 
party choice variable that grouped parties of the left into one category and all 
other parties into the other category. He argues that also this division can be 
questioned in advanced industrial societies. Knutsen emphasizes that new-left 
parties receive stronger support from the higher educated and the new middle 
class relative to the less educated and manual workers. Moving beyond ‘traditional’ 
(left/right) class voting, Knutsen proposes that a new generation of research 
should consider all parties as separate categories. 
 Methods of data analysis: Next to the shift in research problems, hypotheses, 
and measurement procedures, there is also promising innovation with respect to 
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the methods and analysis techniques. The third generation primarily relied on 
logistic models of class voting. In doing so, many comparative studies on class 
voting use a generic categorization of parties or party families (often ‘left’ versus 
‘non-left’) regardless of the fact that parties change their positions on policies or 
that different parties within the same ‘party family’ are perhaps similar but often 
far from equal. This raises a problem for comparative analyses of class voting, 
whether over time or space, as the extent to which leftist parties advocate redis-
tributionist policies and non-leftist parties oppose them is - falsely - assumed to 
be fixed. Researchers who realized this began to examine whether variation in 
class voting was related to the difference in the redistributive policy choices 
offered to voters. In the first studies that attempted to account for the ‘top-down’ 
direction in which class and vote are associated, researcher ‘eye-balled’ the 
extent to which the patterns of party change were related to class voting (Evans 
et al. 1999). The second step was to calculate the correlation between party 
polarization and the levels of class voting (Oskarson 2005; Knutsen 2006). In the 
meanwhile, studies on electoral behavior borrowed ‘discrete choice models’ from 
consumer behavior economics (McFadden 1974; Alvarez and Nagler 1998). 
Applied to electoral research discrete-choice models express the probability that 
an individual voter chooses a specific alternative as function only of its attributes, 
without the need to take into account the names or identities of the specific 
alternatives. Elff (2009) recognized the applicability of McFadden’s conditional 
logit model in analyzing social divisions and party choice. His study confirmed 
that the decline in the relation between social divisions and voting behavior is 
attributable to parties’ changing political positions. Once these changes are 
taken into account, Elff argues, the impact of social class and religion on voting 
behavior persists. Although conditional logit models have repeatedly been used 
in electoral research, Elff’s study (2009) is to our knowledge the first to apply this 
model to address changes in cleavage voting. 
 Whether or not the recent developments in class voting truly constitute the 
emergence of a new research generation remains debatable. Some of the 
proposed innovations are subject to controversies, for example, the question 
whether changes in the occupational structure warrant the adjustment of 
established class schemas. Differences within the service class are in part 
associated with the expansion of the welfare state and the growth of public sector 
employment. And the split between those who work in the private sector and 
those who in the public sector is sometimes seen as one of the ‘new’ political 
divisions cross-cutting the class cleavage (Dunleavy 1980). Other developments, 
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such as the inclusion of party positions and the use of discrete choice models, 
are promising but are also still in stages of infancy. We thus draw the same 
conclusion as Nieuwbeerta (1995) did when identifying the first three generations 
of class voting research: Different generations of class voting research are not 
truly separated in time. There is a slow diffusion of innovation in political sociology 
leading to gradual scientific change, not to immediate change of practice. The 
third generation has matured as a result of the studies like those by Nieuwbeerta 
(1995), Evans (1999) and Knutsen (2006). And at the same time, these and other 
studies have paved the way for yet a new precision of research problems, 
hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collections and analysis techniques. 
In table 1.1 we summarize the main developments in class voting research. The 
summary of the first three generations are taken from Nieuwbeerta (1995: 20). 
The potential characteristics of the fourth generation are added on the basis of 
the overview above. 
1.2.3 Religious voting research
Although religious voting research resembles class voting research in the sense 
that they both explore trends and country differences thereof in social structural 
divisions on party choice, the two research lines are rooted in different traditions. 
The generations in class voting research are anchored in the history of comparative 
research on social stratification (Ultee 1989; Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee 
1991). The introduction of new class measures and the shift to logistic modeling 
in this school of research not only moved stratification research from the second 
generation to the third, but also marked the emerge of the third generation in 
class voting research. Contrary, the history of religious voting research is not 
directly linked to developments in the social stratification literature, but much to 
debates about secularization in the sociology of religion. In some studies religion 
is used as a control for class voting (e.g. Alford 1963; Kelly and Evans 1995), but 
electoral studies solely investigating religion are much rarer. The body of literature 
on religion and voting behavior is not only smaller than the class voting literature, 
its history is also less well documented. Exceptions are the very useful reviews 
made by Manza and Wright (2003) and Esmer and Pettersson (2007). Below we 
will discuss the literature on religion and voting by the same criteria that are used 
to identify different generations in social stratification and class voting studies; (1) 
formulation of research problems, (2) the content of the major hypotheses, (3) 
measurement procedures and (4) data collection and methods of analysis. With 
respect to data collection and analytic strategies the developments in religious 
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voting research are similar to those in class voting research. We will, however, 
show that the boundaries between different generations in religious voting studies 
are generally less clear-cut.
 Research problems: In contrast to class voting, religious voting research is 
characterized by a broader range of research problems concerning the relationship 
between religion and voting. Esmer and Pettersson (2007) argue that studies of 
religion and voting behavior generally fit two categories, i.e.: studies that compare 
the voting behavior of different denominational groups and studies that correlate 
levels of religiosity with voting behavior. In this categorization religiosity relates to 
both belief and practice. Although the latter is commonly operationalized as 
church attendance, the former may relate to a wider range of indicators of faith 
such as one’s belief in God or Biblical literalism. Manza and Wright (2003: 
299-300) even distinguish four categories of religion-vote relationships that are 
found in the literature: (a) church attendance; (b) denominational groups; (c) 
doctrinal beliefs and (d) local/contextual aspects of congregational memberships 
(e.g. the impact of individual churches or church leaders). ‘Generational’ 
differences between studies conducted in the 1960s versus later research do not 
play a substantive role in the formulation of research problems concerning 
different types of religious cleavages. Most studies investigate either 
denominational differences or religiosity, sometimes using one as a control for 
the other. Simultaneous investigations of various types of religious cleavages are 
rarer, but are found across many decades of research (Lijphart 1979; Bean 1999; 
Kolter-Berkowitz 2001; Raymond 2010). In the US, though, scholars ‘rediscovered’ 
the role of religion in politics in the 1990s by focusing on differences between 
religious affiliation, commitment and belief (Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Layman 
1998). This development matched debates in the sociology of religion about 
belonging, behaving and believing (Davie 1994; Voas and Crockett 2005; Aarts, 
Need, Te Grotenhuis and De Graaf 2008). Generally, the main research question 
in analyzing religion and party choice is not whether a relationship exists or not, 
but rather if, and to what extent this relationship is declining (Esmer and Pettersson 
2007). 
 Major hypotheses: Comparative studies - both over time and space - on 
religious voting have been dominated by theories and hypotheses of secularization. 
Secularization, Manza and Wright (2003) argue, involves that the importance of 
religion in the lives of individuals is declining, that the social and political influence 
of religious organizations is declining and/or that the engagement in political life 
by religious organizations is declining (2003; 300-301). These secularization 
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processes often lay at the core of hypotheses predicting religious dealignment 
(Broughton and ten Napel 2000; De Graaf et al. 2001; Knutsen 2004, Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). Norris and Inglehart (2004) postulate that: “In recent decades 
(…) as secularization has progressively weakened religious identities in advanced 
industrial societies, we would expect to find that the political impact of 
denominational differences would also play less of a role in party and electoral 
politics”. Investigating survey data from a wide range of industrial and postindustrial 
countries, they conclude that: The pattern documented (…) at both the individual 
and macro-level is broadly consistent with these expectations’ (2004: 211-212). 
On the one hand, secularization hypotheses suggest a decline in the religion-vote 
relationship as a result of rising levels of education and affluence causing voters 
to become less reliant on ‘simple religious heuristics to govern all aspects of their 
lives, including how they vote’ (Manza and Wright 2003: 301). On the other hand, 
declining levels of church attendance are assumed to weaken the capacity of 
churches to influence the voting behavior of their members. Yet, changes in the 
religious structures and secularization processes do not necessarily produce a 
decline religion-vote relationship. Manza and Wright (2003; 313) note that while 
church membership or church attendance may decline, levels of religious voting 
can remain stable among those who remain in church. In this sense, the analogy 
to the third generation class voting hypotheses about social mobility is found 
hypotheses about changing or leaving church. Need (1997) explicitly draws this 
comparison by not only looking at inter- and intragenerational class mobility but 
also at religious mobility in the Netherlands. She finds that those who leave the 
church are more likely to vote for a religious party than second generation 
non-church members.
 Secularization theory is not undisputed in the sociology of religion. Most 
criticized is the assumption that secularization is a universal process and a 
one-way road. Secularization theory assumes that religious involvement weakens 
following a decrease in religious demand. Especially the United States are a 
problematic case for secularization theorists because both religious membership 
and church attendance are found to be high despite relatively high levels of 
affluence. Opposing, so-called ‘supply-side’, theory has argued that religious 
demand is stable over time and countries, but that the level of religious participation 
may vary depending on the level of religious pluralism (cf. Stark and Iannaccone 
1994). In religious diverse ‘markets’ the suppliers of religion, denominations and 
sects, are in mutual competition to attract members. In the United States, unlike 
in Europe, “the absence of a state church has resulted in the flourishing of an 
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unprecedented range of denominations and sects” (Manza and Wright: 302). 
Supply-side theory assumes that religious diversity results in high levels of 
religious involvement. However, empirical tests show little evidence to support 
supply-side theory: in most western societies, churches continue to lose member 
(Aarts 2010).
 Despite the recent critique of religious market theory on secularization in the 
field of sociology of religion, religious voting studies are often almost entirely 
focused on demand-side arguments predicting secularization (Jagodzinski and 
Dobbelaere 1995; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Yet, the evidence for the decline of 
religious voting is, also in Europe, far from close to scholarly consensus. Knusten 
(2004) finds that there is no uniform or clear decline in the relationship between 
religious denomination and party choice in Western Europe. For some specific 
periods the average correlation even increases, and although he finds long-term 
decreases in some countries, Knutsen deems the size of such decline to be small. 
Also Elff (2007, 2009) reject the notion of a universal decline in religious voting: 
“Reports of the death of social cleavages are exaggerated. While the consequences 
of class positions seem to have weakened in some of the countries, the 
consequences of the division between religious and secular people have not” 
(2007: 289). Hypotheses on election-specific fluctuations and reversals in religious 
voting trends, attributed to the mobilizing effort of particular religious organizations, 
are mostly found in studies on American politics (Manza and Brooks 1997; Manza 
and Wright 2003). The religious pluralism of the US also led to the formulation of 
more group-specific hypotheses, like the ‘Catholic Dealignment Thesis’ and the 
‘Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis’ (Manza and Brooks 1997). In 
section 1.3 we will discuss the content of these hypotheses in more detail, and 
compare them to the major hypotheses in the class voting literature. 
 Measures: The fact that religion can be broken down into various aspects not 
only caused diversity in research questions and theoretical approaches, but also 
brought about a wide selection of categorizations and measures of religious 
membership, behavior and belief. Wald and Wilcox (2006) emphasize the 
complexity of measuring religion in political science by establishing that the 
American National Election Study in 2004 had 135 categories of religious 
affiliation, including 18 for Baptists alone. The diversity of the religious structure in 
the US is in sharp contrast to the Protestant state churches in the Nordic countries 
or the dominance of the Catholic Church in Southern Europe. Classifications of 
church membership may therefore strongly vary between studies from different 
countries. There are also large inconsistencies in the way church attendance is 
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measured across studies. Church attendance is often used to measure attachment 
to the church. A lot of cleavage voting studies use a dichotomous measure of 
‘regular church attendance’, but rely on different classification of what counts as 
‘regular’ (e.g. weekly, once a month, or twice a month). Church attendance is 
even more complex because the frequency or religious services may vary between 
denominations (Wald and Wilcox 2006). The frequency of attendance that is 
associated with strong religious attachment may thus differ from one faith to the 
other. More sophisticated, i.e. multicategorical or ordinal, measures are sometimes 
used instead of binary variables. Affiliation and church attendance are indicators 
for respectively religious belonging and behaving. As a third aspect of religion, 
the measurement of religious beliefs is heavily debated in the sociology of religion, 
but it is far less central in studying the religious cleavage in politics. 
 Methods of data analysis: Already in early 20th century the relationship between 
religion and voting behavior was subject to scholarly attention. Like class voting, 
early studies on religion in politics were primarily based on aggregated data of 
single countries or single elections. In 1904 Blank, for example, published an 
ecological analysis the electoral support for the German Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) that aimed to reveal the intervening role of religion in class politics. A similar 
analysis in the Netherlands was conducted by Den Uyl (1951) who investigated 
the association between denomination and party choice in the Dutch 1948 
elections. The advent of election surveys marked the starting point of systematic 
empirical research on religious voting. The study of De Jong (1954) is probably 
the first (cf. Lijphart 1979) cross-national survey-based analysis of voting behavior. 
Investigating a series of cross-tabulations De Jong concludes that “across 
Western Europe there is at least a certain association between religion and political 
choice” (1956: 125). In seeking explanations for differences between countries in 
this association he suggests both individual level (church attendance, religious 
belief) and contextual level (state churches, Catholic hegemony) explanations. 
De Jong therefore not only pioneered in empirical descriptions of religious voting 
in cross-national perspective, but also in addressing explanatory questions. 
 Class voting research has moved away from the examination of cross- 
tabulations a long time ago. In religious voting research there are great differences 
in methods employed to analyze the influence of religious cleavages on voting. 
Cross-tabulations were common in the 1950s and 1960s (De Jong 1954; Scoble 
and Epstein 1964), but are still employed in some very recent studies (Minkenberg 
2010). Also in studying trends recent, prominent comparative studies have 
analyzed religious differences in voting on the basis of percentage differences 
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and bivariate correlation coefficients (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Knutsen 2004). 
Via researchers in Britain (Heath et al. 1985, 1991, 1995) logistic regression 
models and odds ratios found their way from class voting studies to religious 
voting studies in the 1990s (Ultee, Arts and Flap 1992; Manza and Brooks 1997; 
Need 1997). Religious voting research is therefore increasingly connected to the 
third and coming fourth generation of class voting studies (Need 1997; Bean 
1999; De Graaf et al. 2001; Oskarson 2005; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2009). 
1.3. Two perspectives on cleavage voting
In this section we will further discuss the most common hypotheses raised in the 
literature explaining variation in class and religious voting. We will show that the 
same logic is applied in formulating explanations about the decline in religious 
voting as to explaining the decline in class voting, albeit sometimes under the 
guise of different names and labels. With respect to class voting various, more or 
less equivalent, categorizations of explanations can be found across the literature 
(see: Manza et al. 1995; Goldthorpe 1996; Evans 1999; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 
1999; Knutsen 2006). Most of these summaries are mainly concerned with 
explanations in which social changes are the primary source for changes in class 
voting. But next to hypotheses about changes in the attributes, attitudes and 
aptitudes of voters, the class voting literature contains explanations with respect 
to the characteristics of voting, i.e. hypotheses about party strategy, electoral 
appeal and the choices offered to voters (Manza et al. 1995: 146). This distinction 
is most explicitly made by Evans (2000) and Evans and Whitefield (2006) who use 
the term ‘bottom-up perspective’ to refer to all explanations that approach the 
decline in class voting as a consequence of social changes, i.e.: changes in the 
composition of classes and the relative importance of class versus other cleavage 
lines. For explanations that use changes in political choices as the primary source 
for changes in class voting the term ‘top-down’ perspective is adopted. In this 
study we use this distinction, and apply the theoretical insights from both 
perspectives. By discussing hypotheses about religious voting simultaneously 
with hypotheses about class voting we aim to illustrate that ‘bottom-up’ and 
‘top-down’ processes are applicable to both social cleavages. 
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1.3.1 Bottom-up: social change explanations
Social mobility: In class voting research mobility hypotheses involve that the level 
of class voting declined due to increasing inter or intra-generational mobility 
across the boundaries of social classes. Mobile voters are expected adopt a 
middle position between their class of origin and class of destination. Upwardly 
mobile voters are expected to be more right-wing than those who remain in their 
origin class, and more left-wing than those in their destination class. The reverse 
may be expected for downwardly mobile voters (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and 
Heath 1995). With respect to religious voting mobility hypotheses are primarily 
concerned with outflow mobility. The boundaries between those who are in church 
and those who or not are expected weaken because those who leave the church 
are more likely to vote for a religious party than second generation non-church 
members (Need 1997). 
 Heterogenization: Related to mobility is the social structural composition of 
social categories and the heterogenization of specific groups in particular. With 
respect to social class, compositional changes involve transformations in labor 
market structure of advanced industrial economies. As a result of continuing de-
industrialization and market liberalization the share of manual laborers in the 
workforce sharply declined in Western democracies after the Second World War. 
In the same period, the service class grew rapidly in size and became increasingly 
heterogeneous. This is the reason why scholars of the third generation 
distinguished sub-classes within the ‘non-manual class’ and why scholars of the 
fourth generation even further differentiate within the service class. In this respect, 
the distinction between the manual and non-manual class has become less 
relevant due to changing class structures. With respect to religious voting 
compositional changes are primarily concerned with the growth of the secular 
portion of the population. Due to religious outflow the secular group becomes 
more and more heterogeneous; enlarged by first and second generation church 
leavers from various religious origins. For this reason students of religious voting 
differentiated ‘secular voters’ from ‘church leavers’ or included parental religious 
affiliation (Need 1997). In this respect, the distinction between the church members 
and non-members has become less relevant due to changes in the religious 
structure of societies.
  New social divisions: Another type of hypotheses that is put forward to explain 
the decline in cleavage voting is related to the emergence of ‘new’ social divisions. 
Although typically raised in relation to class divisions, both industrial (e.g. class) 
and pre-industrial (e.g. religion) cleavage lines are expected to be replaced or 
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cross-cut by new ‘post-industrial’ cleavages. Various ‘new’ forms of social differ-
entiation have been raised, e.g.: gender, ethnicity, education, sector employment 
or new identity and interest groups. Class and religious voting are expected to 
decline in post-industrial democracies as such new social cleavages are 
increasingly relevant for political interests. 
 Cognitive mobilization: The ‘Cognitive Mobilization Thesis’ implies that voters 
increasingly possess the cognitive skills and resources that enable them to make 
independent political choices without relying on constraining loyalties to political 
parties or specific interest groups (Dalton 2007). Class and religious voting are 
expected to decline as educational expansion and the rise of mass media 
transformed voters from being driven by cleavage-based loyalties into calculative, 
preference- and issue-oriented citizens (Franklin 1985; Inglehart 1990).
 Growing affluence: Rising incomes and improved living standards have 
enhanced the economic security of many voters in advanced industrial 
democracies. In class voting research hypotheses about the consequences of 
growing affluence are known as the ‘Embourgeoisement Thesis’. The working 
class-support for left-wing parties declines because workers increasingly have 
incomes, living standards and consumption patterns that overlap with those of 
the middle class and they no longer need to struggle to improve their economic 
situation. (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechfofer and Platt 1968; Knutsen 2006). In 
religious voting research a similar line of reasoning is employed to explain the 
narrowing of differences in voting behavior between Catholics and Protestants in 
the US. This ‘Catholic Dealignment Thesis’ states that Catholic voters are shifting 
away from the Democratic Party as they become more affluent over time, matching 
or even surpassing the economic position of Protestants (Manza and Brooks 
1997). Moreover, increasing economic security may also have undermined the 
importance of religious values (Inglehart 1990; Dogan 1995). General 
secularization theory therefore suggests a decrease of religious voting among all 
religious categories as economic security increases. 
 Cultural conflict: Hypotheses about cultural conflict often emphasize the 
importance of value change and the rise of ‘new’ attitudinal cleavages as opposed 
to ‘old’ social-structural cleavages. In the literature this ‘New Politics Thesis’ 
builds upon two arguments to explain the decline in class voting. First, the rise of 
a materialist/post-materialist dimension has increased the concern for ‘new’ 
political issues such as democratization, civil rights and environmental protection 
among the middle class. Traditional left-right class voting declined because of 
middle class realignment away from right-wing parties to ‘new left’ parties. The 
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primary source for such realignment is so-called ‘middle class radicalism’. As a 
counter-reaction, some portion of the working class may has shifted to right-wing 
parties to reaffirm the traditional emphasis on material values (Knutsen 2006). 
 Second, the advent of cultural issues in politics has evoked the rise of ‘new 
right’ parties that appealed to working class voters on non-economic issues, 
such as anti-immigration, anti multiculturalism, nationalism and law and order. In 
either way, new non-economic conflict weakens the class basis of traditional 
left-right divisions. The emergence of cultural conflicts has also led to the 
formulation of new hypotheses with respect to religious voting. The most prominent 
is the ‘Culture Wars Thesis’, based on conflicts in the US over social morality and 
ethical issues, e.g.: family values, gay rights, evolutionary biology and abortion. 
This argument is however used to explain both decrease and increase in religious 
voting. On the one hand, growing concern about moral issues is expected to 
further intradenominational conflict, therefore breaking down traditional 
denominational alignments. This also taps into the ‘Liberal/Mainline Protestant 
Dealignment Thesis’, which identifies the shifts among liberal Protestants, 
characterized by dropping levels of regular church attendance, as the primary 
source of decline in religious voting in the US (Manza and Brooks 1997). On the 
other hand, cultural conflicts may have increased political divisions by lining up 
religious conservatives of all denominations against both religious liberals and 
secular voters (cf. Manza and Wright 2003). 
  
1.3.2 Top-down: political choice explanations
Electoral Trade-off: Parties are unable to successfully appeal to all groups in 
society, and they therefore adopt a trade-off strategy in appealing to different 
groups of voters. Hypotheses in class voting research about the consequences 
of party strategy are often built on what has become known as the ‘Dilemma of 
Electoral Socialism’ (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Left-wing parties face an 
electoral dilemma if they want to win elections: Since their core constituency, the 
working class, is an electoral minority left-wing parties must seek support from 
the middle class as well. Following this reasoning, the electoral dilemma causes 
class voting to decline in two ways. First, the working class is shrinking in size, 
and class voting declines as far as working class parties succeed in compensating 
this decline by attracting members from other social classes. Second, as left-wing 
parties extend their appeal they undermine class identity and discourage 
class-based appeals in politics as a whole. Socialist parties become the parties 
of workers as individuals not as a collectivity. “Workers are no longer mobilized as 
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workers but as consumers, taxpayers, parents, economic prosperity, ‘the poor’, 
‘the [hard working, own addition] people’, ect.” (Sainsbury 1990: 31; Knutsen 
2006: 8). The rise of new issues on the political agenda may have reinforced this 
process. In endeavoring to be more inclusive left-wing parties may appeal to the 
non-material values of the new middle class. In turn they estrange themselves 
from workers that do not share the cultural liberal middle class-values. 
 The same logic may be applied to religious voting. Kalyvas (1996) has 
translated the electoral dilemma to the consequences of the electoral strategy of 
confessional parties in the nineteenth century. Historically, confessional parties 
gave emphasis to religious issues. But their religious nature hindered Christian 
Democrats to successfully mobilize non-religious voters. In order to maximize the 
numbers of votes Christian parties had to deemphasize religion without destroying 
the confessional character of the party. This ‘Confessional Dilemma’ led Christian 
parties to redefine the position of religion in politics. They broke their organizational 
dependence on the Church, and reinterpreted their electoral appeal by replacing 
specific and detailed religious doctrines by general and abstract moral values. 
From this view religious voting thus declines as Confessional parties extend their 
appeal beyond their core constituency of religious voters (Kalyvas 1996: 
242-244). 
 Party system convergence: A second, though related, set of explanations for 
changes in cleavage voting concerns the relative positions of political parties with 
respect to class-related or religion-related policy issues. The emphasis here is on 
the difference between the main party choices that voters face. In their landmark 
publication The American Voter Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960: 
364) write that casting a class vote is more likely if voters ‘perceive that differences 
exist between parties that are relevant to class interest’. Class interests are 
associated with the degree of left-right polarization. Polarization is large when 
parties adopt different, distinguishable positions with respect to socio-economic 
policies. It is hypothesized that class voting declines as parties converge towards 
the political centre, and the socio-economic differences narrow between the 
major leftist and rightist parties. Contrary, programmatic divergence (or growing 
political polarization), may increase the levels of class voting. Political campaigns 
may revive old loyalties and re-engage differentiation between groups in society. 
As class-relevant, economic issues are more salient this may give rise to political 
polarization and reveal underlying differences between classes (Weakliem 1993: 
386). Party strategy, programmatic polarization and electoral appeals may 
therefore not only be used to explain a decline, but also temporary fluctuations or 
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increases in the class-vote relationship. When translated to religion it can be 
hypothesized that the levels of religious voting are correlated with the degree of 
polarization on traditional moral policies (Oskarson 2005). The religion-vote 
relationship is expected to decline as confessional parties narrow the differences 
with secular parties by de-emphasizing particular moral issues. In American 
research on religious voting, hypotheses on political strategy have been raised to 
explain increases in the political alignment of conservative Protestants in the late 
1970s/ early 1980s and late 1990s/ early 2000s. The ‘Christian Right Thesis’ 
attributes the reinforcement of the linkages between Evangelicals and the 
Republican Party in these periods to the rise of moral issues on the political 
agenda, the candidacy of openly religious candidates like Ronald Reagan, Pat 
Robertson and George W. Bush, and organized efforts to mobilize Evangelicals 
by Christian Right organizations (Manza and Brooks 1997: 42-43; Claassen and 
Povtak 2010: 13). 
1.3.3 Towards a bottom-up and top-down design 
In this study we are not able to test all major hypotheses mentioned above. 
Especially the lack of relevant variables on voters’ characteristics restricts our 
ability to test specific hypotheses in the category of ‘bottom-up’ explanations. We 
will therefore use the theoretical insights of various explanations to derive a more 
general expectation about the influence of social changes on the level of cleavage 
voting. We expect social groups, whether class or religious categories, to lose 
their distinctiveness as social mobility, compositional changes, educational 
expansion, value changes and the rise of new political issues have eroded the 
divisions between them. We expect that this process, in subsequent chapters 
referred to as ‘the blurring cleavage boundaries’ diminishes the relevance of 
traditional class and religious conflict for voters’ political choices. 
 ‘Top-down’ explanations differ from ‘bottom-up’ explanations in two ways: 
First, most ‘bottom-up’ explanations implicitly assume that political changes are 
reflections of social changes. Political parties are supposed to respond to 
changing social circumstances: As traditional group boundaries are blurring, or 
as particular social groups shrink in size it is expected that the cleavage-based 
parties adjust their strategy and broaden their appeal. From this line of reasoning 
‘bottom-up’ changes determine both the political strategy of parties and the 
voting behavior of individuals. Contrary to this sociological determinist perspective 
‘top-down’ explanations use political changes as the primary source for changes 
in cleavage voting. Sartori (1969: 84), as an early influential advocate of the 
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‘top-down’ perspective, argues that the politicization of class divisions by parties 
produces class consciousness rather than the other way around. And although 
Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argue that political parties respond to social 
changes, their electoral dilemma implies that the voting behavior of individuals is 
influenced by the party strategy rather than by class conditions. From the 
‘top-down’ perspective - as was also a central feature in the Lipset-Rokkan 
cleavage model of party system formation - political and social factors interact to 
produce the social basis of voter alignment. Political changes are thus contributions 
towards, rather than simply reflections of changes political cleavages. Second, 
‘bottom-up’ processes often assume that the decline in cleavage voting is 
relatively gradual as well as unidirectional. Changes in party strategy, electoral 
appeals or programmatic polarization imply that the importance of social 
cleavages for party choice can increase as well as decrease. Explanations for 
more time-specific changes and possible reversals in cleavage voting may 
therefore be attributed to changes in the political circumstances under which 
voting takes place, rather than to sociological conditions. In the next section we 
will formulate the research questions of this study. Theoretically we will draw 
hypotheses based on the premise that political factors may have an autonomous 
influence on the levels of cleavage-based voting additional to the effect of social 
changes. To test our hypotheses we rely on different data analysis strategies. In 
the next section we therefore also pay attention to measurements procedures, 
data collections and analysis techniques used in various chapters. 
   
1.4 Plan of the book 
1.4.1 Research questions and data analysis strategy 
By reviewing the literature in political sociology, we transposed class voting and 
stratification research to the study of religious voting. On the one hand we have 
shown that the precision of research questions, hypotheses, measures and 
methods in class voting research promises the rise of a new generation. On the 
other hand, we demonstrated that the empirical developments in class voting 
studies are increasingly applied in studying religious voting. By categorizing the 
major hypotheses for class and religion voting simultaneously we showed that 
there are overarching theoretical mechanisms behind how social structure and 
political choices produce variation in cleavage-based voting. However, the review 
has also shown that the emerging fourth generation of class voting research 
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raises new or unresolved theoretical and empirical questions, and that in terms of 
comparability the research on religious voting is not yet of the same generation 
as the research on class voting. Because of the lack of integration of the two 
research traditions, and because the fourth generation of class voting research 
has not yet fully crystallized some important questions remain understudied or 
require more stringent empirical tests. 
 The following chapters are used to answer specific questions about 
cross-national and over-time variation in class and religious voting in Western 
democracies. To improve on previous research problems theoretically as well as 
empirically we subdivide the book into two parts. The first part consists of 
large-scale comparative investigations of cleavage voting in up to 15 modern 
democracies in Western Europe, the United States and Australia in the period 
1960-2008. Using more data than previous studies we are able to make better 
generalized inferences about the variation in class and religious voting from a 
cross-national and over time perspective. For this purpose we have constructed 
a new large-scale dataset, the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV) 
which provides the richest source of pooled individual-level surveys on the 
relations between social position and political choices available for Western 
countries in the post-war period. As we will discuss later, this comparative 
approach has some drawbacks with respect to the level of detail at the respondent 
level and with the availability of comparable variables across surveys. 
 In the second part of the book we therefore examine trends in cleavage voting 
in one country, i.e.: the Netherlands. For this purpose we use data from the Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) between 1971 and 2006. We focus on the 
Netherlands because there are survey data available for elections over a long 
period in which both the societal and the political circumstances have changed 
considerably. As in many other advanced industrial countries the Dutch 
occupational structure transformed as de-industrialization progressed and the 
service sector grew in size. Dutch society has also rapidly secularized: Both 
church attendance and denominational membership rates substantially dropped 
in the period under study. Moreover, during this period there were remarkable 
changes in the political landscape of the Netherlands. Using more detailed 
measures and more sophisticated analyses techniques than previous studies 
(including part I of this book) we further investigate whether changes in cleavage 
voting can be explained by ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ changes. In this thesis we 
will therefore answer two central research questions:
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(1) To what extent are there cross-national and over-time differences in Western 
democracies in the relative influence of social class and religion on voting?
(2) To what extent are social and political changes able to explain (a) the levels of 
and changes in class voting in Western democracies and (b) trends in class 
and religious voting in the Netherlands?
 
1.4.2 Part I: Cleavage voting in comparative perspective
For the international comparative part of this book we constructed an integrated 
dataset of 196 national surveys. Half of these surveys were originally integrated in 
the International Social Mobility and Politics (ISMP) file (Nieuwbeerta 1995; 
Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom 1996). The ISMP-file contains individual information 
on social class and voting behavior in 16 democracies in Western Europe, North 
America and Australia from 1956 to 1990. For our research we have updated the 
ISMP-file and improved the scope of analysis: We nearly doubled the number of 
surveys, and extended the number of years included for most countries. The 
ISMP file contained only ten countries for which the information covered more 
than ten years, and only five countries covering a period longer than twenty years. 
For three countries the file even included only one survey, and in four countries 
only two. Given these limitations Evans (1999c) for example doubted the general-
izability of the finding that class voting declined in most countries (Nieuwbeerta 
and De Graaf 1999). In our updated file all countries have at least five included 
surveys and cover at least a twenty-year period. In ten countries there is information 
covering thirty years or more, and in two countries even forty years or more. We 
exclude Canada and Ireland from our file because there is only a single survey 
available for Canada (CES 1984) and two for Ireland (ISSP 1989, 1990), and we 
are unable to integrate additional surveys for these countries. Moreover, only four 
out of 113 surveys integrated in the ISMP-file are from Catholic countries in 
Southern Europe (three from Italy and one from France). In this book we aim not 
only to improve the generalized inferences with respect to class voting, but also 
to examine comparative patterns of religious voting. For this purpose we added 
more data from countries outside northwest Europe and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. In our updated file we in total included nine surveys for both France 
and Italy, and expanded the file with nine other surveys from Spain.
 In total, we used 105 out of the 113 surveys from the ISMP file, and added 91 
national surveys for 15 countries. The newly constructed dataset, which we label 
the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting, contains information on Australia, 
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Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (former West-) Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the 
United States between 1960 and 2008 (Table 1.2., see appendix A.1 for the 
original data sources). The scope of the CDCV-file in terms of period and countries 
covered is uniquely rich for data on the social bases of politics. However, the 
expansion of the ISMP file comes at the cost of the number of included variables. 
Unlike Nieuwbeerta we did not restrict ourselves to surveys containing information 
about both individual and parental (i.e. fathers’) social class. Because we updated 
the ISMP-file for respondent’s individual variables only we are not able to address 
questions about the effect of social mobility on voting behavior. We also allowed 
a lower level of detail measuring the social class position of respondents. 
Additional variables on the socio-economic characteristics of voters (e.g. income, 
home ownership, employment sector) are neither consistently available in the 
ISMP-file nor in all surveys added here. Moreover, also information on religion is 
not consistently available in all surveys. Therefore only 125 out of 196 surveys in 
our updated file contain sufficient information on church attendance and/or 
church membership. Given the discrepancy between the availability of information 
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Table 1.2   Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV)
Country Period Number of surveys
Australia 1965 – 2004 15
Austria 1974 – 2003 7
Belgium 1975 – 2003 5
Denmark 1971 – 2001 13
Finland 1972 – 2003 6
France 1967 – 2007 9
Germany 1969 – 2005 23
Italy 1968 – 2006 9
The Netherlands 1970 – 2006 20
Norway 1965 – 2001 10
Spain 1979 – 2008 9
Sweden 1972 – 2002 11
Switzerland 1971 – 2003 10
United Kingdom 1964 – 2005 17
United States 1960 – 2004 32
Total 1960 – 2008 196
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on social class and religion we are not able to make use of the full range of the 
CDCV dataset in all chapters of part I of this book. 
 In chapter 2 we aim to connect the trends in class voting with trends on 
religious voting. We therefore only make use of the 125 surveys in the CDCV-file 
which include sufficient information on both class and religion. Still, this 13-country 
analysis provides the largest simultaneous comparison of trends in class and 
religious voting available in the literature. We begin this chapter with an extensive 
overview of literature about the relative influence of class and religion on voting. 
We will show that it is difficult to compare results across studies because there 
are large differences in the way cleavages are measured and how their influence 
on voting is analyzed: Class and religious divisions are measured on the basis of 
different contrasts, categorizations and indicators across studies. The dependent 
variables are often too country-specific to compare internationally. And, above all, 
there is large diversity in the criteria that are used to determine the strength of a 
cleavage. The aim of this chapter is to systematically analyze cross-national 
differences and trends in the magnitude and hierarchy of class and religion as 
social bases of voting behavior in thirteen countries. But unlike the few previous 
studies comparing the magnitude of cleavage voting we uniformly measure 
cleavage-strength based on a multi-category typology of cleavages and parties, 
focus on the relative influence of religion vs. social class, and model changes in 
the effects of class and religion simultaneously. Moreover, we measure cleavage 
strength using appropriate and comparable measures across countries and time, 
the kappa-index. And we compare our results on cleavage strength with the 
differences in explained variance contributed by religion and social class. Further 
details about the operationalization and analysis techniques are discussed in 
chapter 2.
 In chapter 3 we shift from descriptive to explanatory questions. In order to 
make use of a broader range of surveys in the CDCV-file we only focus on class 
voting. Most previous studies that explain the class-vote relationship have often 
focused on ‘bottom-up’ social factors, but paid little attention to ‘top-down’ 
political factors. In this chapter we estimate the impact of the Left-Right positions 
of parties on the class-vote association through a Two-Step Hierarchical analysis 
of integrated data from 15 countries in Western Europe, the United States and 
Australia (1960-2005) supplemented with data from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP datasets are based 
on content analyses of election programs of political parties contesting in national 
elections. The quantity and direction of statements by parties, measured in 
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(‘quasi’)sentences in a program, are classified in 56 policy categories over seven 
policy domains (i.e. external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, 
economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups). Party 
positions in each country are matched to the individual level data on the basis of 
the corresponding election year or the last preceding election. To test our 
hypotheses we select all surveys from the CDCV-file in period for which manifesto 
data is available. This results in a selection of 188 surveys between 1960-2003 
(2004 for the US, 2005 for the UK). In this chapter, instead of reporting the strength 
of class voting as an aggregate kappa-index, we present the log-odds ratios of 
voting left-wing for three classes relative to the manual class. Next, we test cross-
nationally the two versions of the ‘top-down’ thesis as we discussed earlier. The 
first concerns the effect of the ideological position of left-wing parties on the level 
of class voting. The second version involves the differences between the 
ideological positions of various parties, and is concerned with the effect of party 
polarization on the level of class voting between and within countries. In doing so, 
this chapter provides an important step towards expanding the examination of 
cleavage change beyond ‘bottom-up’ processes to those involving the relevance 
of the choices that parties provide for voters.
1.4.3 Part II: Trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands
In the second part of this book we examine class and religious voting in the 
Netherlands. For this purpose we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 
2006. We use information from 11 elections (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N=1.526], 
1977 [N=1.856], 1981 [N=2.305], 1982 [N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 
[N=1.745], 1994 [N=1.812], 1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). 
We excluded the 2003-survey because for that survey no data on occupational 
codings were available. In order to improve on third generation class voting 
research we require detailed information on respondent occupation to use a more 
differentiated measure of social class. The availability of four-digit ISCO scores 
(or CBS84 occupational classifications) allows us to use a modified version of the 
EGP class schema (Güveli 2006). With respect to the surveys of 1989, 1994, and 
2006 we obtained the most reliable and detailed codings directly from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics in Heerlen (the Netherlands). Next to information on social 
class we also harmonized the variables in the 11 DPES-surveys with respect 
to church membership, church attendance, economic ideology, education, 
party choice and some social background characteristics. We supplement the 
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integrated DPES-surveys by data of the Comparative Manifesto Project for Dutch 
political parties. The central question of this part of the book is to what extent 
changes in cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands since the 1970s can be 
explained by social and political changes?
 In chapter 4 we examine trends in class voting in the Netherlands. Again, we 
especially focus on the effects of political changes on the class-vote association. 
Using multinomial logistic models, more years and better differentiated measures 
of social class and party choice, we reexamine De Graaf et al.’s (2001) question 
whether the emergence of GreenLeft led to any class realignment. Next, using 
conditional logistic regression models we examine the interaction between the 
party positions and social class. We aim to test whether class voting in the 
Netherlands is affected by changes in party’s ‘old’ social-economic positions and 
‘new’ conservative-progressive positions. We set out to examine these ‘top-down’ 
changes after accounting for the ‘bottom-up’ process of blurring class boundaries. 
To account for the heterogenization of the service class we differentiate between a 
‘new’ class of social and cultural specialists and an ‘old’ class of technocrats within 
the service class of the traditional EGP class schema (Güveli 2006). 
 A similar strategy is adopted in chapter 5 with respect to examining changes 
in religious-based voting in the Netherlands. Also in this chapter we investigate 
two types of changes in political choices in the Netherlands. First, we build on 
previous research that demonstrated that there was an abrupt decline in religious 
voting in the Netherlands after the merging of the three main denominational 
parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) (cf. De Graaf et al. 2001). 
Because we investigate a longer time trend we are also able to investigate the 
consequences a more recent political merger in 2002; that of two minor Protestant 
parties into the ChristianUnion. In doing so, we examining time-specific changes 
in the strength of religious voting that coincide with the changes in the party 
system. Second, we include direct measures of party positions in order to account 
for parties’ moral traditionalism using the Comparative Manifesto Data. We again 
employ conditional logistic regression analyses to examine the interaction 
between the party positions and religious denomination and church attendance. 
We investigate the effects of these political changes after accounting for the 
‘bottom-up’ process of blurring religious boundaries. Instead of simply inferring 
societal homogenization between religious and irreligious voters we test whether 
trends in religious voting are interpreted by weakening church attendance and 
growing effects of education. 
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1.4.4 Overview
In sum, this thesis consists of four empirical chapters. The two chapters in the first 
part of the book involve cross-national comparisons of trends in cleavage-based 
voting. Chapter 2 investigates the relative importance of social class versus 
religion on voting behavior in 13 countries between 1960 and 2008. Chapter 3 is 
mainly concerned with the impact of ‘top-down’ factors on the class-vote 
association in 15 countries between 1960 and 2005. In the remaining two empirical 
chapters we study trends in cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands. In this 
second part of the book address the question to what extent the changes in 
cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands in the period 1971-2006 are explained 
by ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’ factors. Chapter 4 investigates over-time 
variation in class voting in the Netherlands, and chapter 5 investigates over-time 
variation in religious voting. In table 1.3 we summarize the organization of the 
empirical chapters: the key questions, explanations, measures, analysis 
techniques and data sources. 
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Cleavage Voting in Comparative Perspective
Part I |

Revisiting Lijphart’s Crucial Experiment *
A Comparison of the Relative Infl uence of Class and Religion on Party Choice 
in 13 Modern Democracies, 1960 – 2008.
 *  A slightly different version of this chapter was presented at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology, 
July 16 2010: Gothenburg, Sweden. Co-authors are Ariana Need, Nan Dirk de Graaf and Wout Ultee. 
Chapter 2|

55
2. 1 Introduction
‘Social class is clearly no more than a secondary and subsidiary influence of party 
choice, and it can become a factor of importance only in the absence of potent 
rivals such as religion and language’ (Lijphart 1979: 53). More than three decades 
have passed since Lijphart presented this conclusion. This conclusion was 
derived from his ‘crucial experiment’ on cleavage politics studying the impact of 
religious divisions, linguistic divisions and class divisions on voting in a 
four-country comparison (Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland) where 
these cleavages were simultaneously present. Although Lijphart was not the first 
to suggest that religious divisions are more important for voting than social class 
(Sartori 1969; Rose and Urwin 1969; Converse 1974), he pioneered in systematically 
addressing this question in terms of a hierarchy between social cleavages. 
 Lijphart (1979: 53) interprets the relative importance of religion over social 
class by stressing that religious divisions are accompanied by ‘primordial’ 
communal loyalties stemming from a pre-industrial age. Several studies have 
referred to Lijphart’s claims to emphasize the enduring relevance of religion in 
contemporary politics (Broughton and Rudd 1984; Breen and Hayes 1997; 
McDonough, Shin and Moisés 1998; White and McAllister 2000; Liddle and Mujani 
2007). Above all, Lijphart’s study contributed to establishing the idea that religious 
divisions generally outweigh class divisions (e.g. Schubert 1980; Bakvis 1981; 
Zuckerman 1982; Ragsdale 1983; Jennings 1984; Inglehart 1988; Kim and Ohn 
1992; Weakliem and Biggert 1999; Ventura 2001; Belanger and Eagles 2006; 
Reed 2007). Although his experiment is often cited, surprisingly few studies have 
followed Lijphart’s lead in addressing the question on the relative influence of 
class and religion on voting. There are however good grounds to do so.
 First, with reference to Sartori (1969) Lijphart portrays the strength of social class 
as depending on a society’s religious divide. ‘Class is a major determinant of voting 
behavior only if no other cleavage happens to be present’ (Sartori 1969: 76). 
Consequently, the relevance of class voting is conditional upon the presence or 
absence of religious divisions. However, this condition may be too demanding. There 
is almost certainly no country, not even in the “secularized” West where religious 
differences are entirely non-existent. Even in the predominantly Protestant countries 
of Northern Europe and in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe there are 
differences among voters in their religiosity and church attendance. In this chapter 
we therefore examine to what extent stronger effects of class on voting are associated 
with weaker effects of church membership and church attendance on voting. 
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 Second, after Lijphart compared four countries using 1970s data, new data 
allowing a more stringent test of the hierarchy between class and religion have 
become available. Since Lijphart put forward his study of what he called the 
‘prime determinants of party choice’ (1979: 43) many scholars have used these 
new data to demonstrate that the role of social class is waning in contemporary 
modern democracies (Clark and Lipset 1991; Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995). 
A universal downward trend in religious voting is empirically however less 
clear-cut. Comparative studies have presented evidence for stable associations 
between religious divisions and party choice in Western Europe (Knutsen 2004; 
Elff 2007) or recently even reported a slight increase of the effect of religion on 
party choice (Van der Brug, Hobolt and De Vreese 2009). 
 Third, despite the persistent and widespread scholarly attention for the 
magnitude of class and religious-based voting, there has been little systematic 
attention for questions on the hierarchy between social cleavages. In this chapter 
we will start by reviewing the literature in order to show that it is difficult to compare 
results across studies because there are large differences in the way cleavages 
are measured and how their influence on voting is analyzed: First, class divisions 
are measured on the basis of different class contrasts and different class schemas 
or derived from related variables such as union membership, class identification 
and income. And whereas religious divisions are sometimes measured on the 
basis of church membership, other studies use church attendance or religious 
beliefs. Second, the dependent variable, what party contrast(s) is/are studied, are 
often too country-specific to compare internationally. Third, there is, above all, 
large diversity in the criteria that are used to determine the strength of a cleavage, 
i.e.; explained variance, Alford-index, beta-coefficients, sheaf-coefficients, (log) 
odds ratios, kappa-index. Our review shows that the study of Brooks, Nieuwbeerta 
and Manza (2006) is among few studies to systematically investigate variation in 
the impact of class and religion on party choice for six countries over long time 
period. 
 Brooks et al. (2006) argue that most previous studies assess the relevance of 
social cleavages for voting by considering modest numbers of over-time and 
cross national comparisons, often focusing on single country cases investigating 
one particular cleavage and ignoring the possibility that changes in one cleavage 
may be related to changes in other cleavages. To a large extent they overcome 
such limitations by analyzing comparable survey data from six Western countries 
in the period 1964-1998. For each country Brooks et al. simultaneously modeled 
changes in the impact of the class and religious cleavage. Using the kappa-index 
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(Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995) they systematically measured the magnitude of 
the cleavages, and thus were able to compare their relative weight across 
countries and time.
 Brooks et al. cross-nationally compare cleavage strength based on a 
multi-category typology of cleavages with multinomial logistic regression models. 
Their study, therefore, is an important contribution to the literature on cleavage 
voting. We intend to improve on this line of research in four ways. First, we extend 
the analysis to a larger pool of countries. We examine the effects of social class 
and religion on party choice in thirteen modern democracies in the period 
1960-2008: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, (former West-) Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the 
United States. For this purpose we constructed the Comparative Dataset on 
Cleavage Voting (cdcv). This new file is a large source of pooled surveys with 
multi-category variables of social class, religion and party choice1, available for 
Western countries since the 1960s. We constructed this file by updating the 
International Social Mobility and Politics file (Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom 1996). 
Second, the CDCV-file enables us to differentiate between two aspects of religious 
division: church membership and church attendance. Third, we systematically 
and more elaborately than in previous studies model a vast amount of scenarios 
of cleavage change to evaluate the interrelationship in class and religious voting, 
and changes therein. And fourth, we will not only report the kappa-index to 
measure cleavage strength, we will also compare these results with the contributed 
proportion of variance explained by social class and rel igion. As we will discuss 
later, using explained variance as the decisive criterion to determine which 
cleavage is more important can lead to different conclusions than with evaluations 
of indices derived from regression coefficients. 
 Finally, we argue that our country-sample and the distinction we make between 
church membership and church attendance allow more generalized inferences 
about the relative influence of class and religion on voting compared to previous 
studies. The scope of our analyses is not only uniquely rich in terms of countries 
and period covered, the thirteen countries in our study are also good cases to 
test the relative influence of religion and social class on party choice. Class 
differences are rooted in the contrast between workers and owners and arose 
from transformations in the occupational structure during the Industrial Revolution 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The origin of class divisions across our (post-)industrial 
democracies is therefore similar. Religious cleavages in the West can generally 
be traced back to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation which brought about 
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different religious structures across Europe (and indirectly in the New World). 
Brooks et al. (2006) presented evidence from five predominantly protestant and 
religious-mixed countries (Australia, Britain, Germany, Netherlands and the United 
States) but only one Catholic country (Austria). They concluded that religion 
outweighs class in only two countries, the Netherlands and the US, and not in 
Australia, Austria, Britain and Germany. In this chapter we extend the analysis 
with four extra traditionally Catholic countries (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain), 
two Protestant Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden) and an additional religious 
mixed country (Switzerland). 
 In sum, in this chapter we will investigate to what extent there are cross-national 
and over-time differences in Western democracies in the level of and change in 
the influence of social class and religion on voting. Ultimately we aim to answer 
two central questions with respect to the strength of the class cleavage relative to 
the strength of the religious cleavage, and the changes therein. (1) To what extent 
is a strong class-vote relationship in a country accompanied by a weak religion-vote 
relationship? (2) To what extent are the differences between the strength of the 
religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship in countries declining, 
increasing or stable? In the next section we present an overview of previous 
research concerning the relative influence of class and religion on party choice. 
In section 2.3 we discuss the scope of our pooled dataset and the measurement 
of class, religion and party choice. In section 2.4, using multinomial logistic 
regression models we analyze for each country separately over time changes in 
class and religious voting. Section 2.5 discusses the central conclusions with 
respect to the strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength of the religious 
cleavage.
2.2 Social Class or Religion: What do we know?
2.2.1 Lijphart’s experiment in the literature 
We examined all studies that cite Lijphart (1979) to assess whether they test the 
dominance of religion over class. In total we consider the results of 68 studies2 in 
the period 1979 to 2010. Only 9 of these studies report findings which shed light 
on the relative impact of class versus religion in (post-) industrial societies. The 
most relevant findings with respect to the 13 countries in this chapter are discussed 
below in order of publication. We in particular report the operationalization of 
social class and religion and the measurement of cleavage strength.
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 McDonough, Pina and Barnes (1981) and McDonough, Barnes and Pina 
(1988), comparing beta weights, suggest that political choices in Spain in the 
early 1980s are more strongly determined by religiosity - measured as church 
attendance - than by subjective class identity. Eisinga, Felling and Lammers 
(1994) study the log-odds ratios of religious denominations and income groups 
on party preferences in the Netherlands (1964-1992). They show that religious 
denomination was more important to predict party choice than income. However, 
Eisinga et al. demonstrate that both the effect of religion and the effect of income 
declined over time. Heath, De Graaf and Need (1997) investigate the British 1992 
elections and report a stronger effect of class (5-class schema) compared to 
denomination (6 categories) in England. With respect to the association between 
religion and voting (measured as kappa-indices) in US presidential elections 
(1960-1992) Manza and Brooks (1997) find that the religious political cleavage 
declined in magnitude. With reference to their other findings on cleavage voting 
(Brooks and Manza 1997) they conclude that the effect of religion on voting is 
twice the size of the class effect (1997: 73). Comparing the social bases of voting 
in Britain and the US between 1992 and 2000 Andersen and Heath (2003) find 
that whereas class has a strong effect in Britain, the regression coefficients of 
class in the US are hardly significant. 
 As mentioned, contrarily to most other studies Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and 
Manza (2006: 109) do not find that the impact of religion (protestant vs. catholic 
vs. non-affiliation) on party choice measured as kappa-indices is generally larger 
than the impact of social class (5-class schema). They find that the class cleavage 
is typically larger than the religious cleavage in Australia (1965-98), Austria 
(1974-95), Britain (1964-97) and Germany (1969-98), but that religion is stronger 
in the US (1964-98) and the Netherlands (1970-98). Contrarily to Lijphart they 
suggest that class voting may condition religious voting instead of the other way 
around: ‘declining class divisions may encourage individual voters to distinguish 
among parties on the basis of other social identities such as religion or gender’ 
(2006: 93). 
 McAllister and White (2007) investigate the importance of social cleavages in 
20 democracies. They measure religious and class divisions respectively as 
affiliation vs. non-affiliation and worker vs. owner. They report the relative weight 
of these contrasts on the basis of their share in the proportion of explained 
variance predicting left-right self-placement. McAllister and White show that class 
adds more to the explained variance than religion in Sweden, Switzerland, 
Australia, the US and Britain). In the Netherlands class and religion contribute 
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about equally to the proportion of explained variance. In Belgium, and Germany 
the effect of religion adds more to the explained variance than class. McAllister 
and White’s findings demonstrate that using explained variance as the decisive 
criterion to determine which cleavage is more important can lead to different 
conclusions than when regression coefficients are evaluated. As Heath et al. 
(1997) pointed out minority groups can produce large regression coefficients but 
may contribute little to the explained variance. 
2.2.2 Findings on class and religion in thirteen countries
Next, we more closely examine the thirteen countries in this chapter. Most studies 
do not explicitly aim to assess whether religion or class is more important for 
party choice. Nevertheless, we will try to identify whether social class and religion 
are relevant cleavages in each country, whether or not they retained their initial 
impact on vote choice and whether such changes caused the dominance of 
either class or religion to diminish.
 In Australia class and religion were both influential in shaping the political 
party system. Typically, social class is identified as being more important for 
Australian politics than religion (McAllister 1992; Kelley and Evans 1995; Charnock 
1997). But, especially class differences are weakening and evidence suggests 
that gap between the religious cleavage and the class cleavage has narrowed 
over time (Bean 1999; Brooks et al. 2006). 
 In Austria the image is somewhat mixed. On the basis of late-1980s survey 
data Kelley and Evans (1995: 173) conclude that not class but religion is the most 
striking political difference in Austria. However, as mentioned earlier, Brooks et al. 
(2006) find that in general the class cleavage is larger than the religious cleavage 
in Austrian politics (1974-95). Furthermore, their analysis demonstrates that the 
difference between the two cleavages is not particularly large. But they argue that 
the class cleavage neither increased nor decreased, whereas religious voting 
slightly declines, mainly due to the 1995-survey.
 In Belgium the hierarchy between social class and religion ends in favor of the 
religious cleavage. Not only Lijphart (1979) concluded that religion emerged as 
the strongest factor, but Hill (1974) and Knutsen (1988) reached the same 
conclusion. Moreover, Knutsen (2004) showed that the association between 
religious denomination and party choice in Belgium is quite stable and that 
long-term decreases are small. 
 Also in France the association between religious denomination and party 
choice is fairly stable (Knutsen 2004). Several studies have argued that religion is 
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a prominent determinant of party choice in France, and is more important that 
social class (Lewis-Beck 1984; Knutsen 1988). Lewis-Beck and Skalaban (1992) 
demonstrate that the relative importance of religion and class is stable over time, 
and that the impact of religion in French elections is generally twice as large as 
the impact of social class. 
 Although research on Germany consistently identified the religious cleavage 
as relatively more important than social class (Janowitz and Segal 1967, Knutsen 
1988; Kelley and Evans 1995; Oskarson 2005) Brooks et al. (2006) deem the class 
cleavage to be generally more important than the religious cleavage, although the 
differences between the two cleavages in their analysis are small. Nevertheless, 
both Oskarson and Brooks et al., show that in the long run especially the 
importance of class has declined somewhat whereas religious voting remained 
stable. 
 In the 1960s religion and class were of crucial importance in Italian politics 
(Mackie, Mannheimer and Sani 1992). With respect to the relative impact of both 
cleavages Hazelrigg (1970) suggested that the association between religion and 
political orientation was twice as strong as the association between class and 
political orientation. The trends reported by Bellucci and Heath (2007) in Italy 
(1968-2006) suggest that the magnitude of the religious cleavage, although 
declining, was far stronger than the class cleavage until the 1990s. It has been 
found that after the collapse of the Christian Democratic party (dc) in 1994 there 
was a large and sudden decline of the effect of religion on voting (Segatti and 
Vezzoni 2008) eventually nullifying the dominance of religion over class in 2006 
(Bellucci and Heath 2007).
 In the Netherlands it has been systematically found that religion is more 
important than social class (Knutsen 1988; Oskarson 2005; Brooks et al. (2006). 
According to De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) both the influence of social class 
and religion on party choice declined since the 1970s. As in Italy, this decline can 
partially be attributed to party changes. De Graaf et al. show that the levels reli-
gious-based voting in the Netherlands abruptly declined after the merger of three 
denominational parties into a single Christian Democratic party (cda) in 1977.
 Although Norway is commonly put forward as a textbook example of a class-
dominated political system Oskarson (2005) shows that this picture may be 
misleading: In Norway there is not only a considerable and steady decline of 
class voting, but religious voting is both continually relevant as well as more 
important. The latter is supported by Knutsen (1988) who demonstrates on the 
basis of 1981-Eurobarometer data that of all social divisions in Norwegian politics 
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religion had the strongest impact on party preferences. 
 As mentioned, McDonough et al. (1981, 1988) have shown that political 
choices in Spain during the 1970s and 1980s were more strongly determined by 
religion than by social class. Lancaster (1992) even argues that church attendance 
explains more variance than any other socio-demographic variable when 
predicting left-voting in Spain’s 1984-elections. In the face of accounts announcing 
the decline of religious voting Calvo and Montero (2002) show that religion was 
still a strong determinant of party choice in Spain during the 2000-election.
 Social class has been a key factor in Swedish politics, although the class-vote 
association has decline substantially since the 1970s (Stephens 1981). Long-term 
decline in class voting is also reported by Oskarson (2005) who notes that the 
decrease is most pronounced in the 1960s and 1980s. The role of religion in 
politics has traditionally been far less prominent in Sweden. The Swedish Christian 
Democrats (kd) passed the electoral threshold relatively late in 1991, more than a 
quarter-century after their formation in 1964 (Madeley 2000). However, already in 
the 1960s, as Särlvik (1970) remarked, specific linkages existed between members 
of the “free churches” (minor protestant denominations) and the Swedish Liberal 
Party (fp) and between the Church of Sweden and the Conservative Party (m). But 
Särlvik concluded that religion was merely a subsidiary factor in Swedish 
politics. 
 In Switzerland religion was an important factor shaping the party system, but 
the religion-vote association has continuously declined since the 1970s (Nicolet 
and Tresch 2009). Using the same 1972-survey data Lijphart (1979) and Kerr 
(1974) reached different conclusions about the relative importance of class and 
religion for party choice in Switzerland. Lijphart attributed this discrepancy to the 
different party contrasts they analyzed, and argued that Kerr did not give religion 
a fair chance by dichotomizing party choice in Socialist and Communist versus all 
other parties. And conform Lijphart’s study Trechsel (1995) and Hug and Trechsel 
(2002) show that the influence of religion on electoral behavior was stronger than 
the influence of social class, although both cleavages weakened (1971-1991). 
 In politics of the United Kingdom it is widely held that class differences play a 
larger role than religion (Janowitz and Segal 1967; Books and Reynolds 1975; 
Knutsen 1988). Since the 1960s class divisions declined in Britain, whereas 
religious voting has been rather stable (Evans and Tilley 2011). But despite the 
narrowing of the gap between class- and religious voting the impact of class 
continues to exceed the impact of religion on party choice (Oskarson 2005; 
Brooks et al. 2006). 
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 In the United States religion has always been more important than social 
class. Various studies have reported about declining levels of traditional class 
voting in the US since the 1940s (Books and Reynolds 1975; Dalton 2008) and 
1960s (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995; Brooks et al. 2006). Although Books and 
Reynolds reported relatively stable patterns of religious-based voting between 
the 1940s and 1970s3, Dalton shows that the denominational basis of voting 
declined since the 1970s. Manza and Brooks (1997) argue that the single factor in 
the decline of religious-based voting in the US is the political de-alignment of 
liberal Protestants, because the political alignment of both conservative 
Protestants and Catholics is very stable. 
2.2.3 Findings from comparative studies 
Some of the aforementioned studies are part of larger comparative researches. 
Typically, comparative books are set up by a series of single country chapters 
written by country experts (Evans 1999, Broughton and Ten Napel 2000, Clark 
and Lipset 2001). And although these books are valuable for assessing changes 
in the impact of class or religion in modern democracies, they are in general not 
ideal for formal cross-national comparisons. Because these studies usually focus 
on one phenomenon, class and religion are typically not studied simultaneously, 
making an investigation of their relative impact on party choice impossible. 
 Franklin et al. (1992) present analyses with multiple social and attitudinal 
variables predicting left-wing voting behavior. In each of the 16 country-specific 
chapters they elaborately assess the influence of social-structural variables, 
including class (i.e. working class occupation) and religion (i.e. church attendance) 
on voting (i.e. left vs. non-left). However, Franklin et al. do not compile the coun-
try-specific results on the relative influence of social-structural variables in a final 
comparison. Because the comparisons among countries remain restricted to the 
percentage of variance in voting behavior explained by social variables they 
bypass the question about differences between countries with regard to the 
relative effect of social class and religion (Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1993). 
 Oskarson (2005) reports the trends in the association between social position 
and party choice in six Western European countries, and explicitly notes whether 
class or religious voting is stronger in four of these countries4. She measures 
class voting as log-odds of the working class to vote left-wing rather than anything 
else compared to the non working class. Religious voting is measured as the 
odds that a frequent church attendee votes for a Christian Democratic party rather 
than another party compared to non-religious people. The results presented by 
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Oskarson (2005: 94-95) reveal that in general the difference between class and 
religious voting are the smallest in Germany and are relatively large in Britain, 
Netherlands and Norway. 
2.3 Data and measurement 
To provide a uniform and systematic test of the relative influence of social class 
and religion on voting we constructed the new dataset, the Comparative Dataset 
on Cleavage Voting. See Chapter 1 and appendix A.1 for further details about the 
CDCV-file. For this chapter we only use surveys and respondents for which 
information on both class and religion (denomination and/or church attendance) 
is available, see table 2.1. 
 Social class: Although the scope of the CDCV-file is uniquely rich for data on 
the social bases of politics in terms of period and countries covered, the number 
of pooled surveys comes at the cost of detail at the respondent level. Consequently, 
we use a simplified version of the Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) 
class schema. We distinguish between four social classes: (1) the manual working 
class (collapsing the skilled and the unskilled workers), (2) the self-employed 
(petit bourgeois and farmers), (3) the routine non-manual class and, (4) the 
service class (lower and higher service class). Where possible the EGP class 
position is derived directly from the original file, either on the basis of an originally 
included EGP variable, or otherwise on the basis of an occupational code. In the 
latter case we converted ISCO-68 or ISCO-88 codes into EGP categories 
(Ganzeboom and Treiman 2009). Some surveys contained class- or occupational 
information on the basis of nation specific or simplified coding schemas. In such 
cases we used national conversion tables to recode the national categories into 
the most appropriate EGP category.
 Church attendance: We distinguish between church attendees and 
non-attendees. Respondents are categorized as ‘non-church-goer’ if they never 
or seldom attend religious services, and are labeled ‘church-goer’ if they attend 
church at least a few times a year. 
  Denomination: on the basis of the respondent’s reported church membership 
we distinguish between Protestants (including Anglicans), Catholics and 
respondents with no (or another) religious affiliation. In Norway and Sweden most 
surveys do not contain information on denomination, but because of the religious 
tradition of state churches in these countries it is plausible that most religious 
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respondents belong to a Protestant denomination. In these countries we only 
investigate the cleavage between church-going and non-church going 
respondents. We followed a similar procedure in predominantly Catholic countries 
(Spain and Italy) where information on denomination is not available. In the other 
predominantly Catholic countries, Austria, Belgium and France, we divide 
respondents into Catholics vs. non-Catholics and church-goers vs. non-church 
goers. 
 Party choice: In most surveys respondents were asked to name to the party 
they voted for in the most recent election or vote intention for the upcoming 
election. When available, one of these variables used to measure voting behavior. 
In other, non-election, surveys, political party choice is measured as voting 
intention “what would you vote if election were today/ next Sunday?” or party 
identification. Because the party structure in some countries has changed 
substantially over time (e.g. France, Italy, Netherlands) it is impossible to 
distinguish between individual parties in a multinomial logistic regression analysis 
when covering long time periods. And because for each country we aim to model 
over time changes that are comparable to other countries it is unavoidable to 
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Table 2.1   Surveys in Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting containing 
relevant information on social class, denomination and church 
attendance
Country Period Surveys N
Australia 1965 – 2004 14 20,645
Austria 1974 – 2003 7 3,227
Belgium 1991 – 2003 4 6,766
France 1967 – 2007 8 17,872
Germany 1969 – 2005 22 25,244
Italy 1968 – 2006 9 9,989
The Netherlands 1970 – 2006 18 18,049
Norway 1981 – 1997 5 7,563
Spain 1979 – 2008 5 12,725
Sweden 1985 – 2002 6 9,958
Switzerland 1971 – 2003 6 9,115
United Kingdom 1964 – 2005 9 16,564
United States 1960 – 2004 12 10,585
Total 1960 – 2008 125 157,728
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consistently group political parties across countries. In order to allow a cross 
national and over time comparison of class and religious voting we distinguish 
three categories of party choice: (1) left-wing parties (socialist, communist, left-
socialist), (2) right-wing parties (liberal, conservative, agrarian, and new/far right) 
and (3) Christian parties (Christian Democrats and other denominational parties). 
We primarily relied on party categorizations by Lane and Ersson (1999). For 
details consult Appendix A.2. Respondents who voted for another party are 
excluded from the analyses. 
2. 4 Analysis
2.4.1  Modeling over time changes in class voting and religious voting 
simultaneously 
In this chapter we model changes in the class-vote relationship and religion-vote 
relationship on the basis of multinomial logistic regression analysis. We start with 
modeling the changes in each of the 13 countries separately. In each country-
specific model we simultaneously include categories for the groups comprising 
the three cleavage lines: three dummy-variables for social class (with the manual 
working class as the reference category), dummy-variables for denominations 
(with non/other religion as the reference category), and a dummy-variable for 
church attendance. We also include dummy-variables for all years in which the 
surveys in a country were held, with the first survey as the reference category. 
Next, we assume that over time changes in the magnitude of a particular cleavage 
may take three possible forms: stability, gradual change, and non-gradual 
change. Gradual changes are modeled as interactions between a linear measure 
of year and the categories comprising a particular cleavage. Because cleavage 
changes are not necessarily linear processes we model non-gradual changes by 
including interactions between the groups comprising a cleavage and year-dummy 
variables. In this way we impose no time constraints on the effect of a cleavage 
on party choice. Assuming that the over time pattern of each of the three cleavages 
may take three possible forms we have to evaluate 27 models of cleavage change 
for each country, see table 2.2. It is however possible that the impact of social 
class is weakening with respect to the left vs. right party contrast but that this not 
the case with respect to voting for a religious party. On the other hand, changes 
in the effect of religion may be relevant for voting religious, but irrelevant for voting 
left vs. right. Therefore, we estimated the 27 models of cleavage change twice in 
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Table 2.2   Assumed models of over time changes in the association 
 between social class, denomination, church attendance and  
party choice
Model Social Class 
(C)
Denomination 
(D) 
Church attend. 
(A) 
Model Constraint 
changes *
1 stable stable stable
2 stable stable gradual change 2b A 
3 stable gradual change stable 3b D
4 stable stable unconstrained 4b A
5 stable unconstrained stable 5b D
6 stable gradual change unconstrained 6b D, A
7 stable unconstrained gradual change 7b D, A
8 stable gradual change gradual change 8b D, A
9 stable unconstrained unconstrained 9b D, A
10 gradual change stable stable 10b C
11 gradual change stable gradual change 11b C, A
12 gradual change gradual change stable 12b C, D
13 gradual change stable unconstrained 13b C, A
14 gradual change unconstrained stable 14b C, D
15 gradual change gradual change unconstrained 15b C, D, A
16 gradual change unconstrained gradual change 16b C, D, A
17 gradual change gradual change gradual change 17b C, D, A
18 gradual change unconstrained unconstrained 18b C, D, A
19 unconstrained Stable stable 19b C
20 unconstrained Stable gradual change 20b C, A
21 unconstrained gradual change stable 21b C, D
22 unconstrained stable unconstrained 22b C, A
23 unconstrained unconstrained stable 23b C, D
24 unconstrained gradual change unconstrained 24b C, D, A
25 unconstrained unconstrained gradual change 25b C, D, A
26 unconstrained gradual change gradual change 26b C, D, A
27 unconstrained unconstrained unconstrained 27b C, D, A
[Stable = no over time change in effect, gradual change = linear change in effect, unconstrained = no 
time constraints in effect]
 
*  for social class effects (C) changes are constrained for religious voting, for denomination (D) and church 
attendance effects (A) changes are constrained for voting left vs. right
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countries with religious parties. In the second series we constrained the changes 
in the class effects with respect to voting for a religious party, and we constrained 
the changes in the effects of religion with respect to voting left vs. right-wing. For 
some countries we are not able to estimate the full series of 27 models. In the four 
countries where the denominational cleavage is not measured (Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden), we are only able to examine changes in church attendance. Due 
to small number of religious votes in Sweden, we do not consider models without 
time constraints in the Swedish case. 
 On the basis of goodness-of-fit statistics we select the most optimal model for 
each country. In Appendix B.1 we report for each estimated model, the number of 
respondents (N), -2LL, the number of consumed degrees of freedom (df), as well 
as Schwarz’ Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The BIC statistic takes the -2 
Log-Likelihood into account together with parsimony of the model and the sample 
size: BIC = -2log-likelihood + log(N)df. For each country we rank order the 
estimated models of cleavage change according to their BIC value. The model 
with the lowest BIC index is often considered to be the preferred model. Because 
the BIC leads to the selection of more simple models (Lammers, Pelzer, Hendrickx, 
Eisinga 2007) we test whether the decrease in -2LL between subsequent models 
on the ranking list is significant. Sometimes it thus happens that the model with 
the second or third lowest BIC index is selected as the most optimal model in 
favor of the best ranking model.
 In table 2.3 we summarize the preferred models for cleavage change. Given 
the different religious structures between countries, we categorize our results on 
the basis of a country’s religious tradition, i.e.: Catholic, Protestant and religious-
mixed countries. On the basis of the multinomial logit-estimations of these models 
(see appendix B.2) we indicate whether the effect of a cleavage has remained 
stable, gradually declines or changes non-gradually over time. Table 2.3 clearly 
shows that, in support of the thesis of the decline of class voting, in 8 out 13 
countries (i.e. all but Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Spain) the most 
optimal model assumes gradual decline in the class-vote relationship. With 
respect to the religious cleavage our model selection procedure suggests that in 
only 3 countries (Austria, Spain and United Kingdom) the effect of both church 
attendance and denomination (if measured) on voting has remained stable in the 
period covered. Interestingly, we find that the preferred models often assume 
stable relationships between denomination and vote, but the effect of church 
attendance declines over time. 
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For the Catholic countries we find in table 2.3 that the preferred models allow 
gradual decline in the class-vote relationship in France and Italy, but assume no 
changes in the class-vote relationship in Austria, Belgium and Spain. In Austria and 
Spain also the religious cleavages are assumed to be stable over time. Only in 
Belgium the most optimal model suggests a gradual decline in the effect of having 
a Catholic denomination. In France and Italy we find that the preferred model allows 
a gradual decline in the church attendance-vote association. The selected models 
in the Protestant countries allow the effects of social class to decline over time. 
Exceptions are the estimates for Sweden where the most optimal model assumes 
no over time change in the class-vote association, and the contrast between the 
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Table 2.3   Most optimal model of cleavage change in 13 countries on the 
basis of the Schwarz’ Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
Country (period) Social Class Denomination Church 
attendance
Catholic countries
Austria (1974-2003) Stable Stable Stable
Belgium (1991-2003) Stable Gradual decline(b) Stable
France (1976-2007) Gradual decline Stable Gradual decline
Italy (1968-2006) Gradual decline(a) - Gradual decline(b)
Spain (1979-2008) Stable - Stable
Protestant countries
Australia (1965-2004) Gradual decline Stable Gradual decline
Norway (1981-1997) Gradual decline(a) - Gradual decline(b)
Sweden (1985-2002) Stable - Gradual decline(b)
United Kingdom (1964-2005) Gradual decline Stable Stable
United States (1960-2004) Gradual change(c) Gradual decline Stable
Religious mixed countries
Germany (1969-2005) Stable Stable Gradual decline(b)
The Netherlands (1970-2006) Gradual decline(a) Gradual change(b) Gradual decline(b)
Switzerland (1971-2003) Gradual decline Stable Gradual decline
[Stable = no over time change in effect on party choice, gradual decline = linear decline in effect on 
party choice, gradual change = contradictory changes among groups comprising a cleavage]
(a)   class voting time trend constrained to zero for religious parties
(b)  religious voting time trend constrained to zero for left vs. right-wing parties
(c)  in the US class differences vs. working class are declining with exception of the self-employed
(d)   in the Netherlands, religious differences are declining vs. non-religious, with exception of Protestants
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working class and the self-employed in the U.S. The U.S. are the only Protestant 
country where the most optimal model allows a decline of denomination-vote 
relationship, but assumes the effect church attendance to be stable over time. In 
Australia, Norway and Sweden the parameter estimates according to the optimal 
model suggest that the effect of church attendance is declining over time. The 
preferred model selected for the UK suggests that both the effects of church 
attendance as well as denomination are stable over time. 
 In all three religious-mixed countries the optimal model suggests that the 
effect of church attendance is gradually declining. In the Netherlands also the 
effects of social class and denomination are weakening. In Switzerland the 
preferred model allows the effect of class to decline gradually, but the effect of 
denomination is assumed to be stable. In Germany, the effects of both 
denomination and social class are assumed to be stable over time.
2.4.2 Measuring cleavage strength
In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of the social cleavages on voting 
we use the kappa-index (Hout et al. 1995) as a measure of cleavage-strength. 
The kappa-index is calculated using the standard deviation of the log-odds or 
predicted probabilities of all possible combinations groups (e.g. social classes, 
religious groups) and parties. This measure was introduced by Hout et al. to 
provide “a uniform metric for comparative and historical analyses based on 
suitable class and voting typologies” (1995: 814). We calculate the kappa-index 
on the basis of the most optimal multinomial logistic regression model. Therefore 
we define the kappa-index as follows (cf. Brooks et al. 2006; Lachat 2006):
 
[1]
where,  is the average predicted probability of a member of social group S to 
vote for party P, and where  is the mean probability of all S groups comprising 
a cleavage to for vote P. Because we estimate multinomial regression models with 
three vote outcomes we sum across both social groups and categories of party 
choice. The ct subscript for κ indicates that there is a single kappa-score for each 
country-year combination based on the pattern of change resulting from the most 
optimal model selected for each country. The calculated kappa-indices range 
between 0 and 0.5, and a higher value indicates a stronger association between 
a cleavage and party choice. 
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We set out to compare the strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength 
of the religious cleavage across countries and over time. Because we disentangled 
church attendance and denomination as two distinct aspects of the religious 
cleavage we have to integrate the two kappa-indices again into a single overall 
measure for the strength of religious voting. To do so, we rely on a measure 
introduced by Brooks and Manza (1997) for the total size of cleavage voting. This 
measure, the so-called lambda-index, is calculated as the mean of separate 
kappas in order to determine the total magnitude of all cleavages within a 
particular country at a given point in time (Brooks and Manza 1997; Brooks et al. 
2006). We use this measure not to analyze the total magnitude of all cleavages 
but rather the overall magnitude of the religious cleavage. We therefore define the 
lambda-index as follows:
 [2]
In this equation there are R religious cleavages with kappa score κ. In our case R 
is 2 (r=1 the denominational cleavage, r=2 the church attendance cleavage) and 
thus  expresses the average size of the religious cleavage in country c at time t. 
 Lambda is the mean of separate kappas, and accordingly kappa and lambda 
both have the same metric. We are therefore able to compare the strength of the 
class cleavage with the overall strength of the religious cleavage. Next, we also 
examine whether using explained variance instead of effect size as a decisive 
criterion for the comparative strength of cleavages leads to different conclusions. 
We obtained the contributed proportion of variance explained by social class and 
religion by conducting separate series of multinomial logistic regression for each 
country-year combination. We look at the decrease of the Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 
when excluding the class or religious variables (taking denomination and church 
attendance together) from the model. 
2.4.3 Comparing the strength of social class relative to religion
Our first research question is whether stronger levels of class voting are associated 
with weaker levels of religious voting, and vice versa. In the literature we found 
that this assumption is often not supported. Although the relationship between 
religion and vote is found to be declining in some countries, this development is 
rarely accompanied by an increase of class voting. Here we present for each 
country the correlation between the kappa-index of class voting on the one hand 
and on the other hand the kappa-index of denominational voting, church 
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attendance and the lambda-index of overall religious voting. The correlations 
presented in table 2.4 suggest that the levels of class voting are generally positively 
associated with the levels of religious voting. Negative correlations are found in 
four countries, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and the US. With respect to the 
correlation between class voting and denominational voting we only find negative 
correlation in Belgium and the U.S. By and large, the results therefore indicate 
that class differences are more important for voting when also religious differences 
are larger. The premise that class may have a strong influence on voting only if 
there is no competing influence of other cleavages is therefore not very sound, 
given that in most countries the correlation between class and its most obvious 
rival is positive rather than negative. We now turn to answering our second 
research question about the trends in the differences between the strength of the 
religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship.
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Table 2.4   Correlations between kappa-indices of class and religious voting 
in 13 countriese
Kappa index of class voting
Country (period) N Kappa-indexdenomination
Kappa-index 
church 
attendance
lambda-index
overall 
religion
Catholic countries
Austria (1974-2003) 7 0.81 0.87 0.85
Belgium (1991-2003) 4 -0.45 -0.39 -0.42
France (1976-2007) 8 0.72 0.51 0.63
Italy (1968-2006) 9 - 0.06 0.06
Spain (1979-2008) 5 - 0.53 0.53
Protestant countries
Australia (1965-2004) 14 0.62 0.92 0.87
Norway (1981-1997) 5 - -0.06 -0.06
Sweden (1985-2002) 6 - -0.54 -0.54
United Kingdom (1964-2005) 9 0.70 0.56 0.83
United States (1960-2004) 12 -0.60 0.44 -0.45
Religious mixed countries
Germany (1969-2005) 22 0.50 0.43 0.47
The Netherlands (1970-2006) 18 0.51 0.64 0.60
Switzerland (1971-2003) 6 0.88 0.88 0.90
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 Catholic countries: In figure 2.1a we report the over time changes in the 
kappa-index of the class cleavage, church attendance and - if measured - the 
denominational cleavage in the five traditionally Catholic countries. Figure 2.1b 
presents the contributed proportion of explained variance by social class and 
religion. And in figure 2.1c we compare the difference in contributed explained 
variance between class and religion with the difference in cleavage strength. The 
difference in contributed explained variance is calculated as the proportion of 
Nagelkerke R2 explained by religion minus the proportion explained by social 
class. The difference in cleavage strength is calculated as: lambda-index of 
religious voting minus kappa-index of class voting. In figure 2.1c values on the 
y-axis above 0 therefore present the extent to which the religion is more important 
for voting than class, and values lower than 0 represent the extent to which class 
is more important than religion. 
 Figure 2.1a shows that in three Catholic countries, Belgium, France and Spain, 
religious cleavages are more important than social class throughout the whole 
period in terms of kappa-index. In Spain we find that the difference between the 
strength of the class cleavage and the religious cleavage are stable over time. 
Throughout the whole period the cleavage strength of church attendance is about 
1.5 times the strength of social class. Also with respect to the contributed 
proportion of explained variance we generally find that religion outweighs social 
class, with the exception of the 1986 election, see figure 2.1b. In Belgium and Italy 
the dominance of religion over class is waning in terms of cleavage strength as 
well as explained variance. As indicated by figure 2.1a the cleavages based on 
denomination and church attendance were about 2 times stronger than the class 
cleavage in Belgium in 1991, but religion had lost this relative strength during the 
2003-elections. Figure 2.1b and 2.1c suggest a similar pattern with respect to 
differences in contributed explained variance. In the Italian case we observe 
(figure 2.1a) a sharp and sudden decline in 1994 of the impact of church attendance 
on voting. The strength of the class cleavage on the other hand increased after 
the 1994 election. Consequently, the relative strength of religion in Italy has 
declined from being about two or three times stronger than class in the period 
before 1994, to being about 1.5 times less important in 2006. We do not observe 
a sudden drop of religious voting with respect to the explained variance. Although 
figures 2.1b and 2.1c suggest that the variance explained by religion is decreasing, 
the process appears to be more gradual in nature than the decrease in kappa. In 
France denomination and church attendance were about 1.5 times more important 
than the social class in the 1960s. We find that especially the strength of church 
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Figure 2.1a   Changing strength (measured as kappa-index) of the 
social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 
5 predominantly Catholic countries
Figure 2.1b   Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2) of social class 
and religion predicting party choice in 5 predominantly Catholic 
countries
75
attendance gradually dropped to the level of class voting in 2007. The difference 
between class and religion in explained variance has not changed substantially in 
France. Although the explanatory power of both cleavages declined, religion 
remains relatively more important compared to class. In Austria the class cleavage 
outweighs the two religious cleavage lines throughout the whole period, but only 
by a factor smaller than 1.5. We fi nd different results in terms of contributed 
explained variance (see fi gure 2.1b-2.1c). In the period 1989-1995 religion 
contributes more to the explained variance than social class.
Protestant countries: In fi gure 2.2a we report the changing strength of class, 
denomination and church attendance in fi ve predominantly Protestant countries. 
Figure 2.2b shows the proportion of explained variance contributed by social 
class and religion. And in fi gure 2.2c we present the difference between class and 
religion in contributed explained variance together the difference in cleavage 
strength. For Australia we observe in fi gure 2.2a that class differences are 
consistently more important than both denomination and church attendance. 
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Figure 2.1c   Difference in cleavage strength(a) and contributed explained 
variance(b) by social class and religion in 5 predominantly 
Catholic countries
(a) Religious voting (lambda-index) – class voting (kappa-index)
(b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2)
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Figure 2.2a   Changing strength (measured as kappa-index) of the 
social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 
5 predominantly Protestant countries
Figure 2.2b   Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2) of social class 
and religion predicting party choice in 5 predominantly 
Protestant countries
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Although all three cleavages lines are declining the class cleavages remains 
about 1.5 to 2 times stronger than the denominational cleavage. The impact of 
church attendance is declining the most in Australian politics and therefore the 
strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength of church attendance has 
nearly doubled between 1965 and 2004. Also in terms of explained variance, see 
fi gure 2.2b, we fi nd that class and religion lost their much of their power to predict 
voting. Overall, as indicated by fi gure 2.2c the relevance of class over religion has 
largely been stable in Australian politics in terms of cleavage strength. Also in the 
United Kingdom we fi nd social class to be the dominant political division, although 
it has particularly decreased in strength (fi gure 2.2a) between the 1960s and 
1980s. Before the 1980s the class cleavage was about two times stronger than 
the denominational cleavage and even nearly four times stronger than church 
attendance. After the 1980s this was respectively 1.5 and 3 times stronger. Figure 
2.2a-2.2c suggest that also with respect to explained variance the comparative 
infl uence of class relative to religion is decreasing. For Norway we fi nd that the 
relative importance of social class and religion has reversed over time. Figure 
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Figure 2.2c   Difference in cleavage strength(a) and contributed explained 
variance(b) by social class and religion in 5 predominantly 
Protestant countries
(a) Religious voting (lambda-index) – class voting (kappa-index)
(b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2)
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2.2a indicates that the class cleavage in Norway declined from being about 1.5 
times stronger than religion in 1981 to about 1.5 less important than religion in 
1997. We find a similar reversal regarding the proportion of explained variance in 
figure 2.2b. In Sweden class voting outweighs religious voting throughout the 
1985-2002 period, in terms of cleavage strength as well as explanatory power. We 
find that class differences were about 2.5 times more important than church 
attendance in 1985, and this dropped to 1.75 in 2002. Also the differences in 
explained variance between class and religion are decreasing in Swedish 
elections. The US case stresses the importance of distinguishing between 
denomination and church attendance. Denominational differences are, although 
declining, generally 1.5 to 2 times more important than class divisions in the 
United States, as indicated by figure 2.2a. Church attendance on the other hand 
is about 2.5 times less important than social class throughout the whole period 
but the cleavage is relatively growing in strength. The increasing effect of church 
attendance however cannot compensate the decline of the denominational effect. 
This implies that overall the class cleavage has come to outweigh the religious 
cleavage in US politics, as is indicated by figure 2.2c. In terms of explained 
variance we find that the differences between class and religion are not particularly 
declining nor increasing.
Religious-mixed countries: In figure 2.3a we report the changing strength of social 
class, denomination and church attendance in three religious-mixed countries. In 
the Netherlands and to a lesser extent also in Switzerland we observe that the two 
religious cleavages are generally more important than the class cleavage. We find 
that in the Netherlands, denomination and church attendance are about 2 times 
more important than social class throughout the period 1970-2006. In Switzerland 
the relative importance of denominational differences has gradually declined 
from being about 1.5 times more important than class in 1971 to nearly no 
difference in 2003. Church attendance and social class were about equally strong 
in the 1970s, although church attendance seems slightly more important over the 
whole period. The dominance of religion over social class in the Netherlands and 
Switzerland is also illustrated by the share in explained variance of the two 
cleavages in figure 2.3b. For Germany we find different results when comparing 
the differences in cleavage strength with the differences in explained variance. In 
terms of kappa the class cleavage and the two religious cleavages were about 
equally strong in the 1960-1980s, see figure 2.3a. Throughout the whole period 
we find that denominational differences are in general somewhat stronger than 
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class-based differences, and that particularly after the 1980s church attendance 
has gradually become 1.5 times less strong relative to the class cleavage. Overall, 
as indicated by fi gure 2.3c we fi nd that from the 1990s onwards class has become 
a stronger cleavage than religion. On the basis of contributed explained variance 
we fi nd that the explanatory power of both class and religion declined, but that 
religion continued to outweigh class over the entire 1969-2005 period.
2
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Figure 2.3a   Changing strength (measured as kappa-index) of the 
social class, denomination and church attendance cleavage in 
3 religious mixed countries
Figure 2.3b   Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2) of social 
class and religion predicting party choice in 3 religious mixed 
countries
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2.5 Conclusion and Discussion
2.5.1 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to systematically analyze cross-national differences 
and trends in the magnitude and hierarchy of class and religion as social bases 
of voting behavior in thirteen countries. But unlike the few previous studies 
comparing the magnitude of cleavage voting we uniformly measured cleavage-
strength based on a multi-category typology of both cleavages and parties, 
focused on the relative infl uence religion vs. class, and modeled changes in the 
effects of class and religion simultaneously. Moreover, we measured cleavage 
strength using appropriate and comparable measures across countries and time, 
the kappa-index. And we compared our results on cleavage strength with the 
differences in explained variance contributed by religion and social class.
 We answered two questions. First, we set out to examine to what extent a 
strong class-vote relationship in a country is associated with a weak religion-vote 
relationship. We answered this question by analyzing data on social class, religion 
and party choice from 13 countries in the period 1960-2008. Our results indicate 
that the relevance of class differences and religious differences on voting often 
run more or less parallel. We generally fi nd positive correlations between a 
country’s degree of class voting and degree of religious voting. These fi ndings 
contest Lijphart’s claim that class may have a strong infl uence on voting only if 
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Figure 2.3c   Difference in cleavage strength(a) and contributed explained 
variance(b) by social class and religion in 3 religious-mixed 
countries
(a) Religious voting (lambda-index) – class voting (kappa-index)
(b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2)
81
there is no competing influence of religion. Nevertheless, in five countries we find 
that social class is more important than religion, i.e.: Australia, Austria, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. In six countries, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Switzerland, the religious basis of voting is stronger than the class 
basis. 
 Second, we focused on over time changes in the relative influence of social 
class and religion on party choice. In support of reports proclaiming the decreasing 
significance of traditional cleavages we find that in most countries the association 
between party choice and both class as well as denomination and/or church 
attendance is weakening. However, despite the decline of the magnitude of 
cleavage voting in most countries, the hierarchy between class and religion for 
the most part endures. Religion nowadays is more important than social class in 
the largely same countries as in the 1970s. However, we find that the relative 
influence of religion over class is waning in Belgium and Italy and is even reversing 
in Germany and the US. In the other countries, the dominance of religion over 
class generally persists. Class continues to be more influential relative to religion 
in Australia and Austria. In Sweden and the UK the relative effect of class over 
religion decreased considerably. Yet, in the last decade under study (1997-2007) 
we find the strongest relative effect of social class in Sweden: In Sweden the 
kappa-index of class voting and the contributed proportion of explained variance 
is found to be twice as strong when compared to the effect of religion. In the 
same period we find the strongest relative effect of religion in the Netherlands, 
where the effect of religious voting compared to that of social class is about two 
times stronger, and nearly 15 times in terms of explained variance. 
2.5.2 Discussion
We faced unavoidable limitations in our large-scale comparison. First, although 
we set out to keep away from unnecessary dichotomies, the number of countries 
and period covered imposed restrictions to the level of detail measuring cleavage 
groups and vote outcomes, such as the suboptimal four-category measure of 
social class. It has been argued that also the distinction between Protestants, 
Catholics and those with another/no religion oversimplifies the complex religious 
structure in some countries, such as the within-Protestant differences in the US 
(Manza and Brooks 1997) or the Netherlands (De Graaf et al. 2001). In this chapter 
we merged all different types of Protestant denominations into a single category. 
In chapter 5 we will show that there are considerable differences between orthodox 
and liberal Protestant groups in the Netherlands in the sense that orthodox 
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Protestants are much more likely to vote for a Christian party. For the Netherlands 
the use of a more differentiated denominational classification in this chapter 
would therefore not have substantially changed the fact that religion outweighs 
social class. For other countries with a large variety of Protestant groups the 
implications of lumping them together might be more serious. According to the 
‘Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis’ (Manza and Brooks 1997) 
religious voting in the US is only declining among liberal Protestants, and is stable 
(or even increasing) among conservative Protestants. Moreover, research has 
shown that there is little change in the extent to what Jewish voters in the US 
support the Democratic Party (Manza and Brooks 1997). By only differentiating 
between Catholics and Protestants we therefore have underestimated the 
association between religion and party choice in the US, and over-estimated the 
decline in this association. Our finding that class has come to outweigh religion in 
US politics in recent years may therefore be approached with care. We were, 
however, able to distinguish between frequent and infrequent church attendees. 
Our finding that the association between church attendance and political 
preferences in the US, as one of the few countries, has increased over time 
supports earlier findings by Norris and Inglehart (2004). Identifying church 
attendance as a distinct aspect of the religious cleavage next to church 
membership allows including religious homogeneous countries into cross-national 
comparisons of religious voting without neglecting denominational differences in 
religious heterogeneous countries. Moreover, within-denomination differences 
between moderate and conservative church members are roughly accounted for. 
In this way, we were able to broaden the scope of our research beyond previous 
studies and account for the relevance of the ties of church members to their 
religious communities.
 Second, some have criticized the kappa-index calling it a “naïve” measure 
(Clark 2001; Houtman 2003) because it ignores the direction of group-party 
relationships. We are aware that the kappa-index does not reveal associations 
between specific social groups and parties. In the next chapters, we use log-odds 
ratios to measure the group-specific associations of class and religious voting. 
Log-odds ratios are perhaps more informative for specific group-party 
associations, but they are not necessarily useful if one wants to compare the total 
magnitude of cleavages cross-nationally and over time. For that purpose we 
consider the kappa-index to be appropriate; as the ‘aggregate’ effect of all groups 
comprising a multi-categorical cleavage on multiple vote outcomes. We have 
compared the relative strength of kappa for social class and religion with the 
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differences in contributed explained variance. On average, we found similar 
results using two different criteria to evaluate the hierarchy of social class and 
religion in determining party choice. 
 Third, in this chapter we modeled up to 27 scenarios of cleavage change for 
each country. Point of departure for this exercise was our assumption that there 
are three possible forms of changes: gradual-changes, non-gradual changes 
and stability. Although most of the preferred models assumed either gradual 
changes or stability in the effects of class and religion on voting, we do not rule 
out the possibility that other forms of non-linear change may fit the data better for 
some countries. For the Netherlands and Italy for example we earlier referred to 
discrete interruptions of continuous changes in religious voting (De Graaf et al. 
2001; Segatti and Vezzoni 2008). We leave it to future research to more exhaustively 
investigate the country-specific scenarios of cleavage change beyond the models 
evaluated in this chapter.
 For future research, our approach can easily be applied to analyze the 
hierarchy between other (multi-)categorical determinants of party choice. The 
analytical approach taken in this research could therefore provide useful insights 
for the study of old vs. new social inequalities, e.g.: social class vs. education, or 
religion vs. ethnicity. Next to descriptive questions on the relative influence of 
other social cleavages on party choice, future comparative research could 
address explanatory questions. In this chapter we have shown that the class 
cleavage is only likely to be more important than religion in predominantly 
Protestant countries. But our results do not suggest that the religious tradition in 
a country plays a role in whether the differences between the strength of the 
religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship in countries are declining 
or not. We welcome studies that aim to determine under what conditions religion 
outweighs social class, and vice versa. In the other chapters of this book we 
consider the role of both social and political factors conditioning the processes of 
class- and religious de-alignment. But these explanations are hardly ever used to 
investigate the changing hierarchy between cleavages. The next chapters of this 
thesis make clear that next to social factors political factors may be important to 
understand why social cleavages translates into voting behavior differently from 
one country to another.
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Notes
1  Our comparative setting does not allow the investigation of language as a third factor because the 
 necessary information is not included in our data. Because Lijphart selected four countries on the basis 
of the presence of linguistic minorities we do not examine the same countries. Our investigation does 
not include Canada and South Africa. The political and economic history of South Africa is evidently 
different from the advanced industrial democracies in the United States, Australia and Western Europe. 
For Canada we were unable to match the relevant information on social class to our pooled dataset 
because several waves of the Canadian Election Studies do not include the relevant information on self-
employment.
2 Web of Science listed 60 articles. Additionally, we found 8 published articles using Google Scholar. We 
excluded unpublished working papers or conference papers and books in which only short references 
are made to Lijphart’s study.
3 With the exception of the high index-score of religious voting in 1960 when the association between 
Catholics and Democratic voting was exceptionally high due to Kennedy’s presidential candidacy, see 
also Manza and Brooks (1997).
4 Oskarson (2005) studies cleavage voting in (Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
 Denmark), but does not report about religious voting in Sweden and Denmark due to insufficient data on 
church attendance or insufficient votes for Christian parties.
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*  A slightly different version of this chapter is forthcoming in: G. Evans and N.D. De Graaf (Eds.).  Political 
Choice Matters. Explaining the evolution of class and religious bases of party preference in cross-national 
perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming). Co-authors are Geoffrey Evans and Nan 
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3.1 Introduction
“In all democratic nations, including the United States, there has been a correlation 
between socioeconomic status and political beliefs and voting. The less privileged 
have supported parties that stood for greater equality and welfare protection, 
through government intervention, against the strain of a free enterprise economy. 
(…) This pattern has changed in recent decades” (Lipset 1991: 208). This statement 
by Seymour Martin Lipset paradigmatically encapsulates the central concern of 
class voting as a research subject for comparative political sociologists. It not 
only identifies socioeconomic inequality between groups as a driving force of 
political disagreement in societies, but also stresses interest in redistributionist 
policies as the rationale for the support of left-wing parties. Moreover, much of 
the scholarly debate on the politics of class has concerned the strength of the 
correlation between class and vote, and in particular the alleged decline or 
persistence of this association (cf. Evans 1999b; Knutsen 2007). Many scholars 
have deemed social class to be on the wane as a basis for voting behavior (Clark 
and Lipset 1991; Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995, Knutsen 2006) while a 
universal decline is rejected by others (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1987; Manza, 
Hout and Brooks, 1995; Evans 1999b; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2006; Elff 
2007). What Lipset also makes clear however, and this has been less frequently 
observed, is that students of mass political behavior should concentrate upon 
parties as much as voters. The structure of political supply is not constant: Policy 
positions of parties as well as the range of party positions within party systems 
vary across countries and over time. Such differences in political supply can 
affect voter decision-making by providing them with choices of varying relevance 
to their economic interests. 
 This thesis has become known as the ‘top-down’ perspective on class voting 
(cf. Evans 2000). From this perspective patterns in class voting reflect the 
outcomes of party behavior rather than ‘bottom-up’ changes in social structure. 
As Evans (2000: 411) points out, ‘the adoption of class-relevant policy programs 
should be associated with an increase in the class basis of partisanship’ and vice 
versa. Thus variations in class voting are argued to derive from difference in the 
redistributive policy choices offered to voters. This raises a problem for 
comparative analyses of class voting, whether over time or space, as the extent 
to which leftist parties advocate redistributionist policies and non-leftist parties 
oppose them is assumed to be fixed. Many comparative studies on class voting 
use a generic categorization of parties or party families (often ‘left’ versus 
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‘non-left’) regardless of the fact that parties change their positions on policies or 
that different parties within the same ‘party family’ are perhaps similar but often 
far from equal (Knutsen 1998; Mair and Mudde 1998; cf. Elff 2009). 
 In this chapter we address this concern by estimating the impact of the 
Left-Right positions of political parties on the association between class and vote 
through a broad comparative analysis of integrated data from 15 countries in 
Western Europe, the United States and Australia between 1960 and 2005. We aim 
to answer the question: To what extent are social and political changes able to 
explain the levels of and changes in class voting in Western democracies? For this 
purpose we make use of our large-scale dataset, the Comparative Dataset on 
Cleavage Voting (CDCV) which provides the richest source of pooled individual-
level surveys on the relations between class position and political choices 
available for Western countries since the 1960s. Left-Right positions of parties are 
estimated using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006). In combination this evidence allows us to examine 
patterns of class voting across both countries and time, and test the general 
claim that variations in parties’ Left-Right positions account for variations in the 
class-vote association. 
3.2 Two approaches to the decline of class voting
3.2.1 Bottom-up
The salience of social classes in contemporary Western societies seems in many 
respects to have decreased in recent decades. Unsurprisingly, social class has 
also lost ground as a predictor of political behavior (Clark and Lipset 1991; 
Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995). Many of the explanations offered for this 
decline in class voting are driven by social structural arguments (for elaboration 
see Chapter 1). We will refer to these explanations as the ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
class voting. ‘Bottom-up’ explanations of declining class voting have taken various 
forms: rising living standards and the spread of affluence (Clark and Lipset 1991), 
the changing gender composition of class positions (Kitschelt 1994), the decline 
of traditional communities which has undermined class solidarity and led to more 
privatized, individualistic and instrumental voters (Franklin 1985; Rose and 
McAllister 1986); growing intra- and intergenerational social mobility (Nieuwbeerta, 
De Graaf and Ultee 2000), with upwardly mobile voters being more right-wing 
than those who remain in the working class, but also more left-wing than those in 
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their destination class (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath 1995). Class conflict is 
also believed to be replaced by new social cleavages such as gender, ethnicity 
and sector employment, or to have been cross-cut by new value cleavages 
(Knutsen 1988; Kitschelt 1994; Inglehart 1997; Van der Waal, Achterberg and 
Houtman 2007). From this perspective the association between class and vote is 
declining because cultural (conservative) issues are increasingly relevant to party 
choice for the working class. Finally, it has been claimed that educational 
expansion, accompanied by a general increase of ‘cognitive mobilization’ has 
transformed voters from being driven by particularistic loyalties (such as social 
class) into calculative, preference- and issue-oriented citizens (Franklin 1985; 
Inglehart 1990), thus further weakening class divisions.
 In sum, the ‘bottom-up’ approach to class voting has assumed that structural 
changes run parallel to, and account for, levels of class voting. Classes have lost 
their distinctiveness as social mobility, educational expansion, and compositional 
changes on the labor market have eroded the divisions between them. This in 
turn diminishes the relevance of traditional class conflict for voters’ political 
choices, causing a gradual decline of class voting in Western countries. With our 
dataset we cannot test each of these explanations directly, but we can infer the 
pattern of decline produced by such changes. Their gradual, slowly changing 
character should produce a relatively slowly changing impact on class politics. 
Any observed changes consistent with ‘bottom-up’ processes should take the 
form of a gradual decline, which should not include reversals (i.e. increases) in 
the strength of association. Hence we formulate the ‘gradual change hypothesis’: 
The association between class and vote for left vs. right-wing parties has 
monotonically declined since the 1960s (H1).
To infer the causes of changes in class voting from the patterning of such change 
is not novel. Other studies of class voting (see Evans et al. 1991; Goldthorpe 
1999; De Graaf, Heath and Need 2001) have also relied on evidence concerning 
the volatility and abruptness of changes in the class-vote association to indicate 
the likelihood that changes in association can be seen as social or political in 
origin. We can go further however and include in our models some indicators of 
social change that have been thought to contribute to the weakening of class 
voting. This ‘social change hypothesis’ contends that the blurring of social 
boundaries through processes of social and economic change as demonstrated 
by the growing spread of further and higher education through the class structure 
and the growing impact of gender divisions can be expected to have weakened 
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the effects of class position on party choice. We can therefore hypothesize that 
controlling for changes in the relationship between these social characteristics 
and social class should reduce the observed pattern of changes in the class-party 
association, i.e.: Over-time differences in the association between class and vote 
are (partly) explained by accounting for individual social characteristics of voters, 
such as education and gender (H2).
3.2.2 Top-down
If social change is assumed to be relatively gradualist and unidirectional, political 
change is considered to take a more discrete form, traceable to changes in party 
strategies and the emergence of new parties that shape the focus of political 
debates and interest representation. The degree to which parties offer choices 
that are more or less relevant to differences in interests between classes should 
condition the extent of class voting. From a ‘top-down perspective’, class voting 
is not only a consequence of the strength of the class divide in societies, but is 
also conditioned by the extent to which political parties are seen to be associated 
with interests of different social classes (Evans, Heath and Payne 1999; Oskarson 
2005; Elff 2009). An influential advocate of the ‘top-down’ perspective Sartori 
(1969: 84) even argues that the politicization of class divisions by parties produces 
class consciousness rather than the other way around. From this perspective the 
salience of social class in politics depends on party strategy. As class-relevant, 
economic issues are more salient this may give rise to political polarization and 
reveal underlying differences between classes (Weakliem 1993: 386). Similarly, 
as Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954: 147) argue, political campaigns 
revive old loyalties and re-engage differentiation between groups in society. In 
this respect the strength of class voting is conditioned by the extent to which 
political parties present themselves as representatives of working class interests, 
and to the extent they incorporate class-related issues in their political messages. 
By adopting a more middle class orientated appeal left-wing parties weaken their 
support among the manual working class and increase it among the middle 
class. 
 A similar argument is made by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) in their 
discussion of the ‘Dilemma of Electoral Socialism’. They argue that because 
manual workers are not the numerical majority in most societies, Socialist parties 
aim to assure long-term survival by appealing to middle class voters as well. This 
strategy undermines working class political identity (Przeworski and Sprague 
1986). Of course, this approach is not exclusively ‘top-down’ because it argues 
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that party strategy itself is dependent on class conditions. The policy orientation 
of parties reflects to some degree the composition of electorates. Processes like 
de-industrialization, market liberalization and globalization transformed the highly 
industrialized economies of Western Europe of the 1960s into the contemporary 
post-industrial economies (Esping-Andersen 1999). Whereas the new service 
and middle classes expanded, the manual class shrunk substantively (Kitschelt 
1994; Knutsen 2006). On average, the size of the labor force employed in industry 
fell by nearly 40 percent between 1960 and 2005. Conversely, the share of the 
labor force employed in services has gradually risen over the same period to an 
average of approximately 65 percent of the labor force (own calculations on the 
basis of CPDS data; Armingeon et al. 2008). Left-wing parties can be expected to 
place less emphasis on traditional working class issues as the proportion of 
manual laborers in the population is smaller5.
 However, the empirical validity of the ‘top-down’ approach to class-based 
voting remains uncertain. In support of the approach, Evans, Heath and Payne 
(1991) and de Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) show evidence of marked disconti-
nuities between different elections that are consistent with party shifts not social 
change, while Andersen and Heath (2003) suggest that political representation of 
social groups by parties enables social conflict to become politically relevant. 
They state that the impact of race in U.S. elections is a reflection of firm Democratic 
standpoints on racial issues (Andersen and Heath 2003: 322). Furthermore, Hill 
and Leighley (1996) argue that, at US state-level, the Democratic Party is better 
able to mobilize lower class voters if it is more liberal. But these studies all rely on 
the observation of discontinuity in the strength of class voting effects to infer a 
‘top-down’ influence. They do not measure actual party positions. Studies that 
have done this show less conclusive results. Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), 
Oskarson (2005) and Elff (2009) find evidence of party position effects, but 
Weakliem and Heath find no support for the idea that the ideological difference 
between parties influences class voting. They find that class voting is not higher 
when voters perceive real ideological differences between parties (Weakliem and 
Heath 1999). 
 In this chapter we specify and test cross-nationally two versions of the 
‘top-down’ thesis. The first concerns the absolute ideological position of left-wing 
parties. If parties are economically more to the left (e.g. support typical class 
related issues, maintain strong ties to labor unions and call for a strong welfare 
state to protect disadvantaged groups) it may further the salience of class in 
politics. And without such class orientated party strategy Evans, Heath and Payne 
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(1999: 88) argue class and vote are less strongly associated: ‘Party positions 
therefore create class allegiances’ and show in their study of Britain between 
1964 and 1997 that class voting diminishes when the Labour Party moves to the 
political centre. This thus implies that the effect of belonging to a particular social 
class on the probability of voting left-wing will be smaller when left-wing parties 
are positioned closer to the ideological centre. Therefore we formulate the 
‘left-wing party position hypothesis’: The association between social class and 
vote for left vs. right-wing parties is weaker as the Left-Right position of left-wing 
parties is more centrist (H3). 
The second version of the ‘top-down’ thesis concerns the relative positions of the 
parties on the left-right ideological dimension. The emphasis here is on the 
distance between the main party choices that voters face, rather than the degree 
to which Left-wing parties are ‘anchored’ in left-wing positions. Thus the British 
Labour Party is not unique in its attempt to renew its social-democratic principles 
in an era of post-industrialization, market liberalization and globalization (Kitschelt 
1999). After 1989 most socialist parties no longer advocate the socialization of 
industry but strive instead for a more humane form of capitalism (Esping-Anders-
en 1999; Lipset 1991; Przeworski 1985). Keman and Pennings (2006) have shown 
that many Social Democratic parties in Western Europe have experienced moves 
to the centre of their party systems during the 1990s. They also argue that 
Christian Democratic parties moved to the centre of party systems as well, 
causing political choices to converge. Keman and Pennings argue that 
convergence of traditional political parties creates the opportunity for new parties 
from both the left and right to fill the void on the wings of party systems or to 
challenge the positions of established parties. 
 Therefore the polarization of a party system, as an aggregate of all party 
positions, may affect class voting. If underprivileged classes support leftist parties 
because they favor redistributionist policies then the voting decision is dependent 
on the proximity between voter and party on socio-economic issues. From a set 
of alternatives a voter will pick the party closest to his/her own political beliefs 
(Downs 1957). Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960: 364) write that 
casting a class vote is more likely if voters ‘perceive that differences exist between 
parties that are relevant to class interest’ and Wessels and Schmitt (2008) have 
shown that the more polarized party systems are, the more relevant proximity is 
for voting. We expect that class differences in support for left-wing parties are 
smaller when the Left-Right polarization of a party system is weaker. Hence, our 
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‘polarization hypothesis’ reads that: The association between social class and 
vote for left vs. right-wing parties is lower in less polarized party systems (H4).
A final implication of the ‘top-down’ approach is that party changes in ideological 
positions can explain patterns of change in class voting. Thus if there has been a 
general pattern of movement to the centre by Left-wing parties or a convergence 
in the Left-right divisions between parties over time, this can explain over time 
changes in the class-vote relationship. By controlling for over time changes in the 
ideological position of Left-wing parties or the extent of ideological divisions 
between parties we expect to statistically remove the downward trend in class 
voting. We thus formulate the ‘political change hypothesis’: (a) Movement to the 
ideological centre by left-wing parties over time or (b) over time de-polarization of 
a party system should explain over time decline in class voting (H5). 
3.3 Data and measurement
3.3.1 Comparative Dataset of Cleavage Voting
To test our hypotheses we make use of the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage 
Voting (CDCV). In this chapter we select all surveys from CDCV-file in period for 
which Party Manifesto data is available. This results in a selection of surveys 
between 1960-2003 (2004 for the US, 2005 for the UK). We include only those 
respondents with valid information on party choice, social class, age (in years), 
gender (female=1) and education (recoded into years of education and 
standardized by country). Ultimately, our analyses are based on 188 surveys from 
15 countries with a total of 238.429 respondents. Table 3.1 shows the period 
covered for each country, the number of included surveys and the total number of 
respondents.
 In order to measure social class position we use the same four class-catego-
ries as in chapter 2: the manual working class (i.e. skilled and unskilled workers), 
the self-employed (i.e. petit bourgeois and farmers), the routine non-manual 
class, and the service class (i.e. lower and higher service class).
 In order to allow a cross-national and over time comparison of voting behavior 
we use a dichotomized measure of party choice. Therefore, we first standardized 
the respondent’s party choice by applying a fairly conventional party family 
categorization (primary source: Lane and Ersson 1999). Second, we dichotomized 
these party families on the basis of their traditional socio-economic appeal; 
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distinguishing between left-wing parties (socialist, communist, left-socialist) 
coded as (0) and right-wing parties, including religious parties (i.e.: liberal, 
conservative, agrarian, Christian democrats, and far right) coded as (1). For 
details consult Appendix A.2. Voters who voted for another party are excluded 
from the analyses6
3.3.2 Comparative Manifesto Data
To determine the ideological position of the parties and party blocs we construct 
a scale using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of 
election programs of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity 
and direction of statements by parties, measured in (‘quasi’) sentences in a 
program, are classified in 56 policy categories over seven policy domains (i.e. 
external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare 
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Table 3.1   Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting between 
1960-2003*
Country Period Number of 
surveys
N of 
respondents
% of total N
Australia 1965 – 2001 14 21,529 9.0
Austria 1974 – 2003 7 3,222 1.4
Belgium 1975 – 2003 5 7,355 3.1
Denmark 1971 – 2001 13 18,490 7.8
Finland 1972 – 2003 6 3,333 1.4
France 1967 – 2002 7 14,611 6.1
Germany 1969 – 2002 22 25,680 10.8
Italy 1968 – 2001 8 9,728 4.1
The Netherlands 1970 – 2002 19 18,226 7.6
Norway 1965 – 2001 10 10,974 4.6
Spain 1979 – 2000 7 14,130 5.9
Sweden 1972 – 2002 11 17,792 7.5
Switzerland 1971 – 2003 10 10,600 4.4
United Kingdom 1964 – 2005 17 27,997 11.7
United States 1960 – 2004 32 34,762 14.6
Total 1960 – 2005 188 238,429 100.0
*2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK. 
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and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups). Party positions in each 
country are matched to the individual level data on the basis of the corresponding 
election year or the last preceding election. 
 First, we construct a Right-Left party position only based on economic and 
welfare policy issues. Because these two policy domains are about class-relevant 
issues like social inequality, redistribution, the protection of underprivileged 
groups, welfare state expansion and economic principles, they are perhaps more 
closely associated with the traditional class conflict than the broad left-right scale 
by Laver and Budge7 (1992). We use three pre-constructed scales from the CMP 
data files: The planned economy scale is composed of the joint emphasis on the 
policy categories ‘market regulation: positive’, ‘economic planning: positive’ and 
‘controlled economy: positive’. The welfare scale consists of the policy categories 
‘social justice: positive’ and ‘welfare state expansion: positive’. And the market 
economy scale is constituted by the policy categories ‘free enterprise: positive’ 
and ‘economic orthodoxy: positive’. We combine these three scales with three 
items on social groups, i.e.: ‘labour groups: positive’, ‘middle class and 
professional groups’ and ‘labour groups: negative’. The first item measures 
‘favourable references to labour groups, working class, unemployed; support for 
trade unions; good treatment of manual and other employees’, whereas the 
second item measures ‘favourable references to middle class, professional 
groups, such as physicians or lawyers; old and new middle class’. ‘Labour groups: 
negative’ measures the ‘Abuse of power by trade unions’ and otherwise the 
reverse of ‘Labour groups: positive’. We create a social-economic Left-Right 
position (hereafter: L-R. position) by combining the scales as ((market economy 
+ middle class groups + negative labour groups) - (planned economy + welfare 
+ labour groups). 
 We use this L-R scale to measure the Left-Right position of Left-wing parties. 
Because our hypotheses are concerned with the position of left-wing parties as a 
group instead of individual parties we construct a weighted mean of this scale for 
the left-wing party group in each country-year combination. The weight of a party 
within this group is determined by its vote share in percentages. Because the 
CMP data only includes so-called ‘significant’ parties (parties with coalition 
potential or the ability of political blackmail, see CMP coding instructions) not all 
parties in Western post-war electoral history are covered in the CMP dataset. 
Therefore, we are not able to include the position of minor left-wing parties in 
calculating the mean position of the left-wing party group. In order to measure 
Party System Polarization we employ a measure suggested by Dalton (2008). Like 
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Figure 3.1   LR-positions of Left-wing parties and party polarization in 15 
 countries in the period 1960-2005
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other indicators of party polarization (e.g. Sigelman and Yough 1978) this index is 
calculated on the basis of the standard deviation from the average position of 
parties in a party system weighted by party size. 
 [1]
Where, N is the number of parties in the party system, if  is the vote share of a 
specific party, ix  is the LR-position of a party and ix  is the average LR-position 
of all parties in the party system. The metric of this index runs from 0 (all parties 
occupy the same position) to 10 (full polarization along the ends of the L-R 
scale).
3
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Table 3.2   Linear Trends (correlations with election year) in LR positions of left-
wing parties and LR party polarization in 15 countries (1960-2003a). 
Country N
LR position left-wing 
parties
LR party system 
polarization
Australia 17 0.41* -0.51**
Austria 13 -0.18 0.01
Belgium 14 -0.33 -0.82***
Denmark 17 -0.28 -0.21
Finland 12 0.19 -0.19
France 11 0.31 0.20
Germany 12 -0.23 0.42
Italy 11 -0.06 0.26
The Netherlands 13 0.62** -0.63***
Norway 11 -0.10 -0.36
Spain 8 -0.13 0.41
Sweden 14 0.63** -0.43
Switzerland 11 -0.12 0.38
United Kingdom 11 0.20 -0.23
United States 12 -0.16 -0.15
Total 187 0.11 -0.22***
a  2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project, Budge et al. 2001, 
Klingemann et al. 2006, own calculations
* p. < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Figure 3.1 shows the position of left-wing parties on the L-R scale, as well as the 
L-R party system polarization country by country from 1960 onwards. On the 
y-axis on the left-hand side, a higher score on the L-R scale means a more 
rightward (or centrist) position of left-wing parties. The second y-axis on the 
right-hand side portrays the degree of polarization of a party system based on the 
L-R scale. Whether or not the observed patterns in figure 3.1 follow a linear course 
is tested in table 3.2. This table shows the correlations between election year and 
the LR positions of left-wing parties for 15 countries separately as well as the 
correlation between election year and the party system polarization.
 The patterns in figure 3.1 and table 3.2 tell us that there is no clear sign of a 
universal movement of left-wing parties since the 1960s and where such 
movement is observed it does not follow a linear trend in most cases. This was 
also a conclusion of Achterberg’s (2006) analysis of the overall salience of class 
issues in elections using the CMP data between 1945 and 1998. The only clear 
signs of de-polarization in table 3.2 are observed in Australia, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Sweden. In these countries there has been 
a rightward shift of left-wing parties since the 1960s and the L-R party system 
polarization decreased over this period has well. 
3.4 Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation 
3.4.1 First stage analyses 
Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation method (Achen 2005) involves estimating a 
separate regression analysis for each survey (188) within our dataset. Given the 
categorical nature of our dependent variable we use binary logit models for these 
first-stage estimations. These models provide the multivariate effects of social 
class (with the manual class as the reference category) controlled for age, gender, 
and education on the probability of voting right versus left-wing. The ‘net’ class 
coefficients (i.e. with controls) then become the variables to be explained at the 
second level. We use the natural logarithm of the odds ratios as the dependent 
variables in the second stage analyses, because it has the advantage of being 
asymptotically normally distributed (Agresti 2002). The log-odds ratio is a relative 
measure of cleavage strength and has been used in previous research to study 
class voting (see Chapter 1). In the analysis at the second stage, we take into 
account that the estimated log-odds ratio’s from the first stage differ in reliability, 
due to differences in sample size or to differences in the extent of class voting. 
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Therefore, we use a case weight in the analysis which gives more weight to 
log-odds ratios with a lower standard error (Smits and Park 2009). In a second 
series of first-stage analyses we also estimated the ‘gross’ effects of social class, 
i.e.: without controlling for age, gender, and education. We hypothesized that 
over-time differences in the association between class and vote are (partly) 
explained by accounting for changes in the composition of electorates. We 
therefore present an evaluation of both series of the first stage estimations. First, 
we present country-by-country graphs of the net log-odd estimates in figures 
3.2a (routine non-manual class), 3.2b (service class) and 3.2c (self-employed) as 
well as the fitted trend lines. In order to visualize the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the estimates we also present the corresponding standard error 
intervals. Second, because of the sometimes modest difference between the net 
and gross log-odds ratios we do not present the gross effects in figure 3.2, and 
thus we confine ourselves to the implied fitted trend lines.
 We first discuss the gross association between class and vote. Over all 
countries and years in our first stage models, the results confirm the expectation 
that the working class is generally less right-wing than other classes. As expected 
we find the largest differences in voting between the manual working class and 
the self-employed (mean log-odds ratio = 1.39), followed by the service class 
(mean log-odds ratio = 0.83). The smallest differences in voting in our models 
exist between the manual working class and the routine non-manual class (mean 
log-odds ratio = 0.56). In general we see the differences between classes decline 
in the period between 1960s-70s and the 2000s. For the routine non-manual 
class, the service class and the self-employed it holds that the odds of voting for 
a right-wing party generally have decreased over the last four decades, causing 
the political choices of different classes to convergence over time. Despite this 
decline the order of right-wing voting between classes for the most part persists: 
In 2000-2005 the self-employed are most different from the manual working class 
(mean log-odds ratio = 1.13); followed by the service class (mean log-odds ratio 
= 0.34) and the routine non-manual class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.19). But we 
clearly observe a sharp decline in the political differences between the manual 
working class and the service class.
 With regard to cross-national differences figures 3.2a-3.2c reveal that 
class-based voting is the strongest in Northern Europe (Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland) and the United Kingdom. Also in Norway relatively high log-odds ratios 
are observed, but figure 3.2b also shows a clear decline in this country in the 
differences between the service class and the manual working class in the period 
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Figure 3.2a   Estimated log-odds ratios for routine non-manual class to vote 
right-wing relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, 
gender, education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005
103
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Figure 3.2b   Estimated log-odds ratios for service class to vote right-wing 
 relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, gender, 
education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005
104
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Figure 3.2c   Estimated log-odds ratios for self-employed to vote right-wing 
 relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, gender, 
education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005
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1965-2001. The lowest levels of class voting are found in Italy, France, Switzerland 
and the United States. Nonetheless, in all countries that we observe the political 
differences relative to the working class are most prominent for the self-employed, 
and are the smallest for the routine non-manual class. Moreover, in most countries 
the general pattern of declining class differences is confirmed8. The boundaries 
between the routine non-manual class and the working class seem to have 
declined only modestly in the majority of cases, but this is hardly surprising giving 
the finding that the political differences between these two classes were always 
smaller compared to the distance between the working class and other classes. 
In nearly all countries the decline of class voting is most apparent with respect to 
the working class versus service class. But the self-employed are also, in almost 
all countries, decreasingly inclined to vote right-wing relative to the working class. 
The most notable exception to the general pattern is the United States. In the US 
differences in voting between working class voters and the self-employed 
increased rather than decreased. 
 Let us now turn to the net log-odds estimates in figures 3.2a-3.2c. Over all 
countries and years the net estimates are, as expected somewhat weaker than 
the gross estimates, but the differences are rather small. Controlling for age, 
gender and education only modestly explains the voting differences between the 
routine non-manual class and working class (mean log-odds ratio decline = 0.04) 
and between the self-employed and working class (mean log-odds ratio decline 
= 0.03). Controlling for age, gender and education has the largest effect on the 
political differences between the service class and the working class (mean log 
odds ratio decline = 0.14, which is on average about 20 percent of the association). 
With respect to the service class figure 3.2b shows that not only the net log-odds 
ratios are on average lower than the gross log-odds ratios but also that in most 
countries the slopes of the fitted trend lines are weaker in case of the controlled 
association. With regard to the routine non-manual class and the self-employed 
the differences between the controlled and uncontrolled fitted slopes are less 
apparent.
 What is not shown in the figures is that in general older people more often 
(mean b = 0.008) and females less often (mean b= -0.04) vote right-wing, 
although the effects of age and gender are often not significant. In this sense the 
most prominent control is education. On average for all the whole period between 
1960-2005 we find that the more years of education the more likely a person is to 
vote right-wing (mean b = 0.19), but in most countries this association is weakening 
over time. These findings to some extent support the social change hypothesis 
3
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that over-time differences in the association between class and vote are explained 
by accounting for individual social characteristics of voters. Our results indicate 
that the changing composition of the electorate is partly responsible for the 
decreasing political differences between the service class and the working class, 
but not so much for the differences between the working class and the routine 
non-manual class or self-employed. 
3.4.2 Second-stage analyses
At the second stage each survey is used as one observation (N=188), and we use 
the net log-odds ratios as the dependent variables measuring the levels of class 
voting. Because we investigate three different class contrasts we have three 
dependent variables at the second stage. Because our observations at this stage 
are hierarchically clustered in countries we employ a multilevel analysis9 analyzing 
188 survey-observations nested in 15 countries. We use robust standard errors in 
a multilevel linear regression where we add case weights to control for the 
standard errors of the estimated log-odds ratios (c.f. Smits and Park 2009). 
Descriptive statistics of the second-stage variables are presented in table 3.3. 
We begin our second-stage tests by examining the correlations between the 
log-odds ratios measuring the strength of class voting and the independent 
variables. Table 3.4 shows the zero-order correlation matrix of the second-stage 
variables. Naturally, we observe positive correlations between the log-odds ratios 
corresponding to different class contrasts. On the basis of table 3.4 we notice the 
differences in whether these log-odds ratios correlate with the independent 
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Table 3.3   Descriptive statistics of second-stage variables
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Log-odds routine non-manual class a 188 0.52 0.33 -1.45 1.40
Log-odds service class a 188 0.69 0.46 -0.22 2.34
Log-odds self-employed a 188 1.36 0.70 -0.01 3.66
LR position of left-wing parties 188  -20.51 8.41 -57.65 1.12
LR party system polarization 188 1.08 0.48 0.10 2.44
Year of survey 188 1985 10.39 1960 2005
a cases weight on the basis of their first-stage standard error estimation
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variables. First, the log-odds ratios of the routine non-manual class do not seem 
to be correlated with the LR position of left-wing parties. But there is a positive 
correlation (r=0.294) with party system polarization. The larger the left/right 
polarization between parties the more likely routine non-manual class voters will 
support a right-wing party instead of a left-wing party relative to the working class. 
Second, the log-odds ratios of the service class and self-employed both show 
significant correlations with the two manifesto-based scales. Service class and 
self-employed voters less often vote right versus left-wing as left-wing parties 
adopt more rightist positions (r=-0.227 and r=-0.404) and more often vote 
right-wing as the party system polarization is greater (r=0.363 and r=0.309). 
 The correlations between the log-odds ratios of class voting and a linear 
measure of year confirm our findings based on the plots in figure 3.2. Year of 
survey is positively correlated with the log-odds ratios of the routine non-manual 
class (r=0.241) and the service class (r=0.330), suggesting declining differences 
in class voting over time. With regard to the self-employed, we however find no 
significant correlation between the log-odds ratios and year in table 3.4. However, 
if we exclude all observations based on US-surveys and calculate the correlation 
based on the remaining 156 observation we find a significant and positive 
correlation between log-odds ratio and year for the self-employed (r=0.280). This 
finding confirms what we already noted in figure 3.2c. In spite of a general decline 
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Table 3.4   Correlation matrix of second-stage variables
2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1.  Log-odds routine  
non-manual class (N=188)
0.692*** 0.309*** -0.100 0.294*** -0.241***
2.  Log-odds service class 
(N=188)
- 0.544*** -0.227*** 0.363*** -0.330***
3.  Log-odds self-employed 
(N=188)
- -0.404*** 0.309*** -0.072
4.  LR position of left-wing 
parties (N=187) a
- -0.399*** 0.108
5.  LR Party System Polarization 
(N=187) a
- -0.215***
6. Year of survey -
a Correlation based on 187 observations in Comparative Manifesto Dataset (2001, 2006) for all election 
years between 1960 and 2005 for 15 countries
* p. < 0.1: ** p < 0.05: *** p < 0.01
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of the political differences between the self-employed and the working class in 
most countries, we observe an increase of these differences in the US. 
 Finally table 3.4 shows a negative correlation between the LR position of 
left-wing parties and party system polarization (r=-0.399). In other words, as 
expected a more right-wing position of left-wing parties is associated with low 
party system polarization. However, as we already found in table 1, contrary to 
our expectations the LR position of left-wing parties is not significantly correlated 
with year. This finding suggests that there is no sign of a gradual, universal 
movement of left-wing parties in the period 1960-2005. Party system polarization 
on the other hand is linearly associated with year (r=-0.215). This negative 
relationship suggests a pattern of gradual depolarization, although we have seen 
in table 3.2 that this is not the case in all countries.
 We continue our second-stage test by presenting the results of a series of 
multilevel linear regression analyses. Because we investigate three class contrasts 
we show the results of our models for three different log-odds ratios as the 
dependent variable. We start in table 3.5 by reporting a null model which shows 
the extent to which there is within-country and between-country variation in the 
levels of class voting. With respect to the routine non-manual class the null model 
shows that the survey-level variance is 0.070 and the country-level variance is 
0.045. The implied intra class correlation ((0.045/(0.045+0.070)) = 0.39) indicates 
that not only is there variation in the estimated log-odds between surveys but also 
considerable variation between countries. With respect to the service class and 
the self-employed the intra class correlation is even higher, 0.45 and 0.75 
respectively. 
 Next, we model trends in class voting by introducing a linear measure of year. 
Given the fact that the plots of the first stage estimated log-odds in figure 3.2 
showed that the decline of class voting is not entirely a gradual process and that 
trends differ from country to country we tried to model these trends in various 
ways (i.e.10-year categories, 5-year categories, linear with a random intercept, 
linear with both random intercept and slope). Goodness-of-fit statistics and 
likelihood ratio tests (see appendix C) showed that including year of survey linearly 
with both a random intercept and slope in general proved to be the preferred 
model. Only with respect to the routine non-manual class the random slope model 
is rejected in favor of the random intercept model. In model I we therefore first 
present a random intercept model with the effect of year fixed over countries, and 
in model II we present a random coefficient model with a random slope of year for 
each country. To interpret the mean intercept of the random coefficient model we 
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centered the linear measure of year (1985 = 0). Both models I and II show negative 
year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. These estimates confirm 
that differences in voting between the working class and other classes haves 
declined in recent decades. The most clear sign of decline is found with regard to 
the service class (mean slope = -0.213). Because the random slope variance is 
significant with respect to the service class and self-employed this confirms that 
the linear trends in class voting vary between countries. In figure 3.3 we plotted 
the country-specific trends on the basis of table 3.5, model II. The association 
between class and vote for right vs. left-wing parties has indeed declined since 
the 1960s in most countries, again with the self-employed in the US as the most 
notable exception. The linear trends in figure 3.3 show great resemblance to the 
fitted trend lines in figures 3.2a-3.2c. Despite observed deviations from the linear 
trend in figure 3.2 we find support for our gradual change hypothesis in table 3.5. 
In additional analyses we estimated models I and II on the basis of the gross 
instead of net first-stage log-odds ratios (see appendix C). By comparing the 
‘gross’ mean slopes of year with the ‘net’ results in table 3.5 we can assess to 
what extent social changes account for the linear decline of class voting. With 
respect to the controlled and uncontrolled log-odds ratios of the self-employed 
the mean slope of linear year does hardly differ. In case of the service class and 
the routine non-manual class, the mean slope of year respectively is 25% and 
35% weaker regressing the controlled log-odds ratios instead of the uncontrolled 
log odds ratios. These findings support the social change hypothesis in the sense 
that gradual decline of the association between class and vote is partly accounted 
for by social characteristics of voters.
  In model III of table 3.5, we include the LR position of parties. Critics of the 
Comparative Manifesto Project argue that they are most appropriate for 
within-country comparisons but not necessarily for between-country comparisons. 
In preliminary analyses we therefore included random slopes of the manifesto 
scales allowing these variables to have a different effect in each country. However, 
testing the variance of these slopes using likelihood ratio tests (see appendix C) 
we found that allowing random slopes did not result in better model fits. We 
therefore rejected the random-coefficient models in favor of the random-intercept 
models and included the LR positions of left-wing parties with a fixed slope over 
countries. We find that, allowing country-specific trends in class voting, positions 
of left-wing parties do not significantly affect the log-odds ratios for the routine 
non-manual class, the service class or the self-employed. In other words, the 
likelihood of other classes voting right-wing relative to the working class does not 
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Figure 3.3   Predictions of country-specific trends in class voting(a) with a  
random intercept and slope for year
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decrease when left-wing parties are further to the ideological right. This finding 
refutes the left-wing party position hypothesis
 In model IV we add party system polarization to our models. We find significant 
and positive effects of polarization on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. As 
the ideological polarization in a party system is greater the first-stage estimated 
log-odds ratios for voting right-wing increase. This finding suggests that, allowing 
country-specific trends in class voting, the routine non-manual class (0.104), the 
service class (0.125) and the self-employed (0.137) are more inclined to vote 
right-wing as the differences between political parties are larger. Thus the 
association between social class and vote declines as the party system 
polarization decreases, therefore the polarization hypothesis is supported10, 
although the size of this effect is rather modest. The latter is indicated in figure 3.4 
by the plotted effect of LR party system polarization on the basis of model IV. 
However, the negative year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing are 
not substantially reduced by including party system polarization. In both model III 
and IV we observe negative year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. 
Therefore the political change hypothesis is refuted: neither shifts to the center by 
left party families nor party system polarization account for the over time linear 
decline of class voting.
3
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Figure 3.4   Plotted effect of party polarization on the log-odds ratio to vote 
right-wing relative to the working class (year is fixed at 1985)
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3.5 Conclusion 
Social class is undeniably weakening as a basis of party choice. We not only 
observe patterns towards smaller class differences in the majority of the countries 
in this chapter, we also find a general pattern towards converging class differences 
in the pooled analyses. The differences between the service class and the working 
class have lost much of their strength. The difference between the self-employed 
and the working class is also, in general, weakening. The most apparent exception 
to the general pattern is the United States, where differences in voting between 
the working class and the self-employed are increasing rather than decreasing. 
 Although, our results are consistent with the erosion of class voting in modern 
democracies, they do not signal the end of class politics. Class continues to have 
an impact on party choice in most countries and, despite the decline of the 
magnitude of differences, the order in which classes favor left or right parties for 
the most part endures: thus across the 45 year period the self-employed are the 
most different from the manual working class, followed by the service class and 
the routine non-manual class. Moreover, as shown by the plotted country figures 
the process of a class politics breakdown is not always gradual in nature. But 
despite the deviations from the linear trends in particular countries the general 
pattern based on our cross-national analyses is one of gradual decline. 
 We also aimed to explain variation in the association between class and vote 
by accounting for changes in both the social structure and political structure of 
societies. Our results support the idea of compositional changes leading to 
changes in class voting; changes in background characteristics (age, gender, 
and education) are partly responsible for the decline in political divisions between 
classes. This is primarily due to changes in the relationship between education 
and class position. As educational level is generally rising in post-industrial 
societies this development offers a ‘bottom-up’ explanation for changes in levels 
of class voting - especially between the routine non-manual class/service class 
and the working class. 
 As well as examining ‘bottom-up’ explanations for the levels of class voting we 
tested two versions of the ‘top-down’ perspective on class voting. We did not find 
evidence for the idea that left-right positions of left-wing parties alone influence 
the association between class and vote. We do find, however, that when ideological 
differences between political parties are smaller the association between class 
and vote is weaker (see also Elff 2009). This indicates that the extent of class-related 
political choices presented to voters does influence the extent to which they vote 
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along class lines. There is therefore evidence of a ‘top-down’ direction of influence. 
In order to detect this, however, it is important to investigate party positions of 
different parties in relation to each other. The absolute position of left parties on 
the ideological continuum is not predictive of levels of class voting. Only the 
extent of left-right party system polarization appears to matter. This suggests this 
‘top-down’ effect relates to instrumental calculations about the differences 
between parties presented to voters, rather than simple voter-party proximity. 
 What this pattern of ‘top-down’ influence fails to do, however, is explain the 
over time trends in class voting. The reason for this can be seen from the lack of 
any consistent correlation between left-party moves to the centre, or party 
ideological convergence, and time itself. In some countries left parties have 
moved to the centre over time and/or there has been ideological convergence, 
but in others these patterns have been absent. At a country level we might expect 
to find party ideological convergence accounting for a decline in class voting 
(Evans, Heath and Payne 1999) but we should not expect to find this at the more 
general level examined here. In the next chapter we will investigate whether class 
voting in the Netherlands is affected by differences and changes in party’s social-
economic positions and as well as their ‘conservative vs. progressive’ positions. 
The Netherlands are particularly interesting because it is among the few countries 
in this chapter where we found a clear pattern of depolarization of the party 
system on the traditional left-right dimension. 
 Clearly this analysis represents an early stage of systematic research into 
‘top-down’ effects, the presence of which have previously usually been inferred 
from narrative accounts of party strategies (i.e. Mair et al. 2004), and the limitations 
of the study need to be kept in mind. There is undoubtedly measurement error in 
the CMP data and because of the need for cross-national comparability our 
measures are of the Left-right position of party family groups rather than individual 
parties. In further work it might be useful to compare the effect of party positions 
on class voting using different methods of measuring party positions, i.e. 
manifesto data, expert surveys and perceived party positions. Within-country 
comparisons in single country studies may also be necessary to allow more 
detailed measures of party positions. Currently, however, the Comparative 
Manifesto Data is the only available evidence on party positions across a wide 
range of countries over many years. The scope of our large-scale comparison did 
also not allow the use of more refined measures of social class and party families. 
In the British case for example our categorization of party choice results in 
merging the Liberal-Democrats with the Conservatives instead of Labour. With 
3
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this recoding we are unable to detect the collapse of class voting in the 1997 
elections as found by Evans and Tilley (2011). Moreover, our pooled data also do 
not allow the inclusion of other individual level background characteristics, and 
these other factors may well play a significant role in explaining declining levels of 
class voting. Given the emphasis on redistribution of resources as a rationale for 
left-wing voting individual ideology on the economic left-right dimension, for 
example,  may be such a factor. Neither of these limitations undermine the 
evidence we have presented showing party system polarization impacts on class 
voting however. So this chapter provides an important step towards expanding 
the examination of cleavage change beyond ‘bottom-up’ processes to those 
involving the relevance of the choices that parties provide for voters: in other 
words, ‘top-down’ influences. 
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Notes
5 However, socio-demographic change alone is not sufficient to explain party behavior: As Kitschelt (1999: 
344) points out, party strategy depends on political-economic conditions, and the competitive setting 
of elections as well as party organizational features. Kitschelt (1994: 41) calls it ‘naïve’ to treat left-wing 
electoral support as a direct function of the proportion of blue-collar workers in the labour force. 
6 In our categorization far-right or nationalist parties as treated as right-wing despite their appeal to the 
working class. Excluding far-right parties from the analyses does not substantially change the results. On 
average the estimated class-coefficients at the first stage are somewhat higher, and the trends modeled 
at the second stage are somewhat less steep. But there are no substantial changes in the effect of LR 
positions of left-wing parties or in the effect of party system polarization. The category of left-wing par-
ties does not include Green parties. Including Green parties in the analyses also does not substantially 
change the results. On average the estimated class-coefficients at the first stage are somewhat lower, 
and the trends modeled at the second stage are somewhat steeper. But again there are no substantial 
changes in the effect of LR positions of left-wing parties or in the effect of party system polarization.
7 We also used the Left-Right scale as given by Laver and Budge (1992) which we coded in such a manner 
that it (theoretically) ranges from completely left (-100) to completely right (+100). Because this scale is a 
combination of 26 policy categories (13 left - 13 right) related to all seven policy domains in the CMP data 
it is a measure of the overall Left-Right party position. However, our analyses showed that a scale based 
on more specific class-relevant policy issues is more strongly associated with levels of class voting. 
8 With regard to the extent to which the trend lines fit the estimated points country by country (Achen 2005: 
455) we emphasize the relatively poor fit of the trend lines for Switzerland in figure 3.2a and Finland in 
figure 3.2b.
9 Multilevel models in this chapter are estimated using the stata program gllamm (Rabe-Hesketh &  Skrondal 
2008).
10 We employed two robustness checks. First, we repeated the analyses while each time excluding one 
the countries. In the case of all three dependent variables, excluding specific countries did not produce 
substantially different results with respect to the parameter estimates of party polarization. In all cases a 
higher level of party system polarization is associated with higher log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. Sec-
ond, we tried another indicator for polarization. We replace party system polarization with the ideological 
range in a party system (measured as the distance on the L-R scale between the most right-wing party 
and the most left-wing party in a party system). No substantially different results were found, and these 
findings confirm our results with respect to party system polarization. 
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Trends in Cleavage Voting in the Netherlands
Part II |

Class Voting, Social Changes and Political 
Changes in the Netherlands 1971-2006 *
*  A slightly different version of this chapter is accepted for publication in Electoral Studies. Co-authors are 
Nan Dirk de Graaf and Ariana Need.
Chapter 4|

123
4. 1 Introduction
Like in many other Western European countries class-based voting has become 
much weaker in the Netherlands (De Graaf 1996; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2008; 
Need 1997; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999; Van der Kolk 2000). Although there 
is a fair amount of speculation about the causes of this trend, there is not much 
research that systematically tries to explain the decline in class-based voting. 
Among the few studies addressing the decline of traditional social cleavages in 
the Netherlands De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) have explored the interaction 
between the available political options and the class position and religious 
affiliation of voters. Theoretically, their study contributed to the idea that “in 
understanding the evolving political impact of social divisions it is important to 
recognize that political behavior results from the interplay between social and 
political forces” (2001: 3). De Graaf et al. showed that the decline in religious-
based voting in the Netherlands was affected by the merging of the three main 
denominational parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). With respect 
to class voting they did not find that the downward trends were influenced by the 
merging of four radical left-wing parties into GreenLeft (‘GroenLinks’). 
 In previous chapters we labeled the distinction and interaction between social 
changes and political choices as the ‘bottom-up’ and the ‘top-down’ perspectives 
on class voting. Most explanations in the literature for the decline in class-based 
voting are of sociological nature and emphasize factors related to the class 
composition of electorates and the relevance of class divisions in society. These 
‘bottom-up’ explanations often assume one or more of the following processes 
(see also Chapter 1 and 3): The income and living standard of workers are rising 
and are increasingly similar to those of the middle class, partly because there is 
also a growing group of low-paid and low-status white collar employees (Dalton 
2008); New ‘post-industrial’ and value-cleavages have replaced or cross-cut the 
class-based conflict; And rising levels of education and ‘cognitive mobilization’ 
have enlarged voter’s ability to make political choices independent from old 
class-based loyalties. The traditional economic boundaries between classes 
have, as is often assumed, become blurred. The social and political  distinctiveness 
of social classes have in consequence declined. Due to processes like de- 
industrialization and market liberalization the number of working-class laborers 
declined. At the same time the service class grew rapidly and became increasingly 
heterogeneous, creating new lines for political conflict. What all these explanations 
have in common is that they use changes in social structure as the main source 
4
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for changes in political choices, therefore shaping the class-vote relationship 
from the bottom up. 
 Political parties are assumed to adapt to the changing social circumstances. 
As the working class is shrinking and the service class is growing, political parties, 
especially those on the left, are expected to target middle class voters instead of 
working-class laborers (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986). And when the 
economic boundaries between classes are weakening, all parties may be 
expected to address new political issues that appeal to voters in non-economic 
terms. The significance of new political issues in society may also reveal itself in 
the emergence of new parties with new political agendas. For all these processes, 
the implication is that the political relevance of class is reduced because parties 
respond to social change. Evans (2000) and De Graaf et al. (2001) have contrasted 
this ‘sociological determinist’ perspective with the alternative view that political 
changes are contributions towards, rather than simply reflections of, the evolution 
of political cleavages. They argue that an actual voting choice will reflect the 
political options available to voters as well as their social situation. From this 
perspective class voting is conditioned by the extent to which political parties 
emphasize class issues rather than with the strength of class divisions in society 
(Oskarson 2005). De Graaf et al. (2001) argue that under different political 
circumstances identical social structures may in theory result in different patterns 
of voting behavior. These arguments add a ‘top-down’ perspective to a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective: Not simply social changes, but also class-relevant policy choices 
offered to voters have an additional effect on the class-vote relationship (Evans, 
Heath and Payne 1999; Oskarson 2005; Elff 2009). The Netherlands is particularly 
interesting because not only social changes have been prominent, but, as we 
also observed in the previous chapter there have also been substantial changes 
in Dutch politics. The question that we aim to answer is this chapter is: To what 
extent can the decline in class voting in the Netherlands be explained by social 
and political changes?
 The effects of political factors on the class-vote association are rarely directly 
measured. Most studies infer a ‘top-down’ influence by examining time-specific 
changes in the strength of class voting that coincide with party shifts or changes 
in the party system (Evans, Heath and Payne 1991; Hill and Leighley 1996; De 
Graaf et al. 2001; Andersen and Heath 2003). The measurement of actual party 
positions, as is done in the studies of Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), Oskarson 
(2005) and Elff (2009) is a quite recent innovation to the class voting research. In 
this chapter we investigate two types of changes in political choices in the 
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Netherlands. Using more data and more differentiated measures of social class 
and party choice, we reexamine De Graaf et al.’s question whether the emergence 
of GreenLeft led to any class realignment. But additionally, using data of the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) we 
examine the interaction between party positions and social class. We aim to test 
to what extent class voting in the Netherlands is affected by changes in party’s 
‘old’ social-economic positions and ‘new’ conservative-progressive positions. 
We set out to examine these ‘top-down’ changes after accounting for the 
‘bottom-up’ process of blurring class boundaries. De Graaf et al. (2001) assume 
a process of blurring boundaries by modeling linear class voting trends in the 
Netherlands without accounting for the social distinctiveness of classes. Instead 
of simply inferring societal homogenization we test to what extent trends in class 
voting are interpreted by differences between voters in their economic ideology 
and level of education. Our hypotheses are tested using data from eleven surveys 
of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) 1971-2006 supplemented by 
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project for Dutch political parties.
4.2  Bottom-up: Changes in the class structure of the 
Netherlands
4.2.1 The rise of a ‘new’ social class within the service class
The occupational structure of the Netherlands has changed considerably in the 
past four decades. We observe a contracting working class and an expanding 
service class. The manual class has shrunk from more than 40 % of the working 
electorate in 1970 to less than 30 % in 2004 (Güveli 2006). To understand class 
voting, the simple distinction between blue- and white-collar classes no longer 
suffices (cf. Nieuwbeerta 1995). In a large scale international comparison 
Nieuwbeerta distinguished the unskilled manual class, the skilled manual class, 
the petty bourgeoisie, the routine non-manual class, and the lower-, and upper 
service classes. His findings showed that the distinction between manual and 
non-manual work has become less relevant due to changing class structures. 
Indeed, more recent research shows that due to changes in employment patterns 
and class structure also this more elaborate class distinction is no longer optimal. 
In the Netherlands, the majority of the employed male population works in the 
high and low service classes. These are the high- and low-grade professionals 
and managers, known as classes I and II of the EGP class schema (Ganzeboom 
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and Luijkx 2004). When combined these two service classes increased in size 
from 31% in 1970 to more than 50% in 2004 (Güveli 2006). Güveli and De Graaf 
(2007) and Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2007a, 2007b) argue that in post-industri-
al societies, two extra sub-classes should be distinguished within the service 
class: i.e. the socio-cultural specialists (e.g. social workers, teachers, lawyers) 
and the technocrats (e.g. engineers, accountants, and office managers). Construct 
and criterion validation tests (Güveli 2006) support these new class distinctions. 
Even after taking level and field of education into account these distinctions help 
to account for political choices (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). We will 
therefore apply this adjusted class schema in this chapter. Figure 4.1 reports the 
percentage of social and cultural specialists and technocrats in the labor force. It 
confirms that the service class in the Netherlands expanded a great deal (De 
Graaf and Steijn 1997). The increase applies both to the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats. Due to the increase of the population in higher 
class positions the relative size of the manual class has declined considerably. 
  
4.2.2 Compositional changes and the blurring of class boundaries
The aforementioned changes in the size of class categories can be conceived of 
as compositional changes. When the class-vote association is measured in (log) 
odds ratio’s (as in the present case) compositional changes not necessarily affect 
the strength of the association because the odds ratio is invariant to the marginal 
totals. We argue that it is necessary to distinguish compositional changes from 
the blurring of class boundaries. As said, the processes of blurring boundaries 
will result in less distinctive classes. Traditionally, class-based political conflict is 
related to economic divisions is society. The less privileged classes support leftist 
parties that stand for greater socio-economic equality. In opposition to the 
working class members from other classes have less interest in redistributionist 
policies, and are assumed to vote for economic conservative parties on the right. 
The decline of traditional class divisions is often attributed to the decrease of 
economic differences between classes or the increase of economic differences 
within classes. Growing economic homogeneity between classes involves that 
members of different classes increasingly have common living standards or 
income characteristics. The heterogenization of classes, on the other hand, 
resulted in growing economic and cultural differences within particular classes, 
reducing a sense of shared identity and interest. We expect that the blurring of 
class divisions are a continuing and relatively gradual processes which ultimately 
lead to a convergence in their political preferences. We therefore expect that: The 
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association between class and party choice becomes generally weaker. The odds 
ratios between class and vote would therefore be expected to decline. (H1).
 The heterogenization of the service class, which led to the rise of a ‘new’ 
social class of social-cultural specialists, may have resulted in more differentiated 
patterns of voting behavior. The socio-cultural specialists and technocrats are 
especially different with respect two to characteristics. First, it is relatively more 
difficult for employers to monitor the work performance, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, of socio-cultural specialists than the work performance of 
technocrats. Second, socio-cultural specialists have specific skills and knowledge 
involving social services and social-cultural issues, and they more often work in a 
public or non-profit field (e.g. health, education) that requires state support. So-
cial-cultural specialists therefore have developed a distinct leftist political 
orientation (Güveli and De Graaf 2007; Güveli, Need and De Graaf 2007a, 2007b). 
Güveli et al. (2007b) found that over the last three decades the low-social cultural 
specialists had become the most leftist class in the Netherlands. We thus 
formulate the following hypothesis about class voting within the service class: 
The decline of the association between class and vote weakened the odds of 
technocrats to vote left vs. right, relative to the manual class, but reversed the 
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Figure 4.1   Trends in the percentage of social and cultural specialists and 
 technocrats in the Dutch labor force between 1980 and 2004
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odds of social-cultural specialists to vote left vs. right relative to the manual class 
(H1b). 
 The class cleavage is related to nearly all material concerns of voters in 
modern democracies, e.g. improvement of living standards, maintaining economic 
security, the distribution of economic rewards, income taxation, unemployment 
and inflation (Dalton 2008). We therefore assume that the blurring of class divisions 
should show up in the ideological differences between classes. The relevant 
ideological dimension in this respect is the left-right dimension related to economic 
progressivism/conservatism. We expect that due to rising living standards and 
income levels economic ideology has become less associated with class 
differences. As the ideological differences about redistribution between classes 
decrease, the class basis of voting should diminish. Hence, we formulate: The 
decline of the association between class and party choice becomes less strong 
when we take voters’ economic ideology into account (H2). 
 Of course, Lipset already suggested that the working class is perhaps 
ideologically on left on the basis of socioeconomic issues but certainly not with 
regard to cultural issues (Lipset 1959). From this perspective, the association 
between class and vote is declining because working class conservatism is 
increasingly relevant to predict party choice (e.g. Van der Waal, Achterberg and 
Houtman 2007). However, in this chapter we cannot test to what extent cultural 
conservative ideology accounts for the decline in class voting because we lack a 
direct comparable measure of individual cultural conservatism in our data. But we 
are able to indirectly test this claim in three ways. First, the use of manifesto data 
enables us to consider the impact of cultural conservatism at the party level. We 
can test if, and to what extent manual workers are less likely to vote for a party 
when it is more culturally progressive. Second, we may expect that when 
non-economic cleavages are increasingly relevant for political interests, the 
influence of peoples’ economic ideology on voting has declined in the past 
decades. Third, a higher education is associated with cultural liberal attitudes 
and values (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). From a cultural perspective 
the lower educated will vote for right-wing parties cross-cutting traditional 
class-based voting (Van der Waal et al. 2007). We therefore may expect that as 
cultural issues are increasingly important to predict vote choice, the influence of 
education on voting has increased in recent decades. Hence, we formulate: The 
association between voters’ economic ideology and party choice becomes 
generally weaker (H3a), and the association between education and party choice 
becomes generally stronger (H3b).
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4.3  Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands
4.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos
Instead of merely reflecting social changes, parties may contribute to yet more 
blurring of class boundaries. Facing the decline of the working class left-wing 
parties may adopt a more middle class orientated appeal (cf. Przeworski and 
Sprague 1986). By abandoning class-relevant policy programs left-wing parties 
reduce the distinct political voice of the working class, which may decrease their 
distinct class identity, group solidarity and political awareness (De Graaf et al. 
2001). In this sense, the political relevance of class is, at least in part, a product of 
the behavior of parties and politicians that choose to politicize it or not (Evans and 
Whitefield 2006). It is assumed that the strength of class voting is conditioned by 
the extent to which parties offer choices that are relevant to economic differences 
between classes. If left-wing parties take more centrist positions (e.g. appeal to the 
middle class, have weaker ties to unions and call for retrenchment of the welfare 
state), thus reducing the socio-economic differences relative to other parties, it may 
weaken working-class allegiance to left-wing parties. In appealing to, the growing 
number of, new middle class voters left-wing parties may also be expected to 
emphasize non-economic issues in their campaigns. Especially the new class of 
social-cultural specialists holds progressives attitudes favoring democratization, 
multiculturalism and environmental protection (Güveli et al. 2007). By appealing to 
the liberal values of this group left-wing parties may give them a distinct political 
voice and strengthen their sense of shared interest and identity. But in doing so, 
left-wing politicians will estrange themselves from their traditional social basis of 
manual workers that hold more cultural conservative attitudes. 
 Assuming interaction between party positions and class categories we expect 
that members from the working class generally favor parties that are economically 
progressive, and members from other classes generally prefer parties that are 
economically more conservative. With respect to non-economic issues 
(conservative vs. progressive) the opposite may be true. Members from the 
working are more likely to vote for a party that is culturally conservative, whereas 
other classes prefer parties that are culturally more progressive. Keman and 
Pennings (2006) have shown that there is a general tendency in European 
countries for major parties to convergence with respect to economic differences 
and diverge with respect to progressive/conservative issues. We expect that the 
relevance of economic differences between voters will decline as parties become 
less distinct in their economic policies, as happened in the Dutch case (Pennings 
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and Keman 2008). The depolarization of political parties with respect to their so-
cial-economic positions may have had an independent impact on the voting 
behavior of classes. Alternatively, polarization on non-economic differences, in 
which the voting preferences of classes are assumed to be reversed (Achterberg 
and Houtman 2006), may be responsible for the decline in class voting. We 
therefore formulate the hypothesis that: The decline of the association between 
class and vote becomes less strong when we take the differences and changes 
into account with respect to the ideological position of parties (H4). 
 Second, it may be expected that as a result of the economic convergence of 
the political parties, the economic ideology of individuals will lose its power to 
predict party choice. Therefore the influence of economic conservatism on party 
choice should weaken as the differences on economic issues between parties 
become smaller. Hence we hypothesize: The association between economic 
ideology and party choice becomes less strong when we take the differences and 
changes into account with respect to the economic position of parties (H5).
4.3.2 The emergence of GreenLeft 
The second test of the ‘top-down’ perspective is related to the restructuring of the 
Dutch party system. If the influence of class on party choice is assumed to be 
declining due to ‘bottom-up’ sociological processes, this decline is assumed to 
be relatively gradual as well as unidirectional. Explanations for more time-specific 
and group-specific changes and possible reversals in the associations between 
class and vote must therefore be attributed to changes in the party system or the 
emergence of new parties, rather than to sociological developments. Like in many 
other European countries a Green party emerged in the Netherlands during the 
1980s (Müller-Rommel 2002). This party, GreenLeft, came into existence after 
1989 when four minor radical parties (cpn, psp, ppr and evp) contested the 
election with a joint party list. These four parties had rather diverse and distinct 
histories, the communist cpn dating from 1936, the left-pacifist psp from 1959, 
the radical ppr from 1971 and the progressive Christian evp from 1981. Although 
their electoral strength has always been weak De Graaf et al. (2001) argue that 
their merger may be important because: 
“By appealing to environmentalists in a way that the old left parties did not, [the 
emergence of GreenLeft] may have well have attracted more middle-class, post-
materialist voters than did left-wing parties in the past. By giving a distinctive voice 
to these postmaterialists it may also have led to a strengthening of their group 
chapter 4
131
identity and thus have increased the political awareness of this group. Conversely, 
by fragmenting left-wing appeals and reducing the emphasis on specifically class 
issues, it may also have tended to undermine class identity yet further” (2001: 3).
De Graaf et al. claim that the emergence of new political options, or the 
disappearance of old options may have an immediate impact on the relationship 
between class and vote. To test this for the Dutch case they therefore look for 
sudden changes in the association between class and vote after the formation of 
the common Green Left party list in 1989. De Graaf et al. do not find evidence for 
an abrupt decline of class voting after 1989. We are however able to conduct a 
more group-specific test of their hypothesis that ‘The odds of middle-class voters 
supporting the old left, relative to working class voters, increases after the formation 
of the GreenLeft (De Graaf et al. 2001: 8). Especially the new class of socio-cultural 
specialists benefits from the material advantages which allow the support for 
parties which hold more postmaterialist stances (e.g. Norton 2003; Inglehart 
1979). The immediate consequences of environmental protection policies are far 
less severe for this new middle class compared to the manual class (Obach 
2002). Socio-cultural specialists may therefore have been likely support to 
GreenLeft once the new party list was established. Consequently, this process 
would be expected to increase the level of class voting. This suggests the 
hypothesis: The odds of the social-cultural specialists supporting new-left parties 
increases after the formation of Green Left (H6).
4.4 Data and variable construction
To test our hypotheses we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 2006. 
We use information on social class based on detailed occupational codings, 
economic ideology, party choice and some social background characteristics 
from 11 elections (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N=1.526], 1977 [N=1.856], 1981 
[N=2.305], 1982 [N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 [N=1.745], 1994 [N=1.812], 
1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). We excluded the 
2003-survey because for that survey no data on occupational codings were 
available. In the multivariate analyses we control for age (17=0) and gender 
(male=0), denomination (in categories: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other 
religion, no religion) and church attendance (0-4 interval scale). 
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 To provide a parsimonious study that allows for an over-time comparison it is 
unavoidable to group relevant Dutch political parties into a limited number of 
party groups. We measure party choice in four categories11 on the basis of the 
De Graaf et al. (2001) classification: the old-left (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), new-left 
(D66, GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP), liberal right (VVD, BP, NMP) and religious 
parties (CDA, ARP, KVP, CHU, SGP, GPV, RPF, RKPN and CU). Consult appendix 
A.3 for party names. Respondents voting for another party are excluded from the 
analysis. We mainly examine the odds of voting old-left and new-left relative to 
the odds of voting liberal right12. The old-left/liberal right contrast has also been 
used in earlier studies on class voting (De Graaf et al. 2001). The new-left/liberal 
right contrast is used to get more insight in the changing political alignment of the 
new service class (Güveli et al. 2007b). 
 For social class we want to take into account the evolution of the social classes 
and we therefore use the modified EGP class schema distinguishing the social 
and cultural specialists as a separate class from the technocrats (cf. Güveli, Need 
and De Graaf 2007b) for recoding ISCO-scores into the new classes). We 
distinguish the following classes: 1a. Higher technocrats; 1b. Higher social and 
cultural specialists; 2a. Lower technocrats; 2b. lower social and cultural specialists; 
3. Routine non-manuals; 4. Self-employed; 5. Manual class. We collapsed the 
higher manual and lower manual class, since there is hardly any difference in 
their voting patterns, also not over time. 
 Economic conservatism: In all election surveys there is a question on income 
inequality. This is a question that starts as follows13: “Some people think that the 
difference in incomes in our country should be increased (at number 1). Others 
think that these differences should be decreased (at number 7). Of course, there 
are also people whose opinion is somewhere in between.” Then there are 
questions about where the respondent would place the major political parties on 
this line. Finally respondents were asked: “And where would you place yourself?” 
We coded economic ideology such that the metric is running from 0 (‘the 
differences in our country should be decreased’) to 6 (‘the differences in incomes 
in our country should be increased’).
 We measure the respondent’ level of education as the number of years it 
normally takes to complete a certain level of education. The educational categories 
in the original files are recoded using the conversion tables of Ganzeboom and 
Treiman (2009). In general this results in a metric running from: 6 year for complete 
primary education (=0) to 17 years for complete university level. 
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 Party positions: To determine the ideological position of party groups we use 
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et 
al. 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs 
of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of 
statements by parties on 56 policy categories are measured as the percentages 
of sentences in a program devoted to these issues. First, we construct a left-right 
party position based on socio-economic issues. We use three policy categories 
from the CMP data files: planned economy (i.e. market regulation economic 
planning), welfare (social justice and welfare state expansion), and market 
economy (free enterprise and economic orthodoxy). Next, we add three policy 
categories on social groups: labour groups (positive mentioning of working class 
and trade unions), middle class and professional groups (positive mentioning) 
and ‘labour groups: negative’ (negative mentioning of working class and unions). 
We create a social-economic Left-Right position by combining the categories as 
((market economy + middle class groups + negative labour groups) - (planned 
economy + welfare + labour groups). Hence, a higher score on this scale (-33.9 
– 18.1) corresponds to a more rightist party position. Because our dependent 
variable consists of party groups instead of individual parties we constructed a 
weighted mean of this scale by party group for each election year. The weight of 
a party within this group is determined by its vote share in percentages14.
 In similar vein we constructed the policy positions of party groups associated 
with conservative-progressive ideology. For this purpose we employ a scale 
construction procedure used by Keman and Pennings (2006) who use the total of 
five policy categories to measure the emphasis on progressive issues, and five 
categories to measure conservative issues. The progressive issues are: 
anti-growth economy, national way of life: negative (i.e. appeals to patriotism/ 
nationalism), multiculturalism: positive, traditional morality: negative (i.e. opposition 
to traditional moral values) and environmentalism: positive. The conservative 
issues are: social harmony (e.g. need for society to see itself as united), national 
way of life: positive, multiculturalism: negative, traditional morality: positive and 
middle class groups: positive. We create a progressive position (progressive 
issues – conservative issues) which runs from conservative (-1.2) to progressive 
(18.0). 
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4.5 Analysis
To test the formulated hypotheses we divided our analyses in four steps. First we 
examine the bivariate association between social class and economic 
conservatism. Second, we model over time changes in class voting by employing 
multinomial logistic (MNL) regression analysis. Using figures we will present the 
odds ratios for voting old-left vs. liberal right and new-left vs. liberal right for all 
class categories (working class is reference). Third, we present the parameter 
estimates of more elaborate MNL models to formally test to what extent trends in 
class voting can be explained by the blurring of class boundaries and/or the 
1989-GreenLeft merger. Finally, we use conditional logistic (CL) regression 
models15 to test whether party positions account for changes in class voting. 
4.5.1 The blurring of class boundaries
First, we investigate to what extent the ideological boundaries between classes 
are blurring. For this purpose we regressed economic conservatism on social 
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Figure 4.2   Economic conservatism regressed on social class (manual class 
is reference group) and year of survey assuming linear trends for 
the effect of social class
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class including dummy indicators for the surveys. We assumed linear trends for 
the change of the class effects. In figure 4.2 we report the regression coefficients 
for the reference year 1971 and the calculated class effect for 2006 based on the 
linear trend. 
 Figure 4.2 shows a decrease in the association between class position and 
economic conservatism for all classes when compared to the manual class. 
However, this linear decrease is only significant at the 5% level for the higher 
technocrats and the lower social cultural specialists. In 2006 the associations 
between ideology and the (higher and lower) social cultural specialists or the 
routine non-manual class are not much different from the association between 
ideology and the manual class. As expected, both the higher and lower technocrats 
and the self-employed are clearly the most economic conservative classes in 
2006, which illustrates the political difference of the technocrats and the social 
cultural specialists. In earlier work Van Wijnen (2000) concluded for the 1971-1998 
surveys that there is no systematic difference over time in the association between 
subjective class orientation and the left-right ideology. Our results are different, 
and this difference in conclusions may be explained by our use of a detailed 
objective class measure, our use of more recent elections or a different measure 
of ideology.
4.5.2 Over-time changes in class voting
To analyze the changing class-vote association we employ MNL regression 
models. We concentrate on the contrasts between old-left vs. liberal right and 
new-left vs. liberal right parties. In this unconstrained model we add dummy 
indicators for each year of survey with 1971 as the reference, as well as interactions 
between year-dummies and the class-groups. In figure 4.3 we first look at the 
odds ratios to vote for old-left vs. liberal right parties over time. Six class categories 
are distinguished: Four in the service class (higher and lower technocrats, higher 
and lower social-cultural specialists) and routine non-manual workers and the 
self-employed. The reference group in the analysis are people in the manual 
class. An odds ratio above 1 (ranging to infinite) indicates that the odds to vote 
old-left vs. liberal right are higher compared to the manual class. Odds ratios 
ranging between 0-1 indicate negative associations. In order to make the scale in 
figure 4.3 comparable for positive and negative association we present negative 
associations as –(1/odds ratio). We start with a comparison of the lower and upper 
service class, routine non-manual class and the self-employed relative to the 
working class. Figure 4.3a shows that the high service class is least likely to vote 
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Figure 4.3a   Odds ratios for voting Old left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
Figure 4.3b   Odds ratios for voting Old left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
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Figure 4.4a   Odds ratios for voting New left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
Figure 4.4b   Odds ratios for voting New left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
-29 
-24 
-19 
-14 
-9 
-4 
1 
6 
11 
16 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
 -(
1/
od
ds
 ra
tio
)  
   
 | 
   
  o
dd
s 
ra
tio
 
high service class low service class 
routine non-manual self-employed 
-29 
-24 
-19 
-14 
-9 
-4 
1 
6 
11 
16 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
 -(
1/
od
ds
 ra
tio
)  
   
 | 
   
  o
dd
s 
ra
tio
 
high technocrats low technocrats low social/cultural specialists 
138
old-left followed by the self-employed and low service class/ routine non-manual 
class, and that until 2002 the differences compared to the manual class decline. 
This indicates a process of class dealignment. 
 To illustrate how important changes in the occupational structure are for 
understanding changes in the class-vote relationship we disentangle the classes 
within the service class. In figure 4.3b we report the odds ratios for the higher 
technocrats, the lower technocrats and the lower cultural specialists vote left wing 
compared to the manual class. Due to a lack of a substantive number of cases for 
each year we do not report the higher social specialists. Figure 3b shows that 
until 1981 there was not much difference between the low technocrats and the 
lower social-cultural specialists relative to the manual class and these difference 
increases over time. After 1994 the lower social and cultural specialists are even 
more likely to vote for left-wing than the manual class, suggesting a process of 
class realignment although the differences with the manual class are very small. 
This shows that it becomes increasingly important to disentangle the service 
class in order to understand the evolution of class voting. With respect to the 
higher technocrats we see that they are far less likely to vote old-left relative to the 
manual class than the other classes in the service class. The differences between 
the lower and higher technocrats seem to have weakened since the 1970s and 
from 1989 onwards there is hardly any difference.
 Next, in figure 4.4 we investigate the odds ratios of voting new-left versus 
liberal right. Figure 4.4a shows that in general the self-employed the least likely to 
vote new-left vs. liberal right, followed by the high service class, routine non-manual 
class and low service class. We clearly observe a process of convergence: All 
classes, especially the high service class are increasingly likely to cast a new-left 
vote relative to voting liberal right. From the mid-1990s there is hardly any 
difference between the working class and the low service class/ routine 
non-manual class. In 2006 manual class voters were very unlikely to vote for a 
new-left party, and therefore also the odds for the high service class to vote 
new-left vs. liberal right were higher compared to the manual class. 
 With respect to the sub-classes within the service class figure 4.4b shows a 
process of class dealigmnent, i.e.: The new-left/liberal-right voting behavior of the 
(higher and lower) technocrats is converging towards the voting behavior of the 
manual class. For the low-grade social and cultural specialists we observe a 
process of realignment. This class initially voted not that different from the manual 
class, but members of this class are increasingly more likely to cast a vote for a 
new-left party relative to casting a liberal-right vote. The odds ratio to vote new-left 
chapter 4
139
vs. liberal right has reversed between the 1980s and 1990s and this evolution 
shows once again how important it is to distinguish this class within the service 
class.
4.5.3 Interpreting the decline of class voting
Next we formally test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 in table 4.1. We present the MNL 
parameter estimates (b and s.e.) of voting old-left and new-left vs. liberal right. In 
our first model we allow the class effect to change linearly over time. Compared 
to a base model where the class-effects are fixed over years this linear change 
model yields a better model fit (decrease in -2LL of 72 against 18 degrees of 
freedom) and at the same time it is far more parsimonious than the unconstrained 
model shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4. 
 With respect to voting old-left vs. liberal right model I shows gradual decreases 
in class differences for almost all classes relative to the manual class. The negative 
main-effects of the class-year interactions indicate that in 1971 the odds of voting 
old-left rather that liberal right are lower for other classes compared to the manual 
class. In support of hypothesis 1 the significant positive interactions imply that the 
distinction between the manual class and all other classes for voting old-left 
versus a free market liberal party become less important each year. In 1971 the 
parameter estimate is -3.23 for the higher technocrats and this is -1.13 (-3.23 + 
(35 * .06)) in 2006. These effects indicate that in 1971 the odds for higher 
technocrats to vote old-left were about (1/e-3.23) 25 times lower than the odds for 
the manual class, compared to about 3 times lower in 2006. For low-grade 
technocrats the odds respectively are about 8 (1/e-2.03) and 2 (1/e(-2.03+35*0.04)) 
times lower compared to the manual class in 1971 and 2006. Most remarkable is 
that - based on a linear trend - the odds for low-grade social-cultural specialists 
are 6 times (1/e-1.77) lower than the odds for the manual classes in 1971, and they 
are about the same (e(-1.77+35*.06) = 1.3) in 2006.
 We also observe gradual changes in class differences with respect to voting 
new-left versus liberal right. The differences between manual workers and the 
class of social and cultural specialists were relatively small in 1971. In the reference 
year, we find no significant difference in the odds to vote new-left between the low 
social and cultural specialists and manual class voters. With respect to the odds 
for high-grade social and cultural specialists we find that they were only about 2.5 
times lower than the odds for manual class voters. Over time, social-cultural 
specialists become more likely to vote new-left rather that liberal right. Based on 
a linear trend we find support for hypothesis 1b - the odds for both high and low 
4
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social-cultural specialists to vote new-left increase to about 2.5 times the odds for 
manual workers in 2006. In other words: class differences between social- cultural 
specialists and manual workers have increased in the period 1971-2006. With 
respect to other classes we find that the differences relative to the manual class 
decline over the same period. Based on a linear trend the difference to vote 
new-left versus liberal right for high and low-grade technocrats and the routine 
non-manual nearly disappeared in 2006. 
 In model II we account for years of education, and allow the effect of education 
to change over time. With respect to voting old-left versus liberal right we find that 
in 1971 more years of education suggested a rightist party choice (-0.16). But 
based on linear change in the education-vote association (0.004) this negative 
effect has nearly disappeared in 2006. With respect to voting new-left versus 
liberal right we find that since 1986 – 15 year after the reference year - more 
education is increasingly associated (-0.03 +15*0.002) with casting a vote on a 
new-left party. The findings supports hypothesis 3b about ‘cultural voting’, a high 
education is decreasingly associated with voting right-wing, and is increasingly 
associated with voting new-left. Controlling for education has the largest impact 
on class-effects with respect to voting old-left versus liberal right. Especially for 
the sub-classes within the service class both the main-effects as well as the linear 
trends are lower when we control for education: In other words: Class voting is 
partially due to educational differences, and the differences in voting between the 
‘new’ service classes and the working class are in part declining because the 
effect of education changed over time. 
 Model III includes the voters’ economic conservatism. We expected that we 
could interpret class voting trends by accounting for the decline of ideological 
differences between voters. We therefore allow the effect of economic conservatism 
to linearly change over time. The improvement in fit is considerable (-2LL reduction 
of 1617.5 against 6 df). We only find partial evidence for hypothesis 2. With respect 
to voting old-left we find that the main-effects for class voting are somewhat 
weaker compared to model II, but the interaction coefficients are not substantially 
different. This indicates that although economic conservatism accounts for part 
of the class-vote association, it does not explain the linear trend in class voting. 
With respect to voting new-left we find that the interaction coefficients of lower 
social-cultural specialists and technocrats are no longer significant. This suggests 
that the decline in class voting between low-grade technocrats and the manual 
class is accounted for by economic conservatism, and that the former are about 
2.5 (1/e-0.87) times less likely than the latter to vote new-left vs. liberal right 
chapter 4
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throughout the whole period. For low-grade social-cultural specialists we initially 
found that the differences with the manual class were increasing over time. But 
controlled for economic conservatism low-grade social cultural specialists and 
manual workers are equally likely to vote new-left versus liberal right over the 
whole period. We thus find modest support with respect to hypothesis 2. 
Interestingly, we notice an increase of the impact of economic conservatism. In 
1971 the effect of economic conservatism on voting old-left is -0.44 and this 
amounts to -0.8 (-0.44 + (35 * -0.01) in 2006: i.e. for each step up on the economic 
conservatism scale one is 1.5 (1/e-0.44) less likely to vote old-left in 1971 and this 
is 2.7 (1/e.-0.99) in 2006. Also with respect to voting new-left versus liberal right we 
find that economic conservatism is increasingly relevant to predict party choice. 
Therefore we have to refute hypothesis 3a. 
 In model IV we test the ‘top-down’ interpretation using the merging of the 
minor left-wing parties into the Green Party in 1989. To test whether the association 
between class and vote for old and new-left versus liberal parties shows an abrupt 
change after the 1989-election when GreenLeft came into existence we include 
interactions between class categories and a dummy that indicates the 
1989-merger. The estimates however reveal that in general this merging has no 
influence on the class effects whatsoever. We only find that from 1989 onwards 
the higher technocrats are less likely to vote for new-left parties compared to the 
working class. Hence, we have to refute hypothesis 6. We do not find that the 
odds for the social cultural specialists supporting left parties increase after the 
formation of GreenLeft.
4.5.4 Party positions and the decline of class voting
Next we test hypothesis 4 stating that the decline of the association between 
social class and party choice becomes less strong when we take the ideological 
positions of parties into account. First, we look at the changes in the positions of 
parties between 1971 and 2002 with respect to social-economic issues and 
conservative vs. progressive issues. Unfortunately there are no manifesto data 
available for the Dutch 2006-elections. In Figure 4.5 we present the positions 
for the four party groups; old-left, new-left, liberal right and religious parties. 
Figure 4.5a reveals a process of convergence between the major party groups in 
the Netherlands with respect to social-economic issues. In the early 1970s there 
was a clear difference between the liberals and left-wing parties with respect to 
social-economic policy positions. During the 1970s and 1980s the ideological 
gap between party groups has evidently narrowed. The differences between the 
4
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old-left and right are especially small in 1994. Figure 4.5b clearly shows that the 
new-left parties are the most progressive in the Dutch party system, and that the 
liberals are the most conservative. The figure suggests ideological convergence 
between parties with respect to conservatism vs. progressivism until 1986, but 
later we observe divergence on conservative versus progressive policy issues. 
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Figure 4.5a   Social-economic Left-Right positions of party groups in the 
Netherlands (1971-2002)
Figure 4.5b   Conservative versus Progressive positions of party groups in the 
Netherlands (1971-2002)
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To estimate how party choice is affected by the ideological positions of the 
political parties we apply conditional logistic (CL) regression (McFadden 1974). 
Like the MNL model the CL model can simultaneously estimate binary log-odds 
ratios for multiple contrasts among party alternatives. But the CL model also 
allows combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. CL 
models are sometimes used in electoral studies to estimate whether party choice 
is conditional on characteristics of parties that vary across individuals, e.g.: the 
voter-party distance on particular issues (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). But it is also 
possible to examine characteristics of choice options that are constant across 
individuals, like product price in consumer behavior research (Lammers, Pelzer, 
Hendrickx and Eisinga 2007). In our analysis the individual-specific variables are 
the same variables as we used in the MNL models. The choice-specific variables 
are the positions of each party group on social-economic issues and conserva-
tive-progressive issues at each election. This way the CL model enables us to 
examine what happens when parties change their position on two political 
dimensions. We are primarily interested in the extent to which changing party 
positions are responsible for the decline in the class-vote relationship. 
 In order to fit CL models with choice-specific variables we rearrange the 
structure of our dataset by ‘stacking’ the data matrix into a person-choice file. In 
a person-choice file each respondent has a separate row in the data matrix for 
each category of the dependent variable. In our data that is four rows per 
respondent. Next to dummy variables indicating party groups, we construct 
another binary variable indicating the actual choice made by a respondent. This 
binary variable is used as the dependent variable. The four party groups which 
were the dependent contrasts in the MNL models, are now included as an 
independent variables. As dummy variables these party group indicators 
correspond with the intercept term of the MNL model (Hendrickx 2000). In our 
analysis the liberal-right parties are the reference category. Choice-specific 
variables are included using one parameter for the effect of each variable. The 
effects of individual-specific variables on different choice contrasts are modeled 
as interactions between dummy variables of party groups and the individual-spe-
cific variables (cf. Hendrickx 2000; Long and Freese 2006). 
In model I of table 4.2 we report the estimates of a CL model without choice-
specific variables. Without choice-specific variables the CL model is equivalent to 
the MNL model (Long and Freese 2006). Although individual-specific effects are 
modeled as interactions with dummy indicators for party groups we report them 
4
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in similar fashion to standard MNL effects. We include the same individual-specif-
ic variables as in model III of table 4.1. Again we only present the parameter 
estimates for voting old-left versus liberal right and new-left versus liberal right. 
There are however two differences with the MNL models that we presented in 
table 4.1. First, because there are no CMP data available for 2006, we excluded 
this year from the analysis. Second, given that we aim to include choice-specific 
variables that vary between elections we are unable to include year-dummy 
indicators for each election. The linear class voting trends in model I are therefore 
somewhat different from model III in table 4.1: With respect to voting old-left vs. 
liberal right model I shows linear declines in class differences for almost all 
classes relative to the manual class. With respect to voting new-left versus liberal 
right we only find decline for the high-grade technocrats, routine non-manual 
class and self-employed.
 In model II we include the choice-specific variables social-economic position 
and conservative-progressive position. The estimate for social-economic position 
is positive (0.11). This indicates that the more economically right-wing the position 
of a party group, the more likely that party group is to be chosen. Interestingly, the 
effect of the conservative-progressive position is not significant. This implies that 
after accounting for all individual-specific variables in the model, the traditional 
L-R position of parties – and not their position on the cultural dimension - has a 
significant impact on vote choice between the four major party groups in the 
Netherlands between 1971 and 2002. The relevance of the L-R party positions is 
supported by the fact that these results are controlled for economic conservatism 
of voters. Even though such a control is lacking for cultural conservatism there is 
no effect of conservative-progressive party position. Accounting for fact that 
people are inclined to vote for parties that are economically more right-wing has 
not reduced the effect of individual economic conservatism on voting old-left/
liberal right or new-left/liberal right. Hence, we refute hypothesis 5.
  Because party groups became closer towards each over time on social-
economic issues this could have narrowed the differences between voting old/
new-left versus liberal right. To test whether the inclusion of L-R party positions is 
capable of explaining the class voting trends we model interactions between the 
class dummy variables and the social-economic position of party groups. This 
way we test whether the effect of parties’ L-R position varies between social 
classes, with the manual class as the reference. The results are reported in model 
III. We find that compared to the manual class, other classes are not more likely 
to vote for a party as it is economically more right-wing. With one exception we 
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find that voters from all social classes – including the manual class - prefer parties 
with a more rightist position. Only low-grade social-cultural specialists are more 
likely to vote for a party group with a more leftist position. By including these 
interactions we expected to explain the decline in class voting. Both old- and 
new-left parties largely moved to the centre of the Dutch party system since the 
1970s. However, we still see strong trend effects for all classes in model III. 
 Next, we examine whether voters from different classes are more or less likely to 
vote for parties that are more progressive. In model IV we include interactions between 
social class and the conservative-progressive position of party groups. The 
main-effect is negative (-0.36). Keeping in mind that the manual class is the reference 
category, this indicates that a party is less likely to be chosen by manual workers as 
it is more culturally progressive. The positive coefficients for the interaction estimates 
imply that the more progressive the position of a party group the more likely people 
in these classes will vote for that party group compared to the manual class. 
Differences in the effect of conservative-progressive party position are the largest 
between the manual class and the low-grade social cultural specialists. Although this 
clearly implies a top-down effect – i.e. political choice matters, we do not find strong 
evidence that changes in cultural positions of parties are able to account for the 
decline in class voting. As we observed in figure 4.5 especially new-left parties 
became much more culturally progressive after 1986. But, in contrast to hypothesis 
4, both the old-left/liberal and new-left/liberal class voting trends and are not explained 
any further by accounting for conservative-progressive party positions.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter discussed changes in the class basis of voting in the Netherlands. It 
would be misleading if one assumes that only political parties change over time 
and that the cleavage structure remains fixed, or vice versa. There are strong 
indications that the class structure is changing in the Netherlands. We find that 
the rise of the ‘new’ class of social-cultural specialists is important in accounting 
for changes in the class-vote relationship. The higher and lower technocrats are 
clearly not only more right-wing, but the higher and lower social cultural specialists 
also have developed strong preferences for new-left parties, suggesting a process 
of realignment. Overall, the distinction between the manual class and other more 
traditional classes becomes less relevant over time for left-wing voting, i.e. a 
process of class dealignment. 
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We tried to interpret the decline of class voting by accounting for the blurring of 
the ideological boundaries between classes. We found that the differences 
between classes with respect to their economic ideology weakened over the last 
decades. But holding constant for voters’ economic ideology could only partially 
interpret class voting differences and changes therein. Surprisingly, we find that 
the association between economic conservatism and voting has increased, 
although slightly, over time. This is surprising if one considers that an increasing 
number of non-economic, for example cultural, topics are included in the political 
discussion, and this would make economic ideology less relevant16. On the other 
hand, a low education is decreasingly associated with voting left-wing. Especially 
new-left parties are increasingly chosen by voters with a high education. A cultural 
or cognitive explanation for the decline in class voting seems to apply: Education 
has the largest impact on class-effects with respect to voting old-left versus 
liberal right. Especially for the sub-classes within the service class both the level 
and decline of the class effects are somewhat lower when we control for education. 
But after accounting for changes in the effect of educational differences and the 
blurring of ideological boundaries, the decline of class voting largely persists. We 
however cannot test whether the inclusion of a ‘left-libertarian’ or cultural 
progressive ideology would interpret class differences in voting new-left. 
 We tested whether, after accounting for social changes, political choices 
offered to voters have an additional effect on the class-vote relationship. Despite 
the fact we covered more elections after 1989 and used a more differentiated 
class schema than De Graaf et al., we reached similar conclusions about the 
‘top-down’ effect of the GreenLeft merger: There is no evidence that the downward 
trends in class voting were influenced by this political merger. Using conditional 
logistic regression we can conclude that after accounting for trends in class 
differences, economic ideology and level of education, the economic L-R position 
of parties – and not their position on the cultural dimension - has a significant 
impact on vote choice between the four major party groups in the Netherlands 
between 1971 and 2002. It is rather surprising that the extent to which voters favor 
parties with economically right-wing policies does not seem to vary between the 
manual class and other classes. Only low-grade social-cultural specialists tend 
to vote for parties that are economically left-wing. This seems to rule out the 
possibility that changing party positions on the economic dimension are 
responsible for the decline in class voting in the Netherlands. Regarding the 
cultural dimension however, we find that manual workers tend to favor conservative 
parties, whereas other classes – again especially the low-grade social-cultural 
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specialists – prefer progressive parties. But strong evidence that changes in 
cultural positions of parties are able to account for the decline in class voting is 
however not found. Even though political parties seem to converge on the 
traditional left-right dimension, and diverge on ‘new’ political issues we were not 
able to interpret trends in class voting accounting for these political developments. 
Moreover, considering that changing class composition probably affects party 
strategy, one could raise the question on the causality of influence between social 
and political factors. We have demonstrated that there is a lot to gain by directly 
measuring political factors, and by investigating them simultaneously with 
individual factors. We found significant ‘top-down’ effects of party positions after 
accounting for the heterogenization of the service class and the blurring of 
economic class boundaries. Inquiries on the causal relationship between societal 
developments and party strategy are however beyond this study.
  In this chapter we made progress by employing conditional logistic (CL) 
regression analysis. Conditional logistic models accommodate scientific 
improvement in the field of class voting research because the model allows 
combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. The CL model 
therefore has a crucial advantage over the multinomial logistic (MNL) model. In 
our analysis the individual-specific variables were used to test to what extent 
changes in the social background of the electorate were responsible for the 
decline in class voting. Simultaneously, we used information on party positions as 
choice-specific variables. This way we were able to examine what happens when 
parties change their position on various political dimensions. We showed that the 
CL model is suitable to determine which ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’ factors 
influence the level of class-based voting. The conditional logistic model therefore 
not enables more stringent tests of ‘top-down’ theories, but it also facilitates the 
solution to an empirical problem in comparative research, i.e.: how to deal with 
the fact that party categories are not fixed over time. In the next chapter we explore 
possibilities of this model yet further in examining to what extent over-time variation 
in religious voting in the Netherlands is explained by both social changes and 
political choices.
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11  Although we are aware that the LPF attracted 17% of the voters in the 2002 election, we do not include 
the LPF for two reasons. First, it is hard to determine to which of the political groups they belong. A 
separate category of far- and new right parties in order to examine whether the working class has aban-
doned the left to the advantage of the ‘new right’ does also not yield to a comparable category suitable 
for over-time analyses. Second, in this chapter we are especially interested in long term trends. Before 
the rise and fall of the LPF new- and far-right voting was a relatively minor phenomenon in Dutch politics; 
the extreme-right Centre Democrats (CD) only gained 0,9% and 2,4% of the votes in the 1989 and 1994 
elections. In 2006 the PVV managed to draw support (5,9%) on an anti-establishment agenda against 
immigration and ‘islamization’. Although the success of the PVV was accompanied by heavy losses for 
the PvdA and of course the idea of cultural voters pops up immediately, it is too early to examine whether 
the emergence of the PVV has a long-standing impact on the relationship between the working class and 
the classical left and in this study the 2006 election is the latest one
12  We do not present the estimates with religious parties as the reference category for reasons of parsimony. 
Results indicate that voters from all social classes are more likely to vote religious versus old-left relative to 
the manual class. But only for the low-social cultural specialists we find that this association is declining. Re-
sults for voting new-left versus religious parties indicate that – except for the self-employed and low-grade 
social-cultural specialists – class differences do not play a significant role in determining party choice.
13  Before 1989 the exact formulation of this question is slightly different. Especially, for the 1971 and 1972 
surveys. In these surveys three answer categories were being used. We tried several recoding procedures 
to make the items comparable and all resulted in similar results. We recoded the 1971 and 1972 version 
into the seven point version by giving the lowest category a score of 0, the middle category a score of 3 and 
the highest category a score of 6. 
14  Because the CMP data only includes so-called ‘significant’ parties not all parties in Dutch post-war elec-
toral history are covered in the CMP dataset. Therefore, it must be noted that the Dutch Communist Party, 
Pacifist Socialist Party and Evangelical People’s Party are not covered in the CMP data thus not included in 
calculating the old-left or new-left mean scores. On the liberal right-wing side this also applies to the Farm-
ers Party and Middle Class Party. 
15  We are aware that both MNL and CL models make the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives (IIA), i.e.: adding or omitting a category of the dependent variable does not affect the odds of the 
initial or remaining alternatives. The IIA assumption can be relaxed using computationally more complex 
multinomial probit models (MNP) instead of MNL (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998; Long & Freese 2006). We de-
cided not to use MNP models for three reasons. First, the tests commonly used to detect whether the IIA 
assumption is violated – the Hausman Test and the Small-Hsiao Test – both indicated that there is more 
evidence that IIA is not violated in our models than evidence for the opposite (see Appendix D). Second, 
the results of MNP models were are not substantially different from our MNL estimations. We used the 
stata program asmprobit - alternative-specific multinomial probit (ASMP) – as an alternative for the CL 
model (Long & Freese, 2006). The CL models presented in this chapter were however too demanding 
to converge with ASMP estimation. Third, MNL models are often used to study electoral behavior and 
research has shown that for most applications the IIA assumption is neither relevant nor particularly re-
strictive (Dow & Endersby 2004). By applying CL models we follow a recent innovation in cleavage voting 
research (Elff 2009).
Notes
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16  This finding might be influenced by differences in the way the question about ‘income differences’ that 
we used to measure economic ideology was phrased in the pre-1989-surveys, and in particular in 1971 
and 1972. We have however no reasons to assume these differences are responsible for the increasing 
effect of economic ideology on voting. Also when we investigate shorter time trends (i.e. from 1981 or 1982 
onwards) we find similar results with respect to the over-time effect of economic conservatism. However, 
when we  investigate the 5 surveys form 1989 and later, which is only half of the original time period, we 
find no over-time change in the effect of economic conservatism on voting (neither linear nor year-specific 
changes). 
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Religious Voting, Social Changes and Political 
Changes in the Netherlands 1971-2006 *
*  A shorter version of chapters 4 and 5 is forthcoming under the title ‘The political evolution of class and 
religion: An interpretation for the Netherlands 1971-2006’ in: G. Evans and N.D. De Graaf (Eds.). Political 
Choice Matters. Explaining the evolution of class and religious bases of party preference in cross-national 
perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming). Co-authors are Nan Dirk De Graaf and Ariana 
Need.
Chapter 5|

161
5.1 Introduction
Throughout the twentieth century, religion has been one of the most dominant 
political divisions in the Netherlands. Dutch society was more segregated by 
religion than by class. In chapter 2 we established that religion strongly outweighed 
social class as a determinant of voting behavior in the Netherlands. The religious 
cleavage in the Netherlands involves not only the contrast between the religious 
and non-religious population, but predominantly divided Protestants and 
Catholics. Protestants affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church and Protestant 
Church can be distinguished from those who belong to more orthodox Calvinist 
churches (Janse 1985). A well-known outcome of the Dutch religious segmentation 
was the ‘pillarized’ political system. From the historical denominational 
fragmentation, the Dutch party system inherited separate political parties linked 
with different denominational groups. Religious-based voting has traditionally 
been high in the Netherlands because denominational parties largely draw 
support from specific religious groups. Consequently, religious people have 
always been more likely to cast a vote for a religious party than those without a 
religion. 
 Research shows that religious-based voting has declined in the Netherlands 
over the past decades (Eisinga, Felling and Franses 1997; Need 1997; Van der 
Kolk 2000; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2008; and chapter 2 of this thesis). This process 
matches the alleged ‘conventional wisdom’ (Dalton 2002) that traditional social 
divisions such as religion and social class are increasingly incapable to explain 
voting behavior in modern democracies. However, contrary to the widespread 
decline of the association between class and vote (Clark and Lipset 1991; 
Nieuwbeerta 1995), a universal downward trend in religious voting is empirically 
less obvious. Comparative studies have demonstrated evidence for relatively 
stable associations between religious divisions and party choice in Western 
European countries (Knutsen 2004; Elff 2007) or recently even reported a slight 
increase of the effect of religion on voting in European Parliament elections (Van 
der Brug, Hobolt and De Vreese 2009). These findings may raise questions about 
recent changes in the course of the trend in religious voting in the Netherlands, 
they especially raise questions about the causes of this trend. The question that 
we aim to answer is this chapter is: To what extent can changes in religious voting 
in the Netherlands be explained by social and political changes?
  If the influence of religion on political behavior of individuals is assumed to be 
declining due to sociological processes such as secularization and the growth of 
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individualism, this decline is assumed to be relatively gradual and unidirectional. 
Explanations for time-specific changes or potential (temporary) reversals in the 
associations between religion and vote must therefore be attributed to changes 
other than sociological developments. De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) have 
examined the interaction between the available political options and the religious 
affiliation of voters. They demonstrated that the there was an abrupt decline in 
religious-based voting in the Netherlands after the merging of the three main 
denominational parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). This finding 
supports the idea that political changes affect the religion-vote association. To 
understand over time variation in religious voting in the Netherlands we therefore 
derive explanations from two theoretical approaches borrowed from the class 
voting literature. In the introductory chapter of this thesis and in chapters 3 and 4, 
we have grouped perspectives on explanations in variations in class voting into 
two categories: Approaches that emphasize sociological factors related to the 
composition of classes and the relevance of class divisions in society, and 
approaches that mainly use political factors related to the extent to which parties 
appeal to voters on the basis of class differences (Evans 2000; Evans and 
Whitefield 2006). 
 The former, so-called ‘bottom-up’ approach uses social changes as a source 
of changes in political choices. Hypotheses about secularization often lay at the 
core of arguments predicting a decline of the religion-vote relationship (Broughton 
and ten Napel 2000; De Graaf et al. 2001; Knutsen 2004). Secularization, Manza 
and Wright (2003) argue, involves that the importance of religion in the lives of 
individuals is declining, that the social and political influence of religious 
organizations is declining and/or that the engagement in political life by religious 
organizations is declining (2003; 300-301). On the one hand, secularization theory 
suggest a decline in the religion-vote relationship as a result of rising levels of 
education and affluence causing voters to become less reliant on ‘simple religious 
heuristics to govern all aspects of their lives, including how they vote’ (Manza and 
Wright 2003: 301). On the other hand, declining levels of church attendance are 
assumed to weaken the capacity of churches to influence the voting behavior of 
their members. The traditional boundaries between different denominations and 
between those who are religious and those who are not have, is often assumed, 
become blurred. Consequently, not only the cultural, but also the political distinc-
tiveness of religious groups has in declined. 
 The implication of the secularization process is that changes in the social 
structure of societies produce changes in political choices, therefore shaping the 
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religion-vote relationship ‘bottom-up’. Parties are considered to respond to 
changes in societal circumstances. In class voting research it is commonly held 
that due to the shrinking size of the working class politicians, socialists in 
particular, are more likely to seek support from the middle class, which in turn 
leads them to alienate themselves from the working class (Przeworski and 
Sprague 1986). In this view, the outcomes of party behavior are contributions to, 
and not mere reflections of, the evolution of political cleavages. From this 
‘top-down’ perspective, Evans Heath and Payne (1999) for example explained 
that class voting in Britain declined between 1964 and 1997 as a result of the 
Labour Party’s move to the centre of the party system. Kalyvas (1996) has 
translated this ‘Dilemma of Electoral Socialism’ to the consequences of the 
electoral strategy of confessional parties in the nineteenth century. Historically, 
confessional parties gave emphasis to religious issues. But their religious nature 
hindered Christian Democrats in successfully mobilizing non-religious voters. In 
order to maximize the numbers of votes Christian parties had to deemphasize 
religion without destroying the confessional character of the party. This 
‘Confessional Dilemma’ induced Christian parties to redefine the position of 
religion in politics. In the late nineteenth century Christian Democrats broke their 
organizational dependence on the Church, and they reinterpreted their religious 
identity by replacing specific and detailed religious doctrines by general and 
abstract moral values (Kalyvas 1996: 242-244). Therefore, Kalyvas states that 
“Confessional parties (…) contributed making religion less relevant for politics” 
(Kalyvas 1996: 245). This contests a simple ‘bottom-up’ process. Paradoxically, 
Kalyvas remarks that by eroding their members’ link to the church religious parties 
– once formed to bring religion back in society and politics – instead reinforced 
general secularization (1996: 256). A similar argument for the Dutch case is made 
by De Graaf et al. (2001) who argue that the merging of the major Catholic, 
Protestant and Calvinist parties in 1977 into a into a single Christian Democratic 
party has ‘replaced specific linkages between denomination and party with a 
more diffuse relation’ (2001: 3). Rather than simply reflecting social changes, a 
‘top-down’ perspective on cleavage voting suggests that changes in political 
choices may reinforce the blurring of religious boundaries. 
 In this chapter we simultaneously investigate two types of changes in political 
choices in the Netherlands. First, we re-address De Graaf et al.’s question about 
the extent to which the formation of the CDA led to sudden religious dealignment. 
Because we investigate a longer time trend we are also able to investigate the 
consequences of a more recent political merger in 2002; that of two minor 
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Protestant parties into the ChristianUnion. In doing so, we examine time-specific 
changes in the strength of religious voting that coincide with the changes in the 
party system (De Graaf et al. 2001; Andersen and Heath 2003; Hill and Leighley 
1996). Second, following recent innovations in cleavage voting research (Oskarson 
2005; Elff 2009), we include direct measures of party positions. We account for 
parties’ moral traditionalism using the Comparative Manifesto Data (Budge et al. 
2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). In doing so, we examine the interaction between 
denominational membership/church attendance and differences and changes in 
party positions.
 We examine the effect of two forms of political change on the religious voting 
after accounting for the ‘bottom-up’ process of blurring religious boundaries. De 
Graaf et al. (2001) simply assume a process of blurring boundaries. In this 
research, instead of inferring societal homogenization between religious and 
irreligious voters based on gradual decline of religious voting, we formally tests to 
what extent trends in religious voting are interpreted by weakening church 
attendance and growing effects of education. Our hypotheses are tested using 
the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) between 1971 and 2006.
 
5.2  Bottom-up: Changes in the religious structure of the 
Netherlands 
The considerable change in the Dutch religious structure in the past decades has 
already been mentioned. Figure 5.1 shows that the proportion of church members 
has fallen noticeably. It also reveals a more or less linear downward trend of both 
church attendance and church membership over a 35-year period. Total church 
membership dropped from 70% to 45% and regular church attendance (i.e. at 
least once a month) dropped from 39% to 18%. Using different data De Graaf and 
Te Grotenhuis (2008) showed that religious belief and belief in the supernatural 
declined as well. Figure 5.1 also shows that the decline in church membership 
runs more or less parallel for Catholics and Protestants, dropping from 37% and 
23% in 1971 to 24% and 12% in 2006. The total membership of Calvinist groups 
constituted about 10% over the whole period.
 Yet, the observed changes in the religious structures and secularization 
processes do not necessarily produce a decline religion-vote relationship. Manza 
and Wright (2003; 313) note that while church membership or church attendance 
may decline, levels of religious voting can remain stable among those who remain 
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in church. The changes in the sizes of the different religious categories can be 
defined as compositional changes. We therefore need to distinguish compositional 
changes from the blurring of religious boundaries. Knutsen (2004: 99) writes that: 
“Although religious issues are not very prominent on the political agenda, religious 
values are related to a wide range of social and political beliefs: work ethics, 
achievement aspirations, lifestyle norms, parent–child relations, morality, social 
relations, attitudes toward authority, and acceptance of the state”. Or, in other words, 
the ideology that connects religion and vote is cultural conservatism (Middendorp 
1991). As said, the process of blurring boundaries will result in less distinctive 
denominational groups, culturally and socially. The decline of religious divisions is 
often attributed to the decrease of religious values and religious integration. Growing 
homogeneity between those who are religious and those who are not may have 
reduced a sense of shared identity and interest among members of religious 
denominations. We expect that the process of blurring religious divisions is 
unidirectional and relatively gradual leading to converging political behavior. We 
therefore expect that: The association between denomination and vote for religious 
versus non-religious parties becomes generally weaker (H1).
5
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Figure 5.1   Trend in church membership, church attendance and denomination 
in percentages between 1971 and 2006
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total church 
membership  
Regular attendance 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Calvinist  
Other religion 
Source: DPES 1971-2006
166
 Secularization involves that religious identity, beliefs and values may be 
reduced because church attendance is declining. Church attendance is important 
because, as integration theory (Durkheim 1879 [1967]) suggests, during religious 
rituals the norms of religious groups are not only transmitted but also confirmed. 
The more often people attend church the more their social, cultural and political 
values reflect the religious norms that are transmitted during religious services. 
Therefore, people who attend church frequently hold a more conservative ideology 
than infrequent attendees (Felling and Peters 1986; Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis 
and Bosch 1999). We may expect that conservative religious values cause church 
attendees to vote for parties that stand for traditional moral values, which in the 
Netherlands are usually the confessional parties. But the cultural and normative 
boundaries between religious and irreligious voters may blur as the level of church 
attendance declines. Moreover, compared to earlier decades clergymen today 
may not only be less successful in enforcing religious norms but may also put 
emphasis on different values during religious services. A decline in the religion-vote 
relationship should therefore also show up in weaker religious integration, as 
indicated by less church attendance. We therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis: The association between church attendance and religious party 
choice becomes generally weaker (H2).
 A decline in the impact of church attendance on voting could explain why the 
association between denomination and religious party choice is weakening. We 
would assume that church members are attending church less frequently over 
time. Next to religious attendance we would also expect that conservative religious 
values, which are confirmed and transmitted during religious services, are of 
decreasing relevance for party choice. Aarts and Thomassen (2008), for example, 
have shown that value orientations over euthanasia was strongly associated with 
voting for the CDA in 1989, but that this association virtually disappeared in 2006. 
Questions on euthanasia and abortion are, unfortunately, not consistently 
available in the DPES surveys for the whole 1971-2006 period. We therefore 
cannot test to what extent changes in the impact of religious beliefs interpret the 
decline of the denomination-vote relationship. Hence, we only formulate a 
hypothesis about the extent to which changes in the impact of religious behavior 
affect the denomination-vote relationship: The decline of the association between 
denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties becomes less 
strong when we take church attendance into account (H3) 
 Another implication of the secularization process is associated with the rising 
levels of education in post-industrial societies. Because higher educated people 
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generally adhere to more individualistic and liberal norms than less educated 
they are less often religiously affiliated and more often leave their church (Need 
and De Graaf 1996). Higher educated church members are expected to have a 
less traditional world view than church members with a lower education. An 
increasing level of education may therefore blur the cultural boundaries between 
religious and irreligious voters. Our expectation is: The decline of the association 
between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties becomes 
less strong when we take education into account (H4). 
5.3  Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands
5.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos 
From the political perspective the religion-vote association is dependent on the 
nature of political appeals to the electorate (Evans and Whitefield 2006). In 
appealing to the growing number of secular voters, confessional parties may 
have deemphasized religious issues in their campaigns. By calling less attention 
to morality policies religious parties decrease the distinct political voice of 
particular  religious groups. Studying election surveys from Britain, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Norway Oskarson (2005) demonstrates that the levels of religious 
voting correlate with polarization regarding traditional values at the party level. 
She argues that: “the impact of social cleavages on party choice will not only 
depend on how pronounced or widely spread the cleavages are, but also on how 
the parties relate to the cleavages present in the electorate” (2005: 103). Other 
research on Western Europe (Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands) shows that regular church attendees favor parties with 
relative traditionalist positions, whereas non-churchgoers prefer parties with 
relative modern positions (Elff 2009). Assuming interactions between religious 
categories and the extent to which political parties are culturally conservative, we 
formulate: Church members are more likely to vote for a party relative to non-church 
members as a party holds a more traditional moral position (H5a). And: The more 
individuals attend church the more likely they vote for a party as it holds a more 
traditional moral position (H5b).
 Following this line of reasoning, over time changes in the ideological position 
of parties may result in a decline or increase in the association between religion 
and vote. We expect that religious parties in the Netherlands will become less 
traditionalist over time. Keman and Pennings (2006) showed that political choices 
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with respect to economic dimension converge. This is due to many Social 
Democratic as well as Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, including 
those in the Netherlands, who have moved to the centre of party systems during 
the 1990s. Analogous to the move of Labor parties towards the centre due to the 
shrinking size of the manual class, we expect that religious parties have become 
less traditionalist because of the decline of church members. Discussing the 
position of Christian Democratic parties Keman and Pennings (2006: 110) write 
that: “[I]n trying to keep the median voter they apparently felt compelled in view of 
secularization and economic constraints to moderate their moral views and 
traditional values”. We thus expect that: The decline of the association between 
denomination and vote becomes less strong when we take the differences and 
changes into account with respect the positions of parties regarding traditional 
moral values (H6).
5.3.2 Religious parties in the Netherlands. 
After World War II there were three major religious parties in Dutch politics. The 
oldest one, the ARP (Anti-Revolutionary Party) was founded in 1879. The ARP 
received strong support from Calvinists and other orthodox Protestants. A second 
political party for Protestants was founded in 1908 when the CHU (Christian 
Historical Union) split from the ARP. The CHU was orientated toward the Dutch 
Reformed Church and primarily received support from liberal Protestants (Van 
Holsteyn, Galen and Irwin 2000). The dominant religious party in the post-war 
period was the KVP (Catholic People’s Party) usually attracting around 30 percent 
of the votes. The KVP drew nearly all its support from Catholics. In the 1960s the 
votes for religious parties began to decline, and especially the CHU and KVP lost 
much support. Eventually, the KVP, CHU and ARP participated with a common list 
in the 1977 election and officially merged in a single party (CDA, Christian 
Democratic Appeal) in 1980 (cf. Ten Napel 1990; Pijnenburg 1994). 
 After the formation of the CDA other confessional parties, mainly appealing to 
orthodox Protestants, remained to exist in the Dutch party system. Although these 
minor ‘Re-reformed’ (Gereformeerde) parties (SGP, GPV, RPF) did not join the 
CDA, two of these parties (GPV and RPF) merged into the ChristianUnion in 2002. 
Both the SGP and ChristianUnion draw much less support than the CDA and 
especially with respect to cultural issues these parties are much more conservative. 
On economic issues the ChristianUnion takes a more leftist position than the 
CDA, and the label ‘minor right’ (klein rechts) that was used to summarize the 
CU-predecessors suffices no longer (Pellikaan 2002). 
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 Our hypothesis about the effect of political restructuring takes a different form 
than does the ‘bottom-up’ hypothesis of general and gradual class and religious 
dealignment. We expect to find that, if political options have had any autonomous 
effect, the changes in the relationship between religion and vote will be more 
time-specific and more group-specific. First, following the study by De Graaf et al. 
(2001) we look for changes in the association between religion and vote after the 
formation of the common Christian Democrat party list in 1977. We assume that 
the links between specific denominations and the new CDA are less strong than 
the links with individual parties had been before. At the same time, we postulate 
that the CDA would be more successful in attracting non-religious people than 
before since it was less strongly associated with specific denominational 
connotations. As a result we expect the association between religion and vote to 
go down. Second, we look for changes in the religion-vote association after the 
formation of the ChristianUnion. Although we have less clear expectations about 
the merger of the two minor Protestant parties, we may expect that the new CU 
would appeal less to some orthodox Protestants partly because the party name 
no longer contains an explicit reference to either Protestantism or the Reformation. 
A denomination-neutral name and more left-leaning profile may also have made 
the party more attractive to non-Calvinists. Although the vote share of the CU and 
its predecessors has always been small we expect the association between 
denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties to go down as a 
result of the party merger. Our hypothesis is: The association between 
denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties shows an abrupt 
decline after the 1977 election when the CDA came into existence (H7a) and after 
the 2002 election when the CU came into existence (H7b).
5.4 Data and measurements 
To test our hypotheses we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 2006. 
We use information on church membership, church attendance, party choice and 
some social background characteristics from the same 11 election surveys 
exploited in the previous chapter: (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N=1.526], 1977 
[N=1.856], 1981 [N=2.305], 1982 {N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 [N=1.745], 
1994 (N=1.812], 1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). The 
combined dataset, after selection on valid information on the relevant variables, 
5
religious voting, social changes and political changes in the netherlands 1971-2006
170
contains respondents 16.129 respondents. Below we discuss the operationaliza-
tion of our dependent and independent variables.
 Party choice: In all election surveys respondents were asked “Did you vote in 
the parliamentary elections on [date]?”. Provided that the respondent answered 
‘yes’ the subsequent question was asked “Which party did you vote for?”. In the 
larger part of the analysis we use a dichotomous dependent variable to estimate 
binary logistic regression of voting for a religious party (CDA, KVP, ARP, CHU, 
RKNP, RPF, GVP, CU, SGP) versus all other parties (1/0). In the final part of the 
analysis we employ conditional logistic regression, here we distinguish between 
four major party groups in the Netherlands on the basis of the De Graaf et al. 
(2001) classification. Next to a category for religious parties we combine parties 
of the old-left (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), new-left (D66, GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP) 
and liberal right (VVD, BP, NMP). Consult appendix A.3 for party names. The 
rearrangement of the data, required to fit the conditional logistic model, together 
with the model specification and estimation procedure, are discussed later.
 Religion: Religious denomination of the respondent is measured using a 
question whether respondents consider themselves a member of a particular 
church or religious community: We distinguish between respondents without a 
religious affiliation, Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists and those with another 
religion. In our analyses the ‘non-members’, those without a religious affiliation, 
are the reference category. 
 Education: We measure the educational level of the respondent as the number 
of years it normally takes to complete a certain level of education. The educational 
categories in the original files are recoded using the conversion tables of 
Ganzeboom and Treiman (2009). In general this results in a metric running from: 
6 year for complete primary education (=0) to 17 years for complete university 
education. 
 Church attendance: Respondents were asked how often they attended 
religious services: (1) at least once a week; (2) 2 or 3 times a month; (3) once a 
month; (4) several times a year; (5) Never. We coded church attendance such that 
a high score refers to more attendance (0-4). 
 Party positions: To determine the position of religious parties we use data 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 
2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs of 
political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of 
statements by parties, measured in (‘quasi-’) sentences in a program, are 
classified in 56 policy categories. With regard to the position of parties regarding 
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cultural conservatism we use the emphasis in the manifesto placed on positive 
statements about ‘traditional morality’. This item was measured as the number of 
‘quasi-sentences’ as a percentage of the total manifesto text dedicated to 
‘favourable mention of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and 
suppression of immorality and unseemly behavior; maintenance and stability of 
family, and religion’. Because our dependent variable consists of party groups 
instead of individual parties we constructed a weighted mean of this scale by 
party group for each election year. The weight of a party within this group is 
determined by its vote share in percentages. Because the CMP data only includes 
‘significant’ parties not all parties in Dutch post-war history are covered. Therefore, 
the positions of minor religious parties (RPF, GVP, SGP)17 are not included in 
calculating the position of the religious party group on the traditional morality 
scale.
5.5 Analysis
To test the formulated hypotheses we divided our analyses in four steps. First we 
examine the association between denominational membership and church 
attendance. Second, we show the over time results of the denomination-vote 
relationship. For this purpose we employ logistic regression with a binary 
dependent variable contrasting religious parties versus other parties. The results 
of this model will be presented in figures as odds ratios for religious groups to 
cast a religious vote relative to the unaffiliated. Third, we present the parameter 
estimates of multivariate logistic regression models to formally test to what extent 
declining trends in religious voting are accounted for by ‘bottom-up’ changes 
(declining effect of church attendance, increasing effect of education) and/or 
‘top-down’ changes in the party structure (CDA merger in 1977, CU merger in 
2002). Finally, we use conditional logistic regression models to test to what extent 
changes in traditionalist party positions account for changes in religious voting. 
5.5.1 Denomination and church attendance
First, we investigate part of the ‘bottom-up’ explanation for the decline of religious 
voting which assumes that the association between denomination and church 
attendance has declined. In table 5.1 we present the mean levels of church 
attendance broken down by denomination for 1971 and 2006. Table 5.1 suggests 
a clear pattern of convergence between the non-members and other denominations 
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in the mean level of church attendance. For all denominations church attendance 
is lower in 2006 compared to 1971. For Catholics the average church attendance 
even becomes about half the size, dropping from 3.1 in 1971 to 1.5 in 2006. Also 
the mean attendance of Protestants, Calvinists and those with another religion is 
significantly lower in 2006 compared to 1971. The differences between religious 
groups decrease as well: as indicated by the F-statistics (between-group variance 
/ within group variance) differences between religious groups are lower in 2006 
compared to 1971. In general the association between church attendance and 
denomination becomes weaker. This supports the idea that the association 
between church membership and the church attendance declines. 
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Table 5.1   Mean church attendance (0-4) by religious group in 1971 and 2006
1971 2006 1971 vs. 2006
Religious 
group
N (%) Mean s.d. N (%) Mean s.d. Compare means(a)
Non-members 743 (29.8) 0.00 0.00 1424 (54.3) 0.00 0.00 n/a
Catholic 886 (35.5) 3.14 1.16 629 (24.0) 1.51 1.14 -1.63***
Protestant 528 (21.2) 2.36 1.27 316 (12.1) 1.90 1.70 -0.46***
Calvinist 226 (9.1) 3.51 1.03 100 (3.8) 2.55 1.88 -0.96***
Other religion 112 (4.5) 2.55 1.27 153 (5.8) 2.22 1.83 -0.33*
Total 2495 (100) 2.05 1.70 2622 (100) 0.82 1.41 -0.64***
F-test (all religious groups) 1193 *** 557 ***
F-test (excl. non-religious) 71.1 *** 18 ***
Source: DPES 1971 and 2006 ; *p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01
(a) T-test for equality of means
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5.5.2 Denominational groups, church attendance and voting confessional
Next we show the overtime results of the denomination-vote relationship. We 
present the results of logistic regression analyses regressing religious voting on 
dummy-variables for Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, and those having another 
religion. The reference group in the analysis consists of those without a 
denomination. To allow over time changes we add dummy indicators for each 
year of survey with 1971 as the reference, as well as interactions between 
year-dummies and the religious groups. In figure 5.2a we present for each 
denomination for each year the odds ratio of voting for a religious party versus 
any other party as opposed to the non-members. 
 It is clear that the odds of casting a religious vote are highest for Calvinists 
followed by Catholics, Protestants and those with another religion. In 1972, the 
odds of Calvinists voting for a religious party versus any other party were 172 
times the odds of the non-members voting for a religious. For Catholics and 
Protestant and those with another religion the 1972-odds of voting religious were 
respectively 30, 15 and 11 times higher compared to the non-members. There 
has been a strong decline of the denomination-vote relationship after the 1970s. 
The odds that Calvinists will vote for a religious party, although peaking again in 
1998, eventually dropped to 30 times higher as opposed the odds of non-members 
in 2006. The odds of Catholics and Protestants casting a religious vote relative to 
the non-members dropped from respectively 30 and 15 in 1972 to 8 in 1986. From 
1986 onwards there is hardly any difference left relative to the non-members 
between Protestants and Catholics. Together with the other religious people their 
odds to cast a religious vote are about 4 to 10 times higher compared to the 
non-members throughout the 1986-2006 period. 
 Figure 5.2b shows that almost the whole trend can be interpreted by taking 
church attendance into account (note that we reduced the y-axis by a factor 5). 
Since the association of church attendance with religious voting declined over 
time (see table 5.2) we allowed church attendance to change linearly over time. 
The results indicate that, accounting for a declining effect of church attendance, 
the odds of Catholics to vote for a religious party are about the same in 1971 and 
2006 (about 2 times higher compared to the non-members). The odds of 
Protestants are even about two times higher in 2006 than in 1971. In 1972 the 
odds of Calvinists to cast a religious vote are about 16 times higher compared to 
the non-members. In 1986 this odds ratio drops to about 3, but again rises to 25 
in 1998 and 12 times in 2006. We conclude that the decline of church attendance 
and therefore religious disintegration among church members is almost fully 
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Figure 5.2a   Uncontrolled odds ratios for voting religious (non-members as 
reference group)
Figure 5.2b   Controlled odds ratios for voting religious (non-members as 
 reference group)
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responsible for the decline in and for the convergence of religious-based voting. 
However, religious disintegration is not able to interpret the alleged increase in 
religious voting between 1986 and 1998.
 To get more insight in the changes and to test our hypotheses formally we 
present several logistic regression models. In our first model in table 5.2 we 
tested for over time changes in the association between denomination and party 
choice. To get a parsimonious model we allow each denomination parameter to 
vary linearly over time. With 1971 as a baseline all religious groups are significantly 
and substantially more likely to cast a confessional vote than those without a 
denomination. The odds to vote for a confessional party in contrast to the 
non-members are (e3.28) 26 times higher for Catholics, 9 times higher for 
Protestants, 97 times higher for Calvinists and 5 times higher for other religious 
groups. However, there are clearly time-interaction effects for all denominations, 
with the strongest linear decline for the Catholics and the Calvinists. Between 
1971 and 2006 the odds that Catholics will vote for religious parties relative to the 
non-members fell from 26 to about 5 (e3.28 – (35 *.05)). There is an even stronger 
decline for Calvinists. In 1971 the odds for Calvinists to vote for a confessional 
party were 97 times higher than for unaffiliated voters, but this becomes (e4.58 – (35 
*.04)) 24 times in 2006. These results support hypothesis 1. Compared to earlier 
research of De Graaf et al. (2001), that covered fewer elections and did not find 
any linear trend for Protestants, we now find a linear decline in religious voting for 
all major denominational groups.
 In model II we add the ‘bottom-up’ changes to the model. We expected that 
social changes would be able to interpret the decline of the association between 
denomination and vote. We include variables for education in years and church 
attendance, and allow these effects to vary linearly over time. With respect to 
church attendance model II demonstrates two things: First, the effect of church 
attendance gradually declines (-0.01), supporting hypothesis 2. Second, the 
decline of the church attendance-vote association largely interprets the decline of 
the denomination-vote association, which supports hypothesis 3. Accounting for 
church attendance model II shows that the odds for all religious groups to cast a 
vote on a religious party relative to unaffiliated voters have fallen. With 1971 as a 
baseline the odds for Catholics fall to 2 (e0.72), for Protestants to nearly 1, and for 
Calvinists to 5.5. Voters having another religion are even less likely to vote for a 
confessional party. Moreover, the decline for the effects of being Catholic and 
being Calvinist, relative to the non-members are also not significant anymore. 
Interestingly, when controlling for the effect of church attendance we find that, for 
5
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Protestants, their denomination becomes now increasingly important, i.e.: up to 
an odds ratio of (e0.18 + (35 *0.03)) about 3.5 in 2006. Model II therefore suggests 
that the extent to which church members attend religious services is of decreasing 
importance for voting confessional. This largely interprets the decline in religious 
voting for Catholics, Protestants and Calvinists. Being a Protestant relative to 
having no religious affiliation becomes more important for casting a vote on a 
religious party between 1971 and 2006.
 The negative main-effect of education indicates that the odds that one votes 
for a religious party in 1971 are about 7 percent (1/(e-0.07)) lower after each year of 
education. The positive year*education interaction suggests that the effect of 
education becomes less strong over time. The positive main-effect of church 
attendance shows that in 1971 the odds of voting for a religious party are higher 
as one attends church more often. The negative year*church attendance-interac-
tion implies that the effect of church attendance is declining over time. Although 
both the effects of education and church attendance are significant it is largely 
church attendance that accounts for the decline in religious voting. When we 
estimate model II without church attendance the effects of the year*denomination 
interactions are the same as in model I. Hypothesis 4, stating that the decline of 
the association between denomination and party choice becomes less strong 
when we take education into account, is refuted.
 In model III we test the political change hypotheses 7a and 7b. To test whether 
the association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious 
parties shows an abrupt decline after the 1977-election when the CDA came into 
existence we include an interaction between denomination and a dummy that 
indicates the 1977-merger of the three main religious parties. This way we test 
whether there was an abrupt decline in confessional voting which coincides with 
formation of the CDA (cf. De Graaf et al. 2001). We also included an interaction 
between denomination and a dummy indicating the 2002-election when the 
ChristianUnion was formed of out the merger of two minor Protestant parties. In 
support of hypothesis 7a the estimates indeed show that compared to 
non-members the 1977 CDA-merger seems to be responsible for a decline in 
confessional voting for the Catholics (e-0.464), Protestants (e-0.732) and Calvinists 
(e-1.108). That is, after the CDA-merger the odds for Catholics voting for a religious 
party fell to sixty percent of their pre-1977 level, whereas the odds for Protestants 
fell to about a half and the odds for Calvinists to a third of their original level. The 
2002-interactions suggest that there was also an abrupt decline in religious voting 
for Catholics and Protestants after the 2002-election. Also after 2002 the odds to 
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vote for a religious party fell to about sixty percent (e-0.432) of their level before 
2002 for Catholics, and to about a half for Protestants (e-0.674). The 2002-elections 
did not affect the odds of voting confessional for Calvinists.
 In model IV we include the ‘bottom-up’ changes (i.e. education, church 
attendance) and ‘top-down’ changes (i.e. party mergers) simultaneously. The 
results indicate that accounting for both types of changes the gradual decline of 
the association between denomination and vote is accounted for, but abrupt 
decreases associated with political changes remain. We find that the odds to vote 
confessional for all major denominations even gradually increase in the period 
1971-2006, but show sudden decreases after 1977 (for Protestants and Calvinists) 
and 2002 (for all denominations). It is however unlikely that the full decline of 
religious voting in 2002 can be attributed to the CU-merger. Votes for the 
ChristianUnion (and its predecessors) only cover a small share of the total votes 
for religious parties. And given the Protestant identity of the party we would not 
expect that the merger affected the odds of casting a religious vote for Catholics. 
Moreover, the 2002-elections were heavily influenced by the parliamentary 
entrance of another newcomer, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). But although the rise 
of the LPF caused massive shifts among the electorate, it is also unlikely to be 
primarily responsible for the abrupt decline in religious voting in 2002. There is no 
obvious relationship between specific denominations and voting LPF18. Moreover, 
research on the Dutch 2002 elections has shown that people who frequently 
attend church were even less likely to vote for the LPF than those never attend 
church (Van der Brug 2003; Lubbers 2007). It is therefore not plausible that the 
decline in the religion-vote association was caused by religious voters that moved 
away from confessional parties to the LPF. This model supports the idea that after 
accounting for social changes and party mergers, there may be other political 
factors that affect religious voting despite the weakening of religious integration 
and the ‘depillarization’ of the party system. In other words: Accounting for church 
attendance perhaps interprets much of the decline in religious voting, and party 
mergers may explain sudden decreases in religious voting. But these factors 
leave unexplained why the odds to vote for a religious party for all denominational 
groups now increase over time.
5.5.3 Religious voting and party positions
Next, we test another version of the ‘top-down’ approach by including the changes 
and differences in positions of political parties. First we look at the changes in the 
emphasis on traditional values in the manifestos of political parties between 1971 
5
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Figure 5.3a   Emphasis on traditional morality issues in party manifestos by 
political party groups in the Netherlands
Figure 5.3b   Controlled odds ratios for voting religious (non-members as 
 reference group) and the emphasis on traditional morality issues 
in party manifestos of religious parties
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
%
 tr
ad
iti
on
al
 m
or
al
ity
 in
 p
ar
ty
 m
an
ife
st
o 
Religious parties free market liberals (VVD) 
old-left parties (PvdA, DS70, SP) new-left parties (D66, PPR, GL) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
%
 tr
ad
iti
on
al
 m
or
al
ity
 in
 p
ar
ty
 m
an
ife
st
o 
od
ds
 ra
tio
 
Catholics Protestants 
Calvinists Other religion 
Morality Issues (religious parties) 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (2001, 2006)
181
and 2002. Unfortunately there are no manifesto data available for the Dutch 2006-
elections. In Figure 5.3a we not only present the positions regarding traditional 
morality for religious parties, but we also show the positions of the Dutch liberals, 
left-wing parties, and new-left parties. Figure 5.3a shows that religious parties 
decreasingly mention issues on traditional morality in their manifestos since the 
1970s, but only until 1982. There is hardly any variation among the other political 
parties over time19. After 1982 the traditional values become more salient again in 
the party programs of religious parties. The common perception that the Christian 
Democrats in the Netherlands adjusted their party program to the changing 
religious structure of society by de-emphasizing traditionalist issues is therefore 
not supported by the pattern in figure 5.3. It seems that the traditionalist position 
of the religious party group in 2002 is at about the same level as in 1972. 
 In figure 5.3b we overlay the manifesto-pattern for religious parties with the 
patterns in religious-based voting as reported in figure 5.2b (viz., controlled for 
the linearly declining effect of church attendance). We clearly observe that for 
Calvinists variation in the odds ratios to vote for a religious party relative to 
unaffiliated voters follows a very similar pattern as the emphasis on traditional 
values in the manifestos of religious parties. Also the increase of religious voting 
from 1986 onwards for Catholics, Protestants and those with another religion 
seems to coincide with an increase of the salience of traditionalist issues in 
religious party programs. Because we are analyzing the odds to cast a religious 
vote relative to the non-members this figure suggests that the manifesto positions 
may especially influence those without a denomination. The more religious parties 
emphasize issues related to traditional moral values the less non-members may 
be inclined to vote for these parties relative to votes with a religious affiliation, 
causing the odds ratios to increase. These results seem to confirm the 
‘Confessional Dilemma’ of Christian Democratic parties.
 To formally test hypotheses 5(a and b) and 6 about the differences and 
changes in party positions regarding traditional values we apply conditional 
logistic (CL) regression (McFadden 1974). In order to employ CL estimation it is 
required to use a multi category dependent variable, similar to multinomial logistic 
(MNL) regression. Next to religious parties we therefore distinguish between three 
other major party groups in the Netherlands on the basis of the De Graaf et al. 
(2001) classification: the old-left (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), new-left (D66, 
GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP) and liberal right (VVD, BP, NMP). Respondents voting 
for another party are now excluded from the analysis (N=13.569). Like a MNL 
model the CL model can simultaneously estimate binary log-odds ratios for 
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Table 5.3   Conditional logistic regression for voting religious vs. old left, new 
left and liberal right parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2002
Model I Model II
Party-specific variables b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Old Left ref. 2.26*** (0.15) 2.51*** (0.14) ref. 2.25***  (0.15) 2.49*** (0.14)
New Left -2.26*** (0.15) ref. 0.25 (0.17) -2.25*** (0.15) ref. 0.24 (0.17)
Liberal -2.51*** (0.14) -0.25 (0.17) ref. -2.49*** (0.14) -0.24      (0.17) ref.
Religious -2.97*** (0.16) -0.71*** (0.18) -0.46*** (0.17) -2.84*** (0.16) -0.59***  (0.19) -0.34*     (0.18)
Emphasis on traditional morality -0.08*** (0.02) -0.08***  (0.02) -0.08***  (0.02)
Individual-specific variables Religious vs. Religious vs.
Old-Left New Left Liberal Old-Left New-Left Liberal
Year (1971 =ref.) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Age 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.02 (0.05) -0.21*** (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) -0.02 (0.05) -0.20*** (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
Denomination (non -members= ref.)
Catholic 0.78*** (0.19) -0.05 (0.23) 0.00 (0.21) 0.89*** (0.19) 0.08 (0.23) -0.11 (0.22)
Protestant 0.16 (0.18) 0.28 (0.24) -0.50** (0.21) 0.29 (0.19) 0.41 (0.25) -0.37* (0.21)
Calvinist 2.49*** (0.33) 1.15*** (0.34) 1.65*** (0.39) 2.61*** (0.33) 1.26*** (0.35) 1.78*** (0.40)
Other religion -0.63** (0.28) -0.76*** (0.34) -1.48*** (0.30) -0.63** (0.28) -0.77** (0.34) -1.48*** (0.30)
Trend 
Year*Catholic 0.01 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Year*Protestant 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
Year*Calvinist 0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
Year*Other religion 0.03** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years 0.07*** (0.02) -0.13*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.02)
Year*education in years -0.003*** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)  0.002*** (0.00)  -0.002*** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.002*** (0.00)
Church attendance 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05) 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05)
Year*church attendance -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
CDA merger since 1977
1977*Catholic 0.01 (0.14) 0.87*** (0.18) 0.08 (0.17) -0.23 (0.16) 0.61*** (0.20) -0.16 (0.18)
1977*Protestant 0.08 (0.18) 0.07 (0.27) -0.09 (0.20) -0.16 (0.19) -0.19 (0.27) -0.33 (0.22)
1977*Calvinist -0.62 (0.43) -0.58 (0.41) -0.85* (0.47) -0.87** (0.43) -0.3** (0.41) -1.11** (0.47)
df 57 58
-2LL 29456.4 29438.7
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=13.659
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Table 5.3   Conditional logistic regression for voting religious vs. old left, new 
left and liberal right parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2002
Model I Model II
Party-specific variables b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Old Left ref. 2.26*** (0.15) 2.51*** (0.14) ref. 2.25***  (0.15) 2.49*** (0.14)
New Left -2.26*** (0.15) ref. 0.25 (0.17) -2.25*** (0.15) ref. 0.24 (0.17)
Liberal -2.51*** (0.14) -0.25 (0.17) ref. -2.49*** (0.14) -0.24      (0.17) ref.
Religious -2.97*** (0.16) -0.71*** (0.18) -0.46*** (0.17) -2.84*** (0.16) -0.59***  (0.19) -0.34*     (0.18)
Emphasis on traditional morality -0.08*** (0.02) -0.08***  (0.02) -0.08***  (0.02)
Individual-specific variables Religious vs. Religious vs.
Old-Left New Left Liberal Old-Left New-Left Liberal
Year (1971 =ref.) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Age 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.02 (0.05) -0.21*** (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) -0.02 (0.05) -0.20*** (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
Denomination (non -members= ref.)
Catholic 0.78*** (0.19) -0.05 (0.23) 0.00 (0.21) 0.89*** (0.19) 0.08 (0.23) -0.11 (0.22)
Protestant 0.16 (0.18) 0.28 (0.24) -0.50** (0.21) 0.29 (0.19) 0.41 (0.25) -0.37* (0.21)
Calvinist 2.49*** (0.33) 1.15*** (0.34) 1.65*** (0.39) 2.61*** (0.33) 1.26*** (0.35) 1.78*** (0.40)
Other religion -0.63** (0.28) -0.76*** (0.34) -1.48*** (0.30) -0.63** (0.28) -0.77** (0.34) -1.48*** (0.30)
Trend 
Year*Catholic 0.01 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Year*Protestant 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
Year*Calvinist 0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
Year*Other religion 0.03** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years 0.07*** (0.02) -0.13*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.02)
Year*education in years -0.003*** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)  0.002*** (0.00)  -0.002*** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.002*** (0.00)
Church attendance 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05) 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05)
Year*church attendance -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
CDA merger since 1977
1977*Catholic 0.01 (0.14) 0.87*** (0.18) 0.08 (0.17) -0.23 (0.16) 0.61*** (0.20) -0.16 (0.18)
1977*Protestant 0.08 (0.18) 0.07 (0.27) -0.09 (0.20) -0.16 (0.19) -0.19 (0.27) -0.33 (0.22)
1977*Calvinist -0.62 (0.43) -0.58 (0.41) -0.85* (0.47) -0.87** (0.43) -0.3** (0.41) -1.11** (0.47)
df 57 58
-2LL 29456.4 29438.7
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=13.659
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Table 5.3   Continued
Model III Model IV
Party-specific variables b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Old Left - 2.24*** (0.15) 2.47*** (0.14) - 2.25*** (0.15) 2.49*** (0.14)
New Left -2.24*** (0.15) - 0.23 (0.17) -2.25*** (0.15) - 0.24 (0.17)
Liberal -2.47*** (0.14) -0.23 (0.17) - -2.49*** (0.14) -0.24 (0.17) -
Religious -2.72*** (0.17) -0.48** (0.19) -0.25 (0.18) -2.81*** (0.16) -0.56*** (0.19) -0.32* (0.18)
Emphasis on traditional morality -0.19*** (0.04) -0.19*** (0.04) -0.19*** (0.04) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.03)
Traditional morality*Catholic 0.11*** (0.05) 0.11*** (0.05)  0.11*** (0.05)
Traditional morality *Protestant 0.19** (0.06) 0.19** (0.06)  0.19** (0.06)
Traditional morality *Calvinist 0.18*** (0.08) 0.18*** (0.08)  0.18*** (0.08)
Traditional morality *Other 0.19*** (0.08) 0.19*** (0.08)  0.19*** (0.08)
Traditional morality *Church att. 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Individual-specific variables Religious vs. Religious vs.
Old-Left New Left Liberal Old-Left New-Left Liberal
Year (1971 =ref.) 0.05*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Age 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)   0.03*** (0.00)  0.01*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.02 (0.05) -0.21*** (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) -0.02 (0.05) -0.20*** (0.06)  0.05 (0.06)
Denomination (non -members= ref.)
Catholic 0.81*** (0.21) 0.00 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23) 0.90*** (0.19)  0.08 (0.23)  0.12 (0.22)
Protestant -0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.28) -0.68*** (0.24) 0.29 (0.19)  0.42* (0.25) -0.36* (0.21)
Calvinist 2.30*** (0.39) 0.99** (0.41)   1.51*** (0.44) 2.61*** (0.33)  1.29*** (0.35) 1.78*** (0.4)
Other religion 0.81*** (0.21) -0.95*** (0.35)  -1.65*** (0.32) -0.62** (0.28) -0.75** (0.34) -1.47*** (0.30)
Trend 
Year*Catholic 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02*) (0.01 0.02** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Year*Protestant 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
Year*Calvinist 0.01 (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
Year*Other religion 0.02 (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years 0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02)  -0.15*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.02)
Year*education in years -0.003*** (0.00) 0.001* (0.00) 0.003*** (0.00) -0.003*** (0.00)  0.001* (0.00)  0.03*** (0.00)
Church attendance 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05)   0.83*** (0.05) 0.88*** (0.05)  0.75*** (0.06)  0.81*** (0.05)
Year*church attendance -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)  -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
CDA merger since 1977
1977*Catholic -0.25 (0.17) 0.60*** (0.21) -0.18 (0.19) -0.21 (0.15) 0.63*** (0.19) -0.15 (0.18)
1977*Protestant 0.09 (0.22) 0.07 (0.3) -0.08 (0.24) -0.15 (0.19) -0.18 (0.27) -0.32 (0.21)
1977*Calvinist -0.65 (0.48) -0.61 (0.47) -0.89* (0.52) -0.84* (0.43) -0.80* (0.41) -1.07* (0.47)
df 62 59
-2LL 29424.3 29437.8
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=13.659
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Table 5.3   Continued
Model III Model IV
Party-specific variables b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Old Left - 2.24*** (0.15) 2.47*** (0.14) - 2.25*** (0.15) 2.49*** (0.14)
New Left -2.24*** (0.15) - 0.23 (0.17) -2.25*** (0.15) - 0.24 (0.17)
Liberal -2.47*** (0.14) -0.23 (0.17) - -2.49*** (0.14) -0.24 (0.17) -
Religious -2.72*** (0.17) -0.48** (0.19) -0.25 (0.18) -2.81*** (0.16) -0.56*** (0.19) -0.32* (0.18)
Emphasis on traditional morality -0.19*** (0.04) -0.19*** (0.04) -0.19*** (0.04) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.03)
Traditional morality*Catholic 0.11*** (0.05) 0.11*** (0.05)  0.11*** (0.05)
Traditional morality *Protestant 0.19** (0.06) 0.19** (0.06)  0.19** (0.06)
Traditional morality *Calvinist 0.18*** (0.08) 0.18*** (0.08)  0.18*** (0.08)
Traditional morality *Other 0.19*** (0.08) 0.19*** (0.08)  0.19*** (0.08)
Traditional morality *Church att. 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Individual-specific variables Religious vs. Religious vs.
Old-Left New Left Liberal Old-Left New-Left Liberal
Year (1971 =ref.) 0.05*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Age 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)   0.03*** (0.00)  0.01*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.02 (0.05) -0.21*** (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) -0.02 (0.05) -0.20*** (0.06)  0.05 (0.06)
Denomination (non -members= ref.)
Catholic 0.81*** (0.21) 0.00 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23) 0.90*** (0.19)  0.08 (0.23)  0.12 (0.22)
Protestant -0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.28) -0.68*** (0.24) 0.29 (0.19)  0.42* (0.25) -0.36* (0.21)
Calvinist 2.30*** (0.39) 0.99** (0.41)   1.51*** (0.44) 2.61*** (0.33)  1.29*** (0.35) 1.78*** (0.4)
Other religion 0.81*** (0.21) -0.95*** (0.35)  -1.65*** (0.32) -0.62** (0.28) -0.75** (0.34) -1.47*** (0.30)
Trend 
Year*Catholic 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02*) (0.01 0.02** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Year*Protestant 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
Year*Calvinist 0.01 (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
Year*Other religion 0.02 (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years 0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02)  -0.15*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.02)
Year*education in years -0.003*** (0.00) 0.001* (0.00) 0.003*** (0.00) -0.003*** (0.00)  0.001* (0.00)  0.03*** (0.00)
Church attendance 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05)   0.83*** (0.05) 0.88*** (0.05)  0.75*** (0.06)  0.81*** (0.05)
Year*church attendance -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)  -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
CDA merger since 1977
1977*Catholic -0.25 (0.17) 0.60*** (0.21) -0.18 (0.19) -0.21 (0.15) 0.63*** (0.19) -0.15 (0.18)
1977*Protestant 0.09 (0.22) 0.07 (0.3) -0.08 (0.24) -0.15 (0.19) -0.18 (0.27) -0.32 (0.21)
1977*Calvinist -0.65 (0.48) -0.61 (0.47) -0.89* (0.52) -0.84* (0.43) -0.80* (0.41) -1.07* (0.47)
df 62 59
-2LL 29424.3 29437.8
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=13.659
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multiple contrasts among party alternatives. But the CL model also allows 
combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. In our analysis 
the individual-specific variables are the same variables that we used in the 
binomial logistic models. The choice-specific variable is the emphasis of each 
party group on traditional moral issues at each election. This way the CL model 
enables us to examine what happens as parties take a more traditionalist position. 
We are primarily interested in whether changing party positions are responsible 
for changes in the religion-vote relationship. 
 In order to fit CL models with choice-specific variables we rearrange the 
structure of our dataset by ‘stacking’ the data matrix into a person-choice file. In 
a person-choice file each respondent has a separate row in the data matrix for 
each category of the dependent variable. In our data that is four rows per 
respondent. Next to dummy variables indicating party groups, we construct 
another binary variable indicating the actual choice made by a respondent. This 
binary variable is used as the dependent variable in the CL model. The 
four-category party group variable, usually the dependent variable in the MNL 
models, is now included as an independent variable (Hendrickx 2000). As dummy 
variables these party group indicators correspond with the intercept term of the 
MNL model. The emphasis on traditional morality is included using one parameter. 
The effects of individual-specific variables on different choice contrasts are 
modeled as interactions between dummy variables of party groups and the indi-
vidual-specific variables (Hendrickx 2000; Long and Freese 2006). 
 In model I of table 5.3 we report the estimates of a CL model without choice-
specific variables. Without choice-specific variables the CL model is equivalent to 
a MNL model (Long and Freese 2006). Although individual-specific effects are 
modeled as interactions with dummy indicators for party groups we report them 
in similar fashion to standard MNL effects. In model I we present the individual-
specific estimates for voting for a religious party using different reference 
categories for party choice. We include the same individual-specific variables as 
in model IV of table 5.2, with two exceptions: First, because there are no CMP 
data available for 2006, the election of 2002 is the latest one in this analysis. We 
therefore cannot include the 2002 CU-merger in this model. Second, given that 
we aim to include choice-specific variables that vary between elections we are 
unable to include year-dummy indicators for each election. With respect to voting 
religious versus old-left we find an increase in the effect of being a Protestant, but 
no overtime change for Catholics or Calvinists. With respect to voting religious 
versus new-left model I shows linear increases in denomination effects for almost 
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all religious groups relative to the unaffiliated. With respect to voting religious 
versus liberal right we find that the differences relative to the non-religious become 
larger for Catholics and Calvinists. We find that in the reference year, holding 
constant for education and church attendance, Protestants were even slightly 
more likely to vote for a liberal party than for a religious party (1/e-0.50). Based on 
a linear trend we find that in 2002 Protestants were about (1/e-0.50+31*0.04) 2 times 
more likely to vote for a religious party relative to a liberal party. 
 In model II we include the choice-specific variable ‘emphasis on traditional 
morality’. The estimate of this effect is negative (-0.08). This implies that after 
accounting for all individual-specific variables in the model, a party group is less 
likely to be chosen when it has a more traditionalist position. To test whether the 
inclusion traditionalist party positions is capable of explaining the linear trends in 
denomination-effects we model interactions between denominational groups and 
the emphasis on traditional morality in party manifestos. This way we test whether 
the effect of parties’ traditionalist position varies between religious groups, with 
the non-religious as the reference. The results are reported in model III. The 
main-effect is negative (-0.19). Keeping in mind that the non-members are the 
reference category, this indicates that a party is less likely to be chosen by secular 
voters as it is morally more traditionalist. And supporting hypothesis 5a, the 
positive coefficients for the interaction estimates imply that the more traditional 
the position of a party group the more likely people of this religious category will 
vote for that party group compared to the non-religious. For most denominations 
the interaction-effect largely compensates the negative main-effect, which 
indicates that parties with more traditional moral positions deter secular voters 
rather than attract religious voters. On the whole, model III shows weaker linear 
trends in religious voting than model II. With respect to voting religious versus 
old-left the initial linear trends are fully accounted for. We also find no linear trends 
in the voting behavior of Protestants and Catholics with respect to the religious 
versus new-left party contrast. Only for the religious versus liberal right party 
contrast we could not interpret the linear trends by accounting for denominational 
differences in the effect of traditional party positions. By and large, we find support 
for hypothesis 6, although we interpreted linear increase rather than linear 
decrease.
 In model IV we test hypothesis 5b by investigating whether the traditional 
position of parties affects the association between church attendance and vote. 
The interaction effect between the manifesto scale and church attendance is 
however not significant. This indicates that there is no evidence that the effect of 
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church attendance is influenced by the emphasis on traditional values in 
manifestos of political parties. Moreover, in model IV we notice no substantial 
change in the trend of church attendance. We do find no support for hypothesis 
5b.
5.6 Conclusions 
There is clearly a decline in the association between church membership and 
vote in the period 1971-2006. For the most part this decline seems to have taken 
place before 1986. Especially for Catholics and Calvinists we observe convergence 
in voting behavior compared to non-affiliated voters. The decline of the political 
boundaries between religious groups is largely explained by declining church 
attendance. Declining church attendance, as an indicator of religious 
disintegration, suggests that church members are less adhered to the conservative 
religious norms and values preached in churches. The difference in voting 
between liberal Protestants and the non-members was already relatively small in 
the 1970s. Therefore, the initial decline of the association between being a 
Protestant and voting confessional is only weak. However, accounting for religious 
disintegration even produces an increase of religious voting for Protestants and 
people with ‘other’ religious affiliations. 
 We find that in addition to the linear trends the merging of religious parties into 
the CDA reduced the level of religious voting (see also De Graaf et al. 2001). The 
CDA-merger seems to be particularly responsible for a decline in confessional 
voting among the Calvinists and the Protestants. Covering more elections than 
De Graaf et al. we also found that the level of religious voting dropped after the 
2002-elections, coinciding with the political merger of two minor Protestant 
parties into the ChristianUnion. Interestingly, the party mergers not only had 
effects in reducing the religion-vote association, we also find that the mergers 
mattered even after the linear trend is fully accounted for by the changing church 
attendance-vote relationship. We conclude that apart from social changes the 
political interruptions are important in the processes of religious dealignment, 
supporting the political choice argument. 
 We have shown that traditionalist party positions increase religious voting 
despite the weakening of religious integration and the restructuring of the party 
system. We found interactions between religious categories and the ideological 
positions of parties. Especially non-affiliated voters are generally less likely to 
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vote for parties that hold traditional moral positions. In this sense we may conclude 
that parties with more traditional moral positions deter secular voters rather than 
attract religious voters. We aimed to investigate whether the traditionalist positions 
of parties could interpret the decline in religious-based voting after accounting for 
social changes that reduce religious boundaries. But because the decline of 
church attendance is almost fully responsible for the decline in religious-based 
voting, party positions do not contribute to explaining linear downward trends. 
After accounting for a declining effect of church attendance a U-curve for religious 
voting remained, that strongly resembles the over-time emphasis of religious 
parties on traditional moral issues. Modeled as a linear increase in religious-
based voting this trend is to some extent explained by the traditional moral 
positions of parties. 
 For future research it may be useful to include a variable measuring individual 
conservative ideology. Now we use church attendance as an indicator of religious 
integration to derive expectations about the transmission of religious beliefs. 
Although we know that frequency of church attendance is correlated with ideology, 
a direct over time comparable measure of cultural conservatism, would allow a 
more sophisticated interpretation of religious voting by linking the effect of party 
ideology directly to individual ideology. 
 Deciding whether the ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ approach is more successful 
in explaining the religion-vote association is difficult. Both are relevant and they 
are of course related. In this chapter we find that the ‘bottom-up’ explanation is 
successful since accounting for religious integration resulted in a powerful 
interpretation of the decline in religious-based voting. Social changes are not only 
likely to affect the religion-vote association but also strategy of political parties. 
On the other hand, it would be misleading if one assumes that only political 
parties change over time and that the cleavage structure remains fixed. This can 
be illustrated by the CDA-merger. The merger itself was a reaction to secularization 
and the waning electoral power of the major denominational parties. It shows that 
the ‘bottom-up’ approach can be seen apart from the ‘top-down’ approach, but 
not the other way around. Social changes may be gradual in nature, but can 
provoke sudden political changes, leading to abrupt changes in political 
alignment.
 We showed that political parties may draw some support from religious voters 
by stressing traditionalist issues. But we also showed that the religious structure 
of the Netherlands has changed considerably in the past four decades. The 
proportion of church members among the electorate has become smaller. If a 
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religious party wants to maximize its vote share in secularized Dutch society it 
should deemphasize traditional moral values. In this sense the nineteenth century 
‘Confessional Dilemma’ Kalyvas (1996) referred to still exists. The implications of 
this trade-off between morals and votes may be problematic to the CDA because 
the meaning of the “C” already gave rise to debates about the Christian identity 
of the party. Our results suggest that also a “Conservative Democratic Appeal” 
may be prone to the effects of secularization. Moreover, the ChristianUnion may 
challenge the CDA more strongly in the future. In the long run the CU may be 
more successful to attract CDA-voters, including Catholics and non-affiliated 
voters. The period studied here may therefore be too short to assess the full 
extent of the ChristianUnion merger after 2002 for long-term changes in the 
religion-vote relationship in the Netherlands. 
17  For the 2002-elections the ChristianUnion is included in calculating the mean value of the religious party 
group. The CU only modestly affects the weighted value of the combined scores, because it attracted 
2.54% of the votes compared to 27.93% that went to the CDA. 
18  A logistic regression of voting LPF in 2002 controlled for age, gender, education and church attendance 
(N=1556) shows no significant (p<0.1) differences between denominations. With the non-religious as the 
reference group the parameter estimates (b, se) are: Catholics (0.25, 0.23), Protestants (-0.22, 0.33) Calvin-
ists (-0.37, 0.48), other religion (0.05, 0.46). Church attendance has a significant negative effect (-0.345, 
0.08). People who attend church more often were less likely to cast a vote for the LPF in 2002.
19  When we use the emphasis in the manifesto placed on negative statements about ‘traditional morality’ 
there is only a slight variation among the other political party groups, and only in the first elections. The 
overall variation among all party groups is much less pronounced than reported in Figure 4a.
Notes
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6.1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis was to describe and explain cross-national and over-time 
variation in class and religious voting in Western democracies. We have tested 
hypotheses based on the assumption that political factors may have an additional 
influence on the levels of cleavage-based voting next to the effect of social 
changes. To test our hypotheses we relied on different strategies of data collection 
and analysis. In the first part of this book we used 196 surveys from the Comparative 
Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV) to present large-scale comparative 
investigations of cleavage voting in up to 15 Western democracies. In the second 
part of the book we focused on trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands using 
eleven surveys of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies. In this final chapter we 
answer our research questions by summarizing the findings of the four empirical 
chapters. Next, we reflect on our research strategy and analyses. Finally, we 
discuss the theoretical contributions of this thesis and the implications for future 
research. 
6.2 Summary: Research questions and findings
6.2.1  Chapter 2: The Relative Influence of Class and Religion on Party 
Choice in comparative perspective
In chapter 2 we investigated the level of and change in class and religious voting 
in 13 countries in the period 1960-2008. We made use of 125 surveys in the 
CDCV-file which include sufficient information on both class and religion The first 
central research problem of this thesis is answered in this chapter by investigating 
to what extent there are cross-national and over-time differences in the influence 
of social class and religion on voting. We divided this research problem into two 
sub-questions about to the strength of the class cleavage relative to that of the 
religious cleavage, and the changes therein: (a) To what extent is a strong 
class-vote relationship in a country accompanied by a weak religion-vote 
relationship? (b) To what extent are the differences between the strength of the 
religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship in countries declining, 
increasing or stable? 
 With respect to the first question our results indicate positive correlations 
between a country’s degree of class voting and degree of religious voting. These 
findings contest Lijphart’s claim that class may have a strong influence on voting 
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only if there the influence of religion on voting is weak. Nevertheless, in five 
countries we find that social class is generally more important than religion, i.e.: 
Australia, Austria, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In six countries, 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland, the religious basis 
of voting is stronger than the class basis. With respect to Germany and the US our 
results are less conclusive.
 The second question in chapter 2 examined over time changes in the relative 
influence of social class and religion on party choice. We found that in most 
countries the association between party choice and both class and denomination 
and/or church attendance is weakening. Despite the decline of the magnitude of 
cleavage voting in most countries, the hierarchy between class and religion as 
social bases of voting for the most part endures. Religion nowadays is more 
important than social class in the largely same countries as in the 1970s. However, 
we find that the relative effect of religion over class is waning in Belgium and Italy 
and is even reversing in Germany and the US. In the other countries, the dominance 
of religion over class generally persists. Class continues to be more influential 
relative to religion in Australia and Austria. In Sweden and the UK the relative effect 
of class over religion decreased considerably. In the last decade under study 
(1997-2007) we find the strongest relative effect of social class in Sweden: In 
Sweden the kappa-index of class voting and the contributed proportion of 
explained variance is found to be twice as strong when compared to the effect of 
religion. In the same period we find the strongest relative effect of religion in the 
Netherlands, where the effect of religious voting compared to that of social class 
is about two times stronger, and nearly 15 times in terms of explained variance. 
6.2.2  Chapter 3: The effect of Left-Right party positions on class voting 
in comparative perspective
After that we established the trends in class and religious-based voting in Western 
democracies in chapter 2, the remaining chapters sought to explain variation in 
cleavage-based voting. The central problem was: To what extent are social and 
political changes able to explain (a) the levels of and changes in class voting in 
Western democracies and (b) trends in class and religious voting in the 
Netherlands? 
 In chapter 3 we address the first, cross-national part of this research problem 
by answering the question: To what extent are the levels of and changes in class 
voting in Western democracies explained by social changes and the positions of 
political parties? To answer this question we estimated the impact of the Left-Right 
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positions of parties on the class-vote association through a Two-Step Hierarchical 
analysis of integrated data from 15 countries (1960-2005) in our Comparative 
Dataset on Cleavage Voting supplemented with data from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). 
 We tested three ‘top-down’ hypotheses: (1) the levels of class voting are 
weaker as the Left-Right position of left-wing parties is more centrist. And (2) the 
levels of class voting are weaker in less polarized party systems. A final expectation 
was that (3) movement to the ideological centre by left-wing parties or de-polar-
ization of a party system would explain decline in class voting. Before testing 
these political hypotheses we assessed to what extent ‘bottom-up’ social changes 
account for the decline in class voting. Our results support the idea that 
compositional changes lead to changes in class voting because changes in 
background characteristics (age, gender, and education) are partly responsible 
for the decline in political divisions between classes. Especially the changes in the 
relationship between education and vote seem to account for the decline in class 
voting. As educational levels are generally rising in post-industrial societies this 
development offers a ‘bottom-up’ explanation for changes in levels of class 
voting. Class voting is declining as the effect of education on vote changes. On 
average for all the whole 1960-2005 period we find that the more years of 
education the more likely a person is to vote right-wing, but in most countries this 
association is weakening over time. The higher educated service class, or more 
likely parts of it, transformed from being right-wing to left-wing. The Dutch analyses 
in chapter 4 give reason to assume that this holds for the social-cultural specialists 
in particular.
 In the third chapter we did not find evidence that left-right positions of left-wing 
parties alone influence the class-vote relationship. We did find, however, that 
when ideological differences between political parties are smaller the association 
between class and vote is weaker. We can therefore conclude that the levels of 
class voting are influenced by the extent of class-related political choices 
presented to voters. But in order to detect this ‘top-down’ direction of influence it 
is important to investigate party polarization rather than the absolute position of 
left parties on the ideological continuum. What variation in both party polarization 
and left-wing party positions fail to do, however, is to explain the over time trends 
in class voting. The reason for this can be seen from the lack of consistent 
correlations between left-party moves to the centre, or party ideological 
convergence, and time itself. 
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6.2.3  Chapter 4: The effect of social changes and political changes on 
class voting in the Netherlands
In the second part of this book we examined trends in cleavage voting in the 
Netherlands. Using more detailed measures and more sophisticated analyses 
techniques than in the cross-national part of this book we further investigate 
whether changes in cleavage voting can be explained by ‘bottom-up’ and 
‘top-down’ changes. In chapter 4 we examined trends in class voting in the 
Netherlands using 11 surveys from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies in 
the period 1971-2006. The main question in this chapter was to what extent the 
decline of class voting can be explained by social and political changes. With 
respect to ‘bottom-up’ social changes we formulated hypotheses about the het-
erogenization of the service class, the blurring of ideological boundaries between 
classes and the effect of education. From a ‘top-down’ perspective we formulated 
hypotheses about the restructuring of the Dutch party system after the formation 
of the GreenLeft party, and the changes in party’s social-economic positions and 
conservative-progressive positions. 
 Using a series of multinomial logistic regression models we found that the rise 
of the ‘new’ class of social-cultural specialists is important in accounting for 
changes in the class-vote relationship. The higher and lower technocrats are 
clearly not only more right-wing, but the higher and lower social cultural specialists 
also have developed strong preferences for new-left parties. Overall, the distinction 
between the manual class and other classes becomes less relevant over time for 
left-wing voting. We also found that the differences between classes with respect 
to their economic ideology weakened over the last decades. But holding constant 
for voters’ economic ideology could only partially interpret class voting differences 
and changes therein. Moreover, we found that the association between economic 
conservatism and voting has increased, although slightly, over time. With respect 
to education we found that a low education is decreasingly associated with voting 
left-wing. Moreover, new-left parties are increasingly chosen by voters with a high 
education. Especially for the sub-classes within the service class both the level 
and decline of the class effects are partially explained by education. With respect 
to ‘top-down’ changes we found no evidence that the downward trend in class 
voting was influenced by the political merger of four minor left-wing parties into 
GreenLeft. Using conditional logistic regression we tested whether the party 
positions affect the class-vote relationship. We conclude that after accounting 
‘bottom-up’ social changes, the economic L-R position of parties – and not their 
position on the cultural dimension - has a significant impact on vote choice 
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between the four major party groups in the Netherlands between 1971 and 2002. 
However, the extent to which voters favor parties with economically right-wing 
policies generally does not vary between the manual class and other classes. Yet, 
there  is a top-down effect: With respect to the cultural dimension, we found that 
manual workers tend to favor parties with conservative positions, whereas other 
classes – again especially the low-grade social-cultural specialists – prefer parties 
that are more progressive. But, although there seems to be a clear relation between 
party positions and the strength class-vote relationship, the party positions hardly 
explain the decline in class-based voting.
6.2.4  Chapter 5: The effect of social changes and political changes on 
religious voting in the Netherlands
Chapter 5 aimed to answer the question to what extent changes in religious voting 
can be explained by social factors and political changes. Similar to chapter 4 this 
chapter first tested a set of ‘bottom-up’ explanations for over-time variation in re-
ligious-based voting before testing two types of changes in political choices. We 
found clear evidence for the decline in the association between church 
membership and vote in the period 1971-2006. For the most part this decline 
seems to have taken place before 1986. Especially for Catholics and Calvinists 
we observe convergence in voting behavior compared to non-affiliated voters. 
The decline of the political boundaries between religious groups is largely 
explained by declining church attendance, as an indicator of religious disintegration. 
The decline of the association between being a Protestant and voting confessional 
is only weak. This is understandable given the fact that the difference in voting 
between liberal Protestants and the non-members was already small in the 1970s. 
However, we found that accounting for religious disintegration even produced an 
increase of religious voting for Protestants. 
 In chapter 5 we tested two ‘top-down’ hypotheses. First, we found that the 
CDA-merger in 1977 was responsible for a decline in religious voting. We also 
showed that the level of religious voting dropped after the 2002-elections, 
coinciding with the political merger of two minor Protestant parties into the 
ChristianUnion. These party mergers not only had effects in reducing the 
religion-vote association, we also found that the mergers mattered after the linear 
trend is fully accounted for by religious disintegration. We therefore conclude that 
apart from social changes the political interruptions are important contributions in 
the processes of religious dealignment in the Netherlands. Finally, we have shown 
that traditionalist party positions increase religious voting. Especially non-affiliated 
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voters are generally less likely to vote for parties that hold traditional moral 
positions. We therefore conclude that parties with more traditional moral positions 
deter secular voters rather than attract religious voters. But because the decline of 
church attendance is almost fully responsible for the decline in religious-based 
voting, party positions do not contribute to explaining linear downward trends. 
After accounting for a declining effect of church attendance a U-curve for religious 
voting remained, that strongly resembles the over-time emphasis of religious 
parties on traditional moral issues. Modeled as a linear increase in religious-
based voting this trend is only to a very modest extent explained by the traditional 
moral positions of parties. 
6.3 Reflections on research strategy and analyses 
In this thesis we combined large-scale cross-national research with the 
examination of trends in the Netherlands. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages to this research strategy. One of the merits is that the two parts in 
this book are complementary. The comparative studies in part I allow general 
conclusions about the levels of cleavage voting between and within countries. In 
this part we were able to test explanatory hypotheses about the effect of party 
positions on class voting based on large-scale cross-national analyses. 
Drawbacks of these pooled analyses were the low level of detail in measuring 
cleavages and cleavage strength, and the lack of testing for alternative 
explanations for variation in cleavage voting. In part II therefore, the nation-specif-
ic analysis of cleavage voting in the Netherlands not only enabled us to measure 
cleavages and party choice with a greater level of detail, but also allowed us to 
more exhaustively test explanations for the trends in cleavage voting. In turn, the 
cross-national analyses allow us to see to what extent trends in the Netherlands 
are part of larger societal developments, and to what extent explanations for 
these trends are mainly Dutch particularities or are universal in nature. 
Nevertheless, both the cross-national analyses in the first part of this book and 
the Dutch analyses in the second part face some limitations. Below we reflect on 
the measures, methods and models used in this book.
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6.3.1 Measurement
Voting behavior: Electoral research gained considerably by the introduction of 
surveys in the 1960s because it furthered the shift from macro to micro data. An 
alleged drawback however, also faced here, is that instead of measuring the 
actual voting behavior of voters at the ballot-box we have to rely on self-reported 
party choice in surveys. In the CDCV-file (used in chapters 2 and 3) we use 
different variables to measure party choice. In most surveys respondents were 
asked to name to the party they voted for in the most recent election or vote 
intention for the upcoming election. When available, one of these variables is 
used. In other, non-election, surveys, political party choice is measured as voting 
intention “what would you vote if election were today/ next Sunday?” or party 
identification. We recognize that such differences between pre-, post- and 
non-election surveys may have implications for the reported party choice of 
respondents. But we are not interested in the univariate frequency distribution of 
single parties. In this book we study the relationship between cleavage groups 
and political choices. Nieuwbeerta (1995) has argued that the relationship 
between class and political preference is not fundamentally different from that 
between class and voting behavior, and that when analyzing only surveys 
containing ‘voting behavior’ does not result in different outcomes than analyzing 
only surveys containing ‘party preference’. Moreover, we use classified variables 
of party choice into two or three categories. By grouping political parties, 
differences in reported party choice due to type of survey will be reduced.
 A second point of consideration is concerned with the classification of party 
choice. In all chapters we grouped political parties into a limited number (2, 3 or 
4) of categories. In Chapter 3 we used a two-category (left vs. right) categorization 
of respondents’ party choice to examine variation in class voting. Cross-national 
comparisons unavoidably come at the cost of nation-specific details, and this 
dichotomous classification is no exception. In the British case for example we 
lumped together the Liberal Democrats with the Conservative party in opposition 
to the Labour Party. Although this logically follows from collapsing non-left party 
categories, in this case ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’, it may affect the patterns of 
class voting. Merging the Liberal Democrats with Labour instead would reveal 
that the level of class voting in Britain dropped in the 1997-elections (Evans and 
Tilley 2011). With our classification, unfortunately, we were unable to detect such 
change. Another limitation is that our dichotomous categorization disregards the 
multidimensionality of party space: In chapter 3 parties are only classified with 
respect to traditional left-right divisions in politics. Many parties that are classified 
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as ‘right-wing’ are in fact Christian Democratic parties that adopt a centre or 
centre-right position in the party system. The electoral appeal of Christian parties 
is not primarily targeted at particular social-economic groups in society. In 
Chapter 2, where we also examined cross-national variation in religious voting, 
Christian parties are therefore distinguished from other right-wing parties, and 
chapter 5 is fully dedicated to voting for a religious party in the Netherlands. 
 In some party systems the existence of a ‘second’ dimension (e.g. new-left 
and new-right) has led to the realignment of social groups. Studies on Nordic 
countries for example have often differentiated between social-democratic parties 
and the new or more radical leftist and rightist parties that challenge them (e.g. 
Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). In chapter 4 we explored the differences in class 
voting between the ‘old-left’ and ‘new-left’ in the Netherlands by applying a more 
detailed classification of parties. But also in this chapter we were forced to group 
relevant parties. In line with the ‘New Politics Thesis’ (see Chapter 1) we merged 
the parties on the materialist ‘old-left’ (PvdA, CPN, SP), as opposed to post-ma-
terialist ‘new-left’ parties (D66 and GreenLeft). This classification of course 
disregards the intergroup differences between parties in each group. And also 
new-right parties are not investigated in this chapter. To provide a more complete 
picture of class differences in vote choices future research may benefit from a 
separate category of ‘new right’ parties in order to examine whether the working 
class has abandoned the left to the advantage of the ‘new right’. The period under 
study in chapter 4 does also not allow a comparable category for the ‘new right’ 
suitable for over-time analyses. Before the rise and fall of the LPF new- and 
far-right voting was a relatively minor phenomenon in Dutch politics; the 
extreme-right Centre Democrats (CD) only gained 0.9% and 2.4% of the votes in 
the 1989 and 1994 elections. In 2006 the PVV (Party for Freedom) managed to 
draw support (5.9%) on an anti-establishment agenda against immigration and 
‘islamization’. The success of the PVV was accompanied by losses for the PvdA 
and although the idea of cultural voters seems very plausible, it is too early to 
examine whether the emergence of the PVV has a long-standing impact on the 
relationship between the working class and the classical left. The large electoral 
gains of the PVV in the more recent elections in 2010, drawing 15.5% of the votes, 
also raise questions about the religion-vote relationship. During the 2010-elections 
the vote share of the CDA was virtually halved. And while the Liberal VVD won the 
general elections for the first time in history, CDA losses were the heaviest in the 
traditionally Catholic South of the Netherlands where the electoral success of the 
Freedom Party (PVV) was the largest. And although it may not have been Catholics 
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that voted for the PVV, it raises new questions about differences in the political 
re-alignment between former Catholics and former Protestants.
Social Class: In the cross-national part of this book we used a four-category 
classification of social class. In explaining over-time variation in class voting, this 
classification is sub-optimal because it is unable to account for all relevant 
compositional changes in the class structure of societies. In all countries, the 
service class grew rapidly in size and became increasingly heterogeneous. Our 
four-category classification distinguishes sub-classes within the ‘non-manual 
class’ (service class, routine non-manual and self-employed), but neglects further 
differentiations within the service class. The decline in class voting that we found 
in chapter 3 between the manual class and the service class may partially be 
attributed to the heterogenization of the service class. In the second part of this 
book, examining class voting in the Netherlands, we therefore distinguished within 
the service class between high-grade and low-grade technocrats and social-
cultural specialists. The advantage of using a four-category classification in the 
cross-national part of this book is that we were able to integrate much more 
surveys into our comparative dataset compared to previous studies. Because all 
countries in our file have at least five included surveys and cover at least a 
twenty-year period we could detect long-term changes in class voting for 15 
modern democracies. In ten countries our class voting trend covers thirty years 
or more, and in two countries even forty years or more. We therefore not only can 
detect long-term decline in class voting, but also confidently generalize this 
finding to all countries in our study. 
Religion: The degree of differentiation is not only an issue in measuring social 
class. Given the diversity of religious structures across countries the most 
appropriate classification of church membership may vary between countries. In 
chapter 2 we aimed to compare the influence of religion on voting cross-national-
ly by applying a uniform categorization of church membership across 13 countries. 
There are however some implications to our measure of denominational 
differences. First, in our survey data for Italy, Spain, Norway and Sweden 
information on denominational membership was not available. Despite the fact 
that also in these countries some people may not feel affiliated to the dominant 
Catholic Church or Protestant state churches survey data did not reveal such 
denominational differences. A second drawback is that some surveys included in 
the CDCV-file do not make sufficient distinction between ‘other religion’ and ‘no 
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religion’. As a result we merged the two categories in chapter 2 for all countries in 
order to enable a cross-national comparison. Because this combined group 
functioned as the reference category we may have underestimated the strength 
of the religious cleavage somewhat in chapter 2. Given the conclusion of this 
chapter - in the majority of the countries religion is more important than social 
class - this does not seem to be a fundamental problem. A better estimation of 
the effect of religion would only have reinforced our conclusion that religion 
outweighs social class in determining party choice. As mentioned, in chapter 2 
we may have underestimated the association between religion and party choice 
in the US, and over-estimated the decline in this association by merging all 
Protestant denominations into a single category.
Party Positions: In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we used the ‘top-down’ perspective to 
derive hypotheses about the effect of party positions on cleavage voting. Although 
there are different approaches to measuring policy positions of parties we use 
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The CMP datasets are the 
most conventional content analysis of election programs available. The most 
important alternative approaches in estimating positions of parties are expert 
surveys and computer-assisted content analysis of election programs. There is 
an extensive body of literature discussing and comparing the measurement 
quality, validity and reliability of the three approaches, see the overview by Volkens 
(2007). We do not repeat all arguments in favor of and against each approach 
because there is one simple but compelling reason to use the CMP data: At this 
moment the CMP data provides the only readily available source of party positions 
over a long time period in a large number of countries that can be compared to 
other comparative data. In this respect expert surveys have two major drawbacks. 
Expert surveys are conducted at fixed and limited numbers of moments in time 
(e.g. Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006), 
and are often ambiguous about the time period for which the estimates are valid. 
Volkens concludes that “Experts (…) judge most parties to stick to the same 
positions over long periods of time. As compared to quickly changing programmatic 
positions, expert surveys seem to provide generalizations of party positions over 
time” (2007: 109). Computer-assisted content analysis of election programs relies 
on computerized word-counts of the same election documents as the CMP data. 
This new technique seems promising but has not yet been able to create a time 
series dataset that can compete to the richness of the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (Budge and Pennings 2007).
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 The CMP data is not only rich, it also contains direct reflections of what parties 
state as their position at each election, and the reliability and validity of pre-con-
structed scales in the dataset are widely examined (Budge and Pennings 2007). 
But despite its strengths there are several shortcomings to the CMP dataset that 
should be mentioned here (cf. Benoit and Laver 2007). First, there is no indication 
of the uncertainty associated with the CMP estimates. Therefore, Benoint and 
Laver argue that “we do not know, for any two adjacent points in a time series, 
whether the difference between them is due to measurement error or movement in 
the underlying variable” (2007: 94). Second, because CMP measures consist of 
pre-defined and fixed scale components, they are unable to reflect local or 
temporal differences in the meaning of certain policy dimensions. Other drawbacks 
of the CMP data are that not every party publishes an election program, not all 
policy areas are mentioned in all of the programs, and some minor parties are not 
included in the data. A final drawback in this book is that we did not calculate the 
position of individual parties, but rather positions of party groups. This is a result 
of the way in which we coded the dependent variable throughout the chapters. 
The limitations of CMP data could in part be responsible for the fact that the 
erratic patterns of party polarization that we found in chapter 3 generally did not 
correlate with a linear measure of time. The more detected fluctuations in party 
positions are caused by measurement error, the less likely it is that such 
‘movements’ are associated with changes in class voting. Yet, we found that 
although our measure of party polarization could not explain trends in class 
voting, it was associated with the level of class voting in our pooled analysis. 
Moreover, in part II, we showed that there is a relationship between cleavage 
voting and CMP-based party positions in the Netherlands. Future studies, 
investigating shorter or fixed time periods, could explore whether using different 
approaches in estimating party positions leads to different conclusions about the 
impact of party positions on cleavage voting. 
6.3.2  Analyses
Models and methods: In chapter 1 we elaborated on the evolution of class voting 
research: From using cross-tabulations and the Alford-index in the 1960s to using 
multinomial logistic regression from the 1990s onwards. We build on this evolution 
by employing binary and multinomial logistic regression analyses. In most 
chapters we measured cleavage strength on the basis on odds ratios and 
log-odds ratios. Only in chapter 2 we summarized class and religious voting 
effects using the kappa-index. By employing a summary measure, we could have 
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used more refined measures of party choice, such as party families or even all 
parties as separate categories (see Knutsen 2007). We decided not to do so 
because with many, often small party categories, the limitations of the kappa-index 
(see Chapter 1) have greater implications. Not only all classes, but also all parties 
contribute equally in calculating the average class voting effect, regardless of 
their size. Strong class voting effects among major parties may therefore not be 
detected due to weak class voting effects among minor parties. It may therefore 
be worthwhile if future studies seek to construct cleavage voting measures that 
are not only a function of aggregate group-party associations, but also of group 
sizes, party popularity and group turn-out rates, see for example the work of 
Lachat (2006) and Best (2007). 
 We made methodological progress in chapters 4 and 5 by employing 
conditional logistic (CL) regression analysis. We argued that conditional logistic 
models accommodate scientific improvement in the field of cleavage voting 
research because the model allows combining case-specific variables with 
choice-specific variables. The CL model therefore has a crucial advantage over 
the multinomial logistic (MNL) model. In our analysis the individual-specific 
variables were used to test whether changes in the social background of the 
electorate were responsible for the decline in cleavage voting. Simultaneously, we 
used information on party positions as choice-specific variables. This way we 
were able to examine what happens when parties change their position on various 
political dimensions. In chapters 4 and 5 we showed that the CL model is suitable 
to determine which ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’ factors influence the level of 
cleavage-based voting. The conditional logistic model therefore not enables more 
stringent tests of ‘top-down’ theories, but it also facilitates the solution to an 
empirical problem in comparative research, i.e.: how to deal with the fact that 
party categories are not fixed over time and space. The CL model is not a new 
analysis technique (cf. McFadden 1974). But, as Alvarez and Nagler (1998) have 
argued, the difference between the CL and the MNL model are not widely 
recognized in political science. The same, we could add, holds for political 
sociology. Only very recently the CL model was first adopted in cleavage voting 
research (Elff 2009). As far as we know chapters 4 and 5 are the first time that 
conditional logit models are employed to examine cleavage voting in a single 
country over time. We encourage other researchers to explore possibilities of this 
model yet further, to explain variation in cleavage voting both within and between 
countries.
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 Despite its merits, the CL model has certain weaknesses. The most important, 
and most frequently debated drawback, is that both CL models and standard 
MNL models make the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA). This assumption holds that adding or omitting a category of the dependent 
variable does not affect the odds of the initial or remaining alternatives. In terms 
of elections IIA implies that when a right-wing party is in competition with a 
left-wing party, the participation of a second left-wing party will not affect the 
odds that an individual voter chooses between the initial two parties. This 
assumption is likely to be violated as the two left-wing parties take similar positions 
on particular issues. In spite of IIA, the odds that a voter chooses the initial 
left-wing party may go down because he or she considers the two left-wing 
parties to be substitutes (cf. Alvarez and Nagler 1998). The violation of IIA may 
therefore be especially relevant in studies focusing on the entry of new political 
options, or the disappearance of old ones. One can test for violation of IIA by 
comparing the estimates from the full model to those of restricted models that 
exclude at least one of the alternatives (Long and Freese 2006). With respect to 
our analyses, the tests commonly used to detect whether the IIA assumption is 
violated – the Hausman Test and the Small-Hsiao Test – both indicated that there 
is more evidence that IIA is not violated in our models than evidence for the 
opposite (see appendix D).
 If necessary, the IIA assumption can be relaxed using computationally more 
complex multinomial probit models (MNP) instead of MNL (Alvarez and Nagler 
1998; Long and Freese 2006). We decided not to use MNP models because the 
results of MNP models were are not substantially different from our MNL 
estimations. We used the stata program asmprobit - alternative-specific multinomial 
probit (ASMP) – as an alternative for the CL model (Long and Freese 2006). The 
CL models presented in this book were however too demanding to converge with 
ASMP estimation. 
Modeling changes: A large part of this study is aimed at explaining over-time 
variation in the effects of social cleavages on voting. We assumed linear changes 
because of the relatively gradual, slowly changing character of most social 
changes after the 1960s. Any observed changes consistent with ‘bottom-up’ 
processes are expected to take the form of a gradual decline. In most chapters 
changes in cleavage voting are therefore primarily modeled as linear changes. In 
chapter 2 we investigated the patterns of changes, but only in three forms, that is: 
stability, fully linear or completely unconstrained. Although this chapter showed 
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that linear changes often fit the data better than stability or trendless fluctuations, 
there are many different forms of non-linear changes that are unconsidered here 
but may be fit the data better. 
 In chapter 3 we adopted a Two-Step estimation procedure to model class 
voting trends. We first presented over-time and country-by-country graphs of the 
class-vote association in log-odd ratios. Next, we estimated a series of multilevel 
linear regression models with the value of the log-odds ratios as the dependent 
variable. To account for the fact that trends differ from country to country we 
modeled linear trends with both a random intercept and slope for each country. 
The advantage of using logit-coefficients instead of individuals as unit of analysis 
is that we can directly explain the association between social class and vote, 
estimate nation-specific class voting trends, and simply include additional macro 
level dependent variables. The problem that remains with our Two-Step approach 
is that it is possible to find significant linear trends even when there is only one 
sudden point of change in the range of observations. Another problem involves 
the degree of uncertainty associated with the dependent variables at the second 
stage of the Two-step Estimation. Recognizing these limitations we like to point 
out that in chapter 3 readers are able to judge for themselves the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the estimates (see figure 2), and to what extent our 
estimated trends lines match the plotted log-odds ratios (see figure 2 and 3).
In the Dutch chapters we paid more attention to non-linear changes. Both chapters 
4 and 5 first show the ‘unconstrained’ odds ratios of cleavage voting over time. 
And in both chapters we investigated discrete discontinuities in the linear trends 
based on the assumption that ‘jumps’ or ‘drops’ in over time patterns of cleavage 
voting are associated with political changes. Especially with respect to religious 
voting chapter 5 showed the importance of non-gradual changes additional to 
linear decline. We found a reversal in the trend between denomination and party 
choice after 1986, and sudden drops of religious voting after 1977 and 2002. We 
leave it to future research to more exhaustively investigate the country-specific 
scenarios of non-linear changes in cleavage voting for other countries.
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6.4 Theoretical contributions
6.4.1  Social change explanations
We have shown that both social and political changes may contribute in explaining 
the level of cleavage-based voting. In chapter 1 we summarized most common 
hypotheses in the literature. Let us first discuss the theoretical implications of this 
book with respect to social change explanations. In the empirical chapters, both 
cross-nationally and over-time in the Netherlands, we did not test all specific 
hypotheses about social changes. In chapter 3 we tested a ‘bottom-up’ hypothesis 
pertaining to the rise of new social divisions and the changes in the effect of 
education. We expected that the decline in class voting is partially accounted for 
by changes in effects of gender and education on voting. The scope of analysis 
in chapter 3 surpasses all previous studies on class voting. We found that in 
particular changes in the effect of education partially accounted for the decline of 
class voting. Our results imply that the differences between the working class and 
the other classes are to some extent waning because of new conflicts between 
those who received a high education and those who have not. A high education 
is decreasingly associated with voting right-wing. This is in line with the idea of 
new cultural divisions between the higher educated holding more liberal views 
than the lower educated. In chapter 4 on the Netherlands we found that a high 
education is decreasingly associated with a rightist party preference, and is 
increasingly associated with voting new-left. Our results should however be 
considered with some caution. In chapter 3 we lacked consistent micro data 
across all 188 included surveys to test alternative ‘bottom-up’ hypotheses, see 
the overview in chapter 1: e.g. growing mobility, rising affluence, and changing 
socio-economic and cultural values. Nevertheless, the analyses in chapter 3 are 
among the few comparative studies that aim to explain changes in class voting 
over-time, especially with respect to both micro level explanations and political 
explanations. 
 In the second part of this book we further examined the influence of social 
changes for the patterns of cleavage voting in the Netherlands. In chapter 4 we 
looked at the rise of the ‘new’ class of social cultural specialists. In doing so, we 
improved on previous research on the trends in class voting in the Netherlands. 
Critics of ‘new class’ theories have argued that the political orientations of the 
new middle class predominantly reflects the more left-wing views among upwardly 
mobile voters due to their classes of origin (Goldthorpe 1982). But in spite of such 
accounts Güveli (2006, chapter 3 and 4) has shown that technocrats recruit more 
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from lower social classes than the social and cultural specialists, and that both 
inter and intragenerational mobility is greater for technocrats than for social 
cultural specialists. Güveli also showed that the political differences between the 
social and cultural specialists and technocrats persist when controlled for 
educational level, gender and employment sector. We are therefore confident that 
the adjusted class schema revealed a process of heterogenization of the service 
class in the Netherlands, which proved to be essential in understanding changes 
in the class-vote relationship. We therefore encourage other researcher to apply 
this schema in studying class voting. 
 In chapter 4 we also tested whether trends in class voting are interpreted by 
differences between voters in their economic ideology and level of education. In 
doing so we improved on De Graaf et al. (2001) who tested hypotheses on social 
changes by only inferring a process of blurring boundaries between classes. We 
actually accounted for the social distinctiveness of classes by looking at their 
economic ideology. We expected that due to rising living standards and income 
levels attitudes on income redistribution had become less associated with class 
differences. This is an indirect micro level hypothesis based the notion of ‘growing 
affluence’. Contrary to our expectation we found that the association between 
economic ideology and voting has increased, although slightly, over time. This is 
unexpected: Assuming that class conflict increasingly has to compete with 
non-economic cleavages, the influence of peoples’ economic ideology on voting 
was certainly not expected to increase. A reason for this rather surprising finding 
may be that the economic progressive views of social cultural specialists 
crystallized over the last decades. In this sense class-based voting among the 
new service class became stronger because the economic orientations of social 
and cultural specialists became more homogeneous over time. 
 With respect to religious voting, the ‘bottom-up’ hypotheses in chapter 5 are 
largely based on secularization theory. Our hypotheses suggested a decline in 
the religion-vote relationship as a result of rising levels of education and declining 
church attendance. We expected that the cultural and normative boundaries 
between religious and irreligious voters are blurring as the level of church 
attendance declines. In formulating this expectation we need the assumption that 
people who attend church hold more cultural conservative views than infrequent 
attendees. This assumption about religious beliefs or social cultural values is not 
tested in chapter 5. Unfortunately, no direct comparable measures of cultural 
conservatism over time are available in the full range of the DPES surveys. But 
additional analyses on data from the “Social and Cultural Developments in the 
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Netherlands” (SOCON20) surveys of 1979, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, 
which include a good set of items for constructing a scale for ‘cultural conservatism’, 
shows a correlation of 0.44 with church attendance. This suggests that church 
attendance is not an optimal but at best a reasonable proxy for cultural 
conservatism. Future research should therefore further disentangle changes in 
the effect of church attendance on voting from that of religious belief or social 
cultural values. 
6.4.2  Political choice explanations
In this book we made an important step towards expanding the examination of 
cleavage change beyond ‘bottom-up’ processes to those involving the relevance 
of the choices that parties provide for voters. Our results suggest that ‘top-down’ 
effects in class voting relate to differences between parties presented to voters, 
rather than to economic appeals of left-wing parties alone. Based on large-scale 
data analyses in chapter 3, we found that when ideological differences between 
political parties are smaller the association between class and vote is weaker. 
According to the ‘Electoral Dilemma’ (Przeworski and Sprague 1986) class voting 
would decline because left-wing parties extend their appeal beyond their core 
constituency of working class voters. But we did not find that class voting is 
weaker as left-wing parties adopt more centrist positions. The emphasis is thus 
on the difference between the main party choices that voters face, and not 
necessarily with respect to economic differences only. For the Netherlands we 
could not find that party differences on the economic issues are responsible for 
the decline in class voting. The position of the social and cultural specialists is 
exceptional. More than any other class, low-grade social-cultural specialists tend 
to favor parties that are economically left-wing. 
 This shows that ‘top-down’ effects of party choices may interact with 
‘bottom-up’ processes such as the heterogenization of the service class. We 
found substantial class differences with respect to the conservative/progressive 
position of political parties. Manual workers tend to favor conservative parties, 
whereas other classes – again especially the low-grade social-cultural specialists 
– prefer progressive parties. In this sense, party polarization does seem to matter 
because parties in the Netherlands have diverged on ‘new’ political issues. 
 What the comparative chapter on class voting and the Dutch chapter have in 
common is that we were not able to interpret trends in class voting accounting for 
changes in political differences between parties. The falsification of the ‘top-down’ 
hypotheses predicting that class voting trends would be explained by accounting 
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for party positions, does not necessitate their immediate rejection. The fact that 
party changes could not explain linear trends, do not mean that they are incapable 
of explaining more time-specific changes and possible reversals in cleavage 
voting. For the Dutch case we found that the CDA and CU party mergers mattered 
after the downward trend in religious voting is fully accounted for by religious 
disintegration. This finding is important because the CDA-merger itself was a 
reaction to secularization and the waning electoral power of the major 
denominational parties. It shows that the ‘bottom-up’ approach can be seen 
apart from the ‘top-down’ approach, but not the other way around. Social changes 
may be gradual in nature, but can provoke sudden political changes, leading to 
abrupt changes in political alignment. By implication, future research could 
consider to what extent programmatic changes can explain time-specific ‘jumps’ 
or ‘drops’ in cleavage voting. This may be promising because after controlling for 
‘bottom-up’ changes we found a U-curve for religious voting in the Netherlands 
that strongly resembles the over-time emphasis of religious parties on traditional 
moral issues.
 By measuring party positions on the basis of statements in election manifestos, 
we assume that voters make prospective calculations about what they may win or 
lose by voting for a particular party. But next to relying on the promises of 
politicians, voters will retrospectively judge what parties, especially the incumbent, 
have done for them during the last government term. Both policy positions and 
policy outcomes are related to the substantive representation of groups in society. 
Cutting welfare expanses, for example, may hit the working class more than the 
prosperous middle class. Class voting may drop as manual class voters punish 
incumbent left-wing parties for cutting welfare expenses. Investigating the impact 
of welfare state characteristics on electoral divisions in eleven countries in the 
early-1970s Henjak (2009, Chapter 5) finds that in countries where social-demo-
cratic parties implemented welfare state policies, the support for these parties 
among the working class increased. Future research could investigate to what 
extent such policy decisions by parties contribute to explain cross-national and 
over-time variation in cleavage voting over a longer period of time and in more 
countries. 
 Next to substantive representation we recommend future research to 
investigate cleavage voting through the lens of descriptive representation. 
Descriptive representation involves the social composition of parliament or 
parties. A member of parliament represents someone by matching him or her on 
relevant characteristics, such as gender, ethnic origin, religion or class. Although 
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research on descriptive representation has in recent years strongly focused on 
socially disadvantaged groups, the underrepresentation of the working class 
remains underexposed in the literature (Wauters 2010). Research on the 
parliamentary behavior of female and black representatives has shown that they 
are more likely to give priority to issues and policies that are important for women 
or black people respectively (Celis 2006; Owens 2005). Interestingly, politicians 
of Christian Democratic parties are often religiously affiliated. But politicians of 
labor parties are rarely of working class origin. Such differences in descriptive 
representation may offer an explanation for why religion is often more important 
in determining voting behavior than social class. This would be a ‘bottom-up’ 
explanation if the composition of parliaments would only be shaped by reflecting 
the structures of society. The under- or overrepresentation of particular social 
groups in parliament is however a consequence of electoral laws and of the 
political recruitment procedures and candidate selection within parties. A shift to 
the question ‘who represents whom’ would therefore mean a further investigation 
of the relationship between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ changes. 
 This having said, we would welcome studies that aim to determine under what 
conditions religion outweighs social class, and vice versa. In chapter 2 we 
addressed questions on the relative influence of social cleavages on party choice. 
In line with a growing number of scholars, the results presented in the other 
chapters of this book suggest that it is important to consider the role of both 
social and political conditions of cleavage voting (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 
1999; Evans 2000; De Graaf et al. 2001; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Elff 2009). 
The hierarchy between cleavages may change as the social circumstances force 
parties to adopt new strategies. Przeworski and Sprague have argued that the 
relative influence of class may weaken as the electoral strategy of left-wing parties 
is less worker-orientated: “As socialists appeal to voters in supra-class terms, they 
weaken the salience of class and (…) leave room open for competing particularis-
tic appeals of religion, ethnic or linguistic groups, regions, etc.” (1986: 46). Heath 
et al. (1997) put forward that social cleavages need political vehicles to exert 
substantial influence on party choice. They attribute the relative unimportance of 
religion in British politics not to the absence of the social basis for a religious 
cleavage but to the fact that the cleavage has not been politicized. These 
arguments make clear that the politicization of cleavages may take different forms 
but that next to social factors political factors may be crucial to understand why 
the relative influence of social cleavages differs by electoral context. 
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20  For details about the SOCON surveys we refer to Eisinga, Felling, Peters, and Scheepers (1992); Eis-
inga, Felling, Peters, and Scheepers (1999); Eisinga, Coenders, Felling, Te Grotenhuis, Oomens, and 
Scheepers (2002); Eisinga, De Graaf, Levels, Need, and Scheepers (2008).
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Inleiding: sociale scheidslijnen en politieke tegenstellingen
Dit proefschrift richt zich op politieke tegenstellingen die voortkomen uit sociaal-
structurele verschillen in de samenleving, de zogenoemde ‘sociale scheidslijnen’ 
waarlangs zich verschillen voordoen in politieke gedragingen en houdingen. In 
democratische samenlevingen functioneren verkiezingen als voornaamste 
mechanisme voor de collectieve uitdrukking van tegenstellingen en overeen-
komsten. De samenhang tussen de sociale positie van mensen en hun stemgedrag 
is daarom een van de belangrijkste onderzoeksgebieden van de politiek 
sociologie. In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik twee traditionele sociale scheidslijnen 
tussen kiezers in westerse democratieën; sociale klasse en godsdienst. 
 Tijdens de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw gingen wetenschappers er veelal 
vanuit dat er een sterke samenhang bestond tussen de sociale groep waar mensen 
bij horen en de politieke partij waarop zij stemmen. Politieke partijen werden gezien 
als de vertegenwoordigers van specifieke sociale belangengroepen, en leden van 
dergelijke groepen werden verondersteld op een bepaalde partij te stemmen vanuit 
groepsbelang en partijloyaliteit. Linkse partijen golden daarbij als de vertegen-
woordigers van de arbeidende klasse. Vanuit het oogpunt van de klassenstrijd 
tussen arbeiders en kapitaalbezitters over de productiemiddelen in de samenleving, 
stemde de arbeidende klasse op partijen die herverdeling en opbouw van sociale 
zekerheden voorstonden, terwijl de burgerij, de zelf standigen en de bezitters van het 
kapitaal op partijen stemden die overheidsbemoeienis in de vrije markt verwierpen. 
‘Klassen gebonden stemgedrag’ in traditionele zin gaat er dan ook vanuit dat 
arbeiders op linkse partijen stemmen en niet-arbeiders op rechtse partijen.
 In vergelijking met sociale klasse is het verband tussen religieuze groepen en 
politieke partijen minder eenduidig. De grote diversiteit aan religieuze denominaties 
en aan partijen die hen vertegenwoordigen, zowel binnen als tussen landen, ligt 
hieraan ten grondslag. In het algemeen geldt echter dat wanneer wetenschappers 
de invloed van religie op stemgedrag onderzoeken, zij er vanuit gaan dat het 
electorale gedrag van religieuze kiezers afwijkt van het gedrag van seculiere 
kiezers. Historisch gezien stemmen religieuzen voor partijen die hun religieuze 
vrijheden verdedigden in conflicten over de afschaffing van staatskerken en de 
positie van godsdienst in het onderwijs. Later werden de tegenstellingen tussen 
religieuze en seculiere kiezers ook belangrijk met betrekking tot andere 
niet-materiële belangen. In tegenstelling tot seculiere kiezers stemmen religieuzen 
op partijen die liberale politieke opvattingen over abortus, euthanasie en rechten 
voor homoseksuelen verwerpen. 
summary in dutch (samenvatting)
220
 Het doel van dit onderzoek is om verschillen tussen en binnen landen te 
beschrijven en te verklaren in de mate waarin sociale klasse en godsdienst 
samenhangen met de keuze voor een politieke partij. Ik richt me op daarbij in het 
bijzonder op twee vragen: (1) In hoeverre bestaan er in westerse democratieën 
verschillen tussen landen en door de tijd heen in de relatieve invloed van sociale 
klasse op stemgedrag ten opzichte van de invloed van godsdienst? En (2) In 
hoeverre bieden sociale en politieke veranderingen verklaringen voor (a) het 
niveau van en veranderingen in klassengebonden stemgedrag in westerse 
democratieën en (b) trends in klassengebonden en godsdienstgebonden 
stemgedrag in Nederland? 
Hoofdstuk 1: Sociale klasse, godsdienst en stemgedrag in de literatuur
In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik aan de hand van een literatuuroverzicht zien dat er sprake is 
van evolutie in de onderzoeksliteratuur naar klassengebonden stemgedrag. Ik 
doe dit aan de hand van veranderingen in een viertal domeinen die eerder door 
Nieuwbeerta (1995) zijn gebruikt om het onderzoek naar klassengebonden 
stemgedrag in drie generaties op te delen, te weten: de (1) formulering van de 
onderzoeksvragen, (2) de belangrijkste hypothesen, (3) meetprocedures en (4) 
de gehanteerde analyse technieken. In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik echter zien dat na de 
studie van Nieuwbeerta dergelijke veranderingen hebben doorgezet, en dat er in 
toenemende mate sprake is van een vierde generatie in het onderzoek naar klas-
sengebonden stemgedrag. De onderzoeksvragen van deze vierde generatie 
richten zich op de vraag waarom de invloed van sociale klasse op stemgedrag 
afneemt. De verklaringen die in de belangrijkste hypothesen worden aangedragen 
hebben in toenemende name betrekking op politieke veranderingen. Naast de 
gebruikelijke gestandaardiseerde maten om sociale klassen te categoriseren, 
zoals het EGP-schema van Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (1979), worden 
er aangepaste ‘postindustriële’ schema’s gebruikt. En ook de ontwikkelingen in 
de gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden laten een toename zien in steeds 
geavanceerdere analysetechnieken. 
 Aan de hand van dezelfde criteria bespreek ik eveneens de onderzoekslitera-
tuur naar godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag. Hoewel er overlap bestaat tussen 
het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stemgedrag en godsdienstgebonden 
stemgedrag, zijn beide onderzoekslijnen geworteld in verschillende tradities. De 
ontwikkelingen in het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stemgedrag zijn sterk 
beïnvloed door het vergelijkende stratificatieonderzoek (Ultee 1989; Ganzeboom, 
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Treiman and Ultee 1991). Onderzoek naar godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag is 
niet in deze traditie geworteld. De evolutie van onderzoeksvragen, hypothesen, 
meetprocedures, en analyse technieken is daarom minder duidelijk als bij het 
klassengebonden stemgedragonderzoek. Verschillende generaties laten zich 
moeilijker onderscheiden. 
 Vervolgens ga ik in hoofdstuk 1 dieper in op de hypothesen die in de literatuur 
worden aangedragen om variatie tussen en binnen landen in godsdienst-/ klas-
sengebonden stemgedrag te verklaren. Ik laat daarbij zien dat er veelal dezelfde 
rederneringen worden gebruikt om verklaringen te formuleren voor de afname 
van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag als voor de afname van klassengebonden 
stemgedrag. In navolging van Evans (2000) groepeer ik de verklaringen in twee 
brede categorieën. 1) Verklaringen die er vanuit gaan dat de afname in klassen/
godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag het gevolg is van sociale veranderingen, de 
zogenaamde ‘bottom-up’ (van-onder-naar-boven) benadering. 2) Verklaringen 
die politieke veranderingen als belangrijkste bron van verandering in klassen/ 
godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag gebruiken, de zogenaamde ‘top-down (van-
boven-naar-onder) benadering.
 In de vier volgende empirische hoofdstukken richt ik me op specifieke vragen 
over trends en landenverschillen in klasse- en religiegebonden stemgedrag. Dit 
boek kent daarbij twee delen. Het eerste deel bestaat uit grootschalige 
vergelijkende studies naar de invloed van klasse/godsdienst op stemgedrag 13 
(hoofdstuk 2) en 15 (hoofdstuk 3) moderne democratieën in West-Europa, de 
Verenigde Staten en Australië in de periode 1960 tot 2008. Voor dit doel heb ik 
een nieuw grootschalig databestand samengesteld, de Comparative Dataset on 
Cleavage Voting (CDCV). In dit bestand zijn de gegevens geïntegreerd van 196 
afzonderlijke survey-onderzoeken in Australië, België, Denemarken, Duitsland, 
Engeland, Finland, Frankrijk, Italië, Nederland, Noorwegen, Oostenrijk, de 
Verenigde Staten, Spanje, Zweden en Zwitserland tussen 1960 en 2008. Dit 
databestand biedt daarmee de grootste verzameling aan gekoppelde (kiezers)
onderzoeken met betrekking tot godsdienst- en klassengebonden stemgedrag 
voor Westerse landen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Het grootschalige karakter 
van het eerste deel van dit proefschrift heeft als belangrijkste nadeel dat er alleen 
vergelijkingen in grove categorieën mogelijk zijn, en dat het aantal vergelijkbare 
variabelen per survey beperkt is. In het tweede deel van dit boek richt ik me 
daarom op trends in klasse- en godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in één land, te 
weten: Nederland. Voor dit doel gebruik ik data van de Nationale Kiezersonder-
zoeken (NKO) tussen 1971 en 2006. 
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Deel 1: sociale scheidslijnen en stemgedrag in vergelijkend 
perspectief
Hoofdstuk 2: Sociale klasse versus godsdienst als determinant van 
stemgedrag
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik de mate van en de verandering klassen-/godsdienst-
gebonden stemgedrag in 13 westerse landen in de periode 1960 tot 2008. Voor 
dit hoofdstuk maak ik gebruik van de 125 surveys in het CDCV-bestand die 
voldoende informatie bevatten over zowel de sociale klasse van mensen als hun 
godsdienstige achtergrond. In dit hoofdstuk beantwoord ik de eerste centrale 
vraag van dit proefschrift over crossnationale verschillen en trends in de relatieve 
invloed van sociale klasse op stemgedrag ten opzichte van de invloed van 
godsdienst. Twee deelvragen staan centraal: (a) In hoeverre hangt een sterk 
verband tussen sociale klasse en stemgedrag samen met een zwak verband 
tussen godsdienst en stemgedrag? (b) In hoeverre zijn de verschillen tussen de 
mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag en de mate van godsdienstgebonden 
stemgedrag in landen afgenomen, toegenomen of stabiel? 
 Ik begin hoofdstuk 2 met een uitgebreide bespreking van de literatuur omtrent 
de relatieve invloed van sociale klasse en godsdienst op stemgedrag. Ik laat 
daarbij zien dat het moeilijk is om resultaten van verschillende onderzoeken met 
elkaar te vergelijken. Er bestaan namelijk grote verschillen in de manier waarop 
sociale scheidslijnen gemeten worden, en hoe hun invloed op stemgedrag wordt 
geanalyseerd. Scheidslijnen op basis van sociale klasse en godsdienst worden 
veelal gemeten op basis van verschillende contrasten, classificaties en indicatoren. 
De afhankelijke variabelen zijn vaak te landenspecifiek om internationaal te 
kunnen vergelijken. En er bestaat een grote diversiteit aan criteria die worden 
gehanteerd om de sterkte van een scheidslijn te kunnen bepalen. In tegenstelling 
tot veel voorgaand onderzoek gebruik ik in dit hoofdstuk uniforme metingen van 
scheidslijnen in alle landen, gebaseerd op multicategorale typologieën van zowel 
scheidslijnen als politieke partijen. Vooruitgang wordt ook gemaakt door de 
analyses te richten op de relatieve invloed van godsdienst versus sociale klasse, 
en door veranderingen in de effecten van sociale klasse en godsdienst simultaan 
te modelleren. Om de invloed van scheidslijnen te beoordelen hanteer ik twee 
criteria; de kappa-index en de toegevoegde verklaarde variantie. 
 Met betrekking tot de eerste deelvraag laten mijn analyses zien dat er een 
positieve samenhang bestaat tussen de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag 
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in een land en de mate van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag. Deze bevindingen 
weerspreken de bewering van Lijphart (1979) dat klasse alleen een sterkte invloed 
kan hebben wanneer de invloed van godsdienst zwak is. Ik vind dat sociale klasse 
over het algemeen belangrijker is voor stemgedrag dan godsdienst in vijf landen, 
te weten: Australië, Engeland, Noorwegen, Oostenrijk en Zweden. In zes landen 
vind ik dat godsdienst een sterkere basis voor stemgedrag vormt dan sociale 
klasse. Deze landen zijn België, Frankrijk, Italië, Nederland, Spanje en Zwitserland. 
Met betrekking tot Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten bieden mijn resultaten een 
minder duidelijke conclusie. 
 De tweede vraag in hoofdstuk 2 richtte zich op veranderingen in de relatieve 
invloed van sociale klasse/godsdienst op stemgedrag. Ik vind dat in de meeste 
landen de samenhang tussen partijkeuze en zowel sociale klasse als godsdienst 
afneemt. Ondanks de afname in de sterkte van deze effecten blijft de hiërarchie 
tussen sociale klasse en godsdienst als voorspeller van stemgedrag in de meeste 
landen ongewijzigd. Tegenwoordig is godsdienst is belangrijker dan sociale 
klasse in globaal dezelfde landen als in de jaren zeventig. Het relatieve belang 
van godsdienst ten opzichte van sociale klasse neemt echter af in België en Italië, 
en keert zelfs om in Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten. In Australië en Oostenrijk 
was, en blijft, sociale klasse een belangrijkere determinant van stemgedrag dan 
godsdienst. In Zweden en Engeland heeft het relatieve effect van sociale klasse 
ten opzichte van godsdienst flink aan kracht ingeboet. Tegenwoordig vinden we 
de sterkste relatieve effecten van sociale klasse versus godsdienst in Zweden, 
waar zowel de toegevoegde proportie verklaarde variantie als de kappa-index 
van sociale klasse twee maal zo groot zijn dan die van godsdienst. Religie is 
tegenwoordig het meest dominant ten opzichte van sociale klasse in Nederland. 
Het effect van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag gemeten in kappa-index is 
ongeveer tweemaal groter dan dat van klassengebonden stemgedrag. In termen 
van toegevoegde verklaarde variantie is dit zelfs vijftien keer.
Hoofdstuk 3: Klassengebonden stemgedrag en links-rechts posities van 
politieke partijen
Na het vaststellen van de trends in godsdienst-/ en klassengebonden stemgedrag 
in hoofdstuk 2, zijn de resterende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift erop gericht 
dergelijke veranderingen te verklaren. In hoofdstuk 3 richt ik mij op de vraag in 
hoeverre het de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag, en veranderingen 
daarin, verklaard kunnen worden door sociale veranderingen en de posities van 
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politieke partijen. Ik beantwoord deze vraag door het effect te schatten van 
links-rechts posities van partijen op de mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag 
door middel van een hiërarchische twee-staps analyse. Ik maak in dit hoofdstuk 
gebruik van gegevens uit 15 landen in het CDCV-bestand aangevuld met 
informatie van het Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann 
et al. 2006). 
 In dit hoofdstuk toets ik drie ‘top-down’ hypothesen; (1) De mate van klassen-
gebonden stemgedrag is lager naarmate de links-rechts posities van linkse 
partijen meer centristisch zijn. En (2) De mate van klassengebonden stemgedrag 
is lager in minder links-rechts gepolariseerde partij systemen. En (3) bewegingen 
naar het ideologische midden door linkse partijen of de-polarisatie van het partij 
system verklaren de afname in klassengebonden stemgedrag. De voorgaande 
hypothesen worden getoetst nadat vastgesteld is in welke mate ‘bottom-up’ 
veranderingen de daling in klassengebonden stemgedrag beïnvloeden. Mijn 
analyses laten zien dat compositionele veranderingen leiden tot veranderingen in 
klassengebonden stemgedrag omdat controle voor achtergrondkenmerken 
(leeftijd, geslacht en opleiding), deels verantwoordelijk zijn voor de afname van 
electorale verschillen tussen sociale klassen. Met name verandering in de 
samenhang tussen opleiding en stemgedrag lijkt een relevante verklaring voor de 
afname van klassengebonden stemgedrag. 
 In dit derde hoofdstuk vind ik geen aanwijzingen voor de stelling dat de 
links-rechts positie van enkel linkse partijen de samenhang tussen sociale klasse 
en partijkeuze beïnvloed. Wel vind ik dat wanneer de ideologische verschillen 
tussen partijen kleiner zijn, dat dan de samenhang tussen sociale klasse en 
stemgedrag zwakker is. Ik concludeer daarom dat de mate van klassengebon-
den stemgedrag beïnvloed wordt door de mate van politieke keuzes die het 
electoraat gepresenteerd krijgt. Om dit ‘top-down’ effect te vinden is het echter 
belangrijk om naar de polarisatie van partijen te kijken, in plaats van naar de 
absolute positie van linkse partijen. Verschillen in partij polarisatie noch in posities 
van linkse partijen kunnen echter trends in klassen gebonden stemgedrag 
verklaren. De reden hiervoor is wellicht gelegen is het gebrek aan stelselmatige 
samenhang tussen verschuivingen van linkse partijen, of ideologische 
convergentie van partijen, en tijd. 
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Deel 2: Trends in de samenhang tussen sociale scheids -
lijnen en stemgedrag in Nederland
Hoofdstuk 4: Klassengebonden in Nederland tussen 1971 en 2006
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik trends in godsdienst en klas-
sengebonden stemgedrag in Nederland. Door gebruik te maken van gedetail-
leerdere maten en geavanceerdere analyse technieken ten opzichte van het lan-
denvergelijkende deel, kan ik me in dit deel van het proefschrift uitgebreider 
richten op de vraag in welke mate ‘bottom-up’ en ‘top-down’ veranderingen ver-
antwoordelijk zijn voor veranderingen in godsdienst en klassengebonden 
stemgedrag. In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik trends in klassengebonden stemgedrag 
in Nederland aan de hand van surveydata afkomstig van 11 Nationale Kiezerson-
derzoeken in de periode 1971 tot 2006. De belangrijkste vraag in dit hoofdstuk is 
in hoeverre sociale en politieke veranderingen verklaringen bieden voor 
veranderingen in klassengebonden stemgedrag in Nederland? Met betrekking tot 
de sociale veranderingen formuleer ik hypothesen over de heterogenisering van 
de dienstenklasse, de vervaging van ideologische scheidslijnen tussen klassen, 
en de invloed van opleiding. Hypothesen over politieke veranderingen hebben 
betrekking op de herstructurering van het Nederlandse partijsysteem na de 
formatie van GroenLinks, en veranderingen in de posities van partijen op de 
 sociaaleconomische links-rechts dimensie en conservatief-progressief dimensie.
 Door middel van een reeks multinomiale logistische regressie analyses vind 
ik dat de opkomst van de ‘nieuwe’ klasse van sociaal-cultureel specialisten een 
belangrijke verklaring is voor de veranderende samenhang tussen sociale klasse 
en stemgedrag. Over het algemeen vinden we dat het verschil tussen de 
arbeidende klasse en andere sociale klassen kleiner wordt over de tijd, maar bij 
de sociaal-cultureel specialisten lijkt er ook sprake te zijn van hergroepering. 
Hogere en lagere technocraten zijn niet alleen rechtser in hun stemgedrag, maar 
de sociaal-cultureel specialisten hebben in het bijzonder en sterke voorkeur 
ontwikkeld voor nieuw-linkse partijen zoals D66 en GroenLinks. Verder vind ik in 
dit hoofdstuk dat de ideologische verschillen tussen sociale klasse wat betreft 
economische herverdeling de laatste decennia zijn afgenomen. Maar wanneer 
constant gehouden wordt voor de economische ideologie van kiezers biedt dit 
slechts een gedeeltelijke verklaring voor verandering in het verband tussen 
sociale klasse en partijkeuze. Sterker nog, ik vind dat de samenhang tussen 
economisch conservatisme en stemgedrag zelfs licht is toegenomen over de tijd. 
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Met betrekking tot opleiding vind ik dat een lage opleiding steeds minder 
samenhangt met stemmen op een linkse partij. Voornamelijk nieuw-linkse partijen 
worden in toenemende mate gekozen door mensen met een hoge opleiding. Met 
name voor de subklassen van de dienstenklasse geldt dat opleidingsniveau een 
verklaring biedt voor zowel de sterkte als de afname van de klasseneffecten op 
stemgedrag. 
 Met betrekking tot de zogenaamde ‘top-down’-hypothesen over politieke 
veranderingen vind ik geen ondersteuning voor de verwachting dat de neerwaartse 
trend in klassengebonden stemgedrag beïnvloed zou zijn door de fusie van de 
PPR, PSP, CPN en EVP in GroenLinks. Of, en in welke mate partijposities de mate 
van klassengebonden stemgedrag beïnvloeden heb ik in dit hoofdstuk getoetst 
door gebruik te maken van conditionele logistische regressie modellen. Ik 
concludeer dat na rekening te houden met de bovenbeschreven sociale 
verklaringen, het vooral de economische links-rechts positie van partijen is, en 
niet hun conservatief-progressief positie, wat een significant effect heeft op de 
keuze tussen de vier grote partijgroepen in Nederland tussen 1971 en 2002. 
Echter, de mate waarin kiezers partijen stemmen met economische rechtse be-
leidsstandpunten verschilt niet tussen de arbeidende klasse en andere sociale 
klassen. Met betrekking tot de culturele posities van partijen vind ik dat arbeiders 
eerder op partijen stemmen naarmate deze conservatiever zijn, terwijl andere 
sociale klassen, en met name de sociaal-cultureel specialisten, vaker op partijen 
stemmen naarmate deze progressiever zijn. Maar hoewel ik in dit hoofdstuk laat 
zien dat er een duidelijke relatie bestaat tussen partijpositie en de mate van klas-
sengebonden stemgedrag, kunnen de veranderende partijposities niet verklaren 
waarom klassengebonden stemgedrag afneemt. 
Hoofdstuk 5: Godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in Nederland tussen 
1971 en 2006
In hoofdstuk 5 beantwoord ik de vraag in hoeverre veranderingen in godsdienst-
gebonden stemgedrag in Nederland verklaard kunnen worden door sociale en 
politieke veranderingen. Net als in het vorige hoofdstuk toets ik in dit hoofdstuk 
eerst een reeks ‘bottom-up’-hypothesen over sociale veranderingen alvorens 
twee typen ‘top-down’ hypothesen te toetsen over politieke veranderingen. Ik 
vind in dit hoofdstuk dat het verband tussen kerklidmaatschap en partijkeuze in 
Nederland sterk is afgenomen. Deze afname heeft voor het grootste deel 
plaatsgevonden voor 1986. Ik observeer dat met name de verschillen tussen 
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katholieken en gereformeerden enerzijds en niet-kerkleden anderzijds kleiner zijn 
geworden. De afname van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag wordt hoofdzakelijk 
verklaard door de terugloop in kerkgang, wat een indicatie is voor religieuze 
disintegratie. De samenhang tussen lid zijn van een protestantse kerk (Nederlands 
Hervormd of Protestantse Kerk Nederland) en het stemmen op een religieuze 
partij is slechts licht afgenomen. De verschillen in stemgedrag tussen protestanten 
en niet-kerkleden waren echter al klein in de jaren zeventig. Ik vind echter dat 
wanneer er rekening wordt gehouden met de disintegratie van kerkleden, aan de 
hand van een veranderende invloed van kerkgang, protestanten zelfs steeds 
vaker op een religieuze partij stemmen ten opzichte van niet-kerkleden. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 toets ik twee hypothesen over politieke veranderingen. Ten 
eerste, vind ik dat de fusie van de KVP, ARP en CHU tot het CDA in 1977 heeft 
geleid tot een aanzienlijke daling van het godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in 
Nederland. Ik laat ook zien dat de invloed van godsdienst op stemgedrag is 
gedaald na de verkiezingen van 2002, het jaar waarin de GPV en RPF voor het 
eerst als de fusiepartij ChristenUnie aan de verkiezingen deelnamen. Beide 
partijfusies hebben niet alleen bijgedragen aan het verminderen van de 
samenhang tussen godsdienst en stemgedrag, ze zijn zelfs van belang wanneer 
de lineaire daling van godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag al volledig wordt 
verklaard door religieuze disintegratie. Ik concludeer daarom dat naast sociale 
veranderingen partijpolitieke herstructureringen belangrijke bijdragen zijn aan het 
proces van religieuze “degroepering” in het Nederlandse electoraat. 
 Tot slot laat ik zien dat religieus stemgedrag wordt bevorderd wanneer partijen 
meer traditionele partijposities innemen. Met name niet-kerkleden zijn minder 
geneigd op partijen te stemmen naarmate deze meer nadruk leggen op traditioneel 
morele standpunten. Ik concludeer daarom dat partijen met traditioneel morele 
standpunten met name seculiere kiezers afstoten in plaats van religieuze kiezers 
aantrekken. Omdat de neerwaartse trend in godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag 
bijna volledig wordt verklaard door de afnemende invloed van kerkgang op 
partijkeuze, dragen de morele standpunten van partijen echter niet verder bij aan 
het verklaren van deze trend. Na rekening te houden met het afnemende effect 
van kerkgang blijft er een U-vormige curve over met betrekking tot de trend van 
godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag sinds de jaren zeventig. Deze curve vertoont 
sterke gelijkenis met de nadruk die het religieuze partijen in Nederland 
(voornamelijk het CDA en haar voorlopers) door de tijd heen hebben gelegd op 
traditioneel morele beleidsstandpunten. Gemodelleerd als lineaire veranderingen 
in godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag wordt deze trend slechts heel beperkt 
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verklaard door rekening te houden met de traditioneel morele posities van 
partijen. 
Slotbeschouwing
In het laatste hoofdstuk vat ik de bevindingen van dit proefschrift samen, en 
evalueer ik de gevoerde onderzoeksstrategie en gehanteerde analysetechnieken. 
Tot slot bespreek ik de wetenschappelijke bijdragen van dit proefschrift en de 
implicaties ervan voor toekomstig onderzoek. De onderzoeksstrategie in dit 
proefschrift is er één van grootschalig landenvergelijkend onderzoek gecombineerd 
met trendonderzoek in Nederland. In het slothoofdstuk stel ik vast dat er zowel 
voor- als nadelen aan deze aanpak zitten. Een belangrijk voordeel is dat de twee 
delen elkaar aanvullen. De landenvergelijkende hoofdstukken in het eerste deel 
van dit proefschrift stellen mij is staat algemene conclusies te trekken over de 
mate van samenhang tussen sociale scheidslijnen en stemgedrag binnen en 
tussen landen. De nadelen van deze vergelijkende analyses zijn gelegen in de 
beperkte mate van detail bij het meten van sociale klasse, godsdienst en 
stemgedrag, en het gebrek aan mogelijkheden om alternatieve verklaringen te 
toetsen voor variatie in klassengebonden stemgedrag. Maar de landenvergelij-
kende analyses laten daarentegen wel zien in hoeverre de trends in Nederland, 
zoals gevonden in het tweede deel van dit proefschrift, deel uit maken van bredere 
internationale ontwikkelingen. 
 Ik ga in dit slothoofdstuk uitgebreid in op de implicaties van gehanteerde 
operationaliseringen van stemgedrag, sociale klasse, godsdienst en partijposities 
zoals gehanteerd in de verschillende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift. Deze 
bespreking zich vooral op de classificatie van variabelen in een beperkt aantal 
categorieën. Met betrekking tot stemgedrag bespreken we de implicaties van het 
indelen van Nederlandse politieke partijen in vier groepen, en het gebruik van 
slechts twee of drie categorieën voor stemgedrag in het landenvergelijkende 
onderzoek dit proefschrift. Met betrekking tot de operationalisering van sociale 
klasse bespreek ik met name de keuze om in het landenvergelijkende deel van dit 
proefschrift niet meer dan vier categorieën te hanteren, waarin verschillen tussen 
aparte segmenten van de dienstenklasse buiten beschouwing worden gelaten. 
De mate van differentiatie speelt ook een rol in de bespreking van de religieuze 
classificaties in dit proefschrift. Ik richt me daarbij vooral op verschillen tussen 
landen in mate waarin er informatie beschikbaar is over kerklidmaatschap van 
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respondenten. Met betrekking tot de operationalisering van partijposities ga ik 
zowel in op de voordelen en nadelen van de Comparative Manifesto Project-data, 
en de belangrijkste alternatieven voor deze data. In dit hoofdstuk besteed ik ook 
aandacht aan de analyse methoden en geschatte modellen. Ik bespreek daarbij 
in het bijzonder het gebruik van conditionele logistische (CL) regressie modellen 
in hoofdstukken 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift. Ik stel dat CL modellen voorzien in 
wetenschappelijke vooruitgang in het onderzoek naar sociale scheidslijnen en 
stemgedrag omdat in deze modellen zowel kenmerken van kiezers opgenomen 
kunnen worden als kenmerken van hun keuzealternatieven. CL modellen maken 
het daarom niet alleen mogelijk om ‘top-down’ theorieën strenger te toetsen, 
maar bieden ook een oplossing voor een empirisch probleem in vergelijkend 
onderzoek, namelijk: hoe om te gaan met het feit dat partij categorieën verschillen 
tussen tijdstippen en plekken. Ik beargumenteer dat CL modellen daarmee een 
voordeel hebben ten opzichte van de meer wijdverbreide multinomiale logistische 
(MNL) regressie modellen. Ook ga ik in dit hoofdstuk in op de zwakte van CL en 
MNL modellen, namelijk de assumptie van Onafhankelijkheid van Irrelevante 
Alternatieven (IIA, ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’). Deze assumptie 
houdt in dat het toevoegen of verwijderen van een categorie van de afhankelijke 
variabele geen invloed heeft op de kansverhoudingen van de initiële of resterende 
alternatieven. 
 Ik besluit dit proefschrift met een beschouwing van wat dit proefschrift aan 
kennis heeft opgeleverd over de sociale en politieke verklaringen voor 
veranderingen in de samenhang van sociale scheidslijnen en politieke partijkeuze. 
Aan de hand van vragen, uitspraken en bevindingen in dit proefschrift geef ik 
daarbij suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. Met betrekking tot de ‘bottop-up’ 
verklaringen over sociale veranderingen laten de landenvergelijkende analyses in 
dit proefschrift onder andere zien dat de verschillen tussen de arbeidende klasse 
en andere sociale klassen deels tanende zijn vanwege de opkomst nieuwe 
scheidslijnen tussen kiezers die een hoge opleiding hebben genoten en kiezers 
die dat niet hebben. Deze bevinding strookt met het idee van nieuwe culturele 
scheidslijnen waarbij hoger opgeleiden er over het algemeen progressievere 
denkbeelden op nahouden dan lager opgeleiden. Immers, ook in Nederland 
vinden we dat een hoge opleiding in steeds mindere mate een rechtse politieke 
partijkeuze voorspelt, en juist in steeds grotere mate geassocieerd moet worden 
met een voorkeur voor nieuw-linkse partijen. Tevens laten de analyses voor 
Nederland zien dat de heterogenisering van de dienstenklasse een cruciale rol 
speelt in het veranderende karakter van klassengebonden stemgedrag. Ik moedig 
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daarom andere onderzoekers aan het onderscheid tussen technocraten en 
sociaal- cultureel specialisten mee te nemen in toekomstig onderzoek naar 
klassen verschillen in politieke gedragingen en opvattingen. 
 In dit proefschrift maak ik belangrijke stap vooruitgang in het onderzoek naar 
veranderende sociaal-politieke scheidslijnen door ‘bottom-up’ verklaringen uit te 
breiden met veranderingsprocessen die betrekking hebben op de rol van keuze-
alternatieven die partijen kiezers bieden. Mijn resultaten veronderstellen dat 
‘top-down’ invloeden op klassengebonden stemgedrag vooral te maken hebben 
met verschillen tussen partijen, en niet zozeer met de economische positie van 
alleen linkse partijen. Deze bevinding weerspreekt de verwachting op basis van 
Przeworksi and Sprague’s (1985) ‘Electorale Dilemma’ dat klassengebonden 
stemgedrag afneemt als gevolg van het feit dat linkse partijen zich uit electorale 
noodzaak steeds sterker op de middenklasse richten om de afname van de 
arbeidende klassen in de samenleving te compenseren. Voor Nederland vind ik 
echter niet dat verschillen tussen partijen met betrekking tot economische 
standpunten verantwoordelijk zijn voor de afname van klassengebonden 
stemgedrag. Ik vind in Nederland echter wel substantiële klassenverschillen in de 
mate waarin progressieve of conservatieve partijstandpunten leiden tot een stem 
op een partij. Arbeiders stemmen eerder op partijen naarmate deze conservatiever 
zijn, terwijl andere sociale klasse vaker op partijen stemmen naarmate deze 
progressiever zijn. In dit opzicht lijkt het relevant dat partijen in Nederland 
divergerende posities innemen met betrekking tot ‘nieuwe’ politieke issues.
 Hoewel ik vind dat partijposities niet in staat zijn de neerwaartse trends in 
klassengebonden stemgedrag te verklaren, betekent dit niet dat hypothesen over 
politieke veranderingen niet zinvol zijn. Het feit dat partijveranderingen geen 
lineaire trends verklaren, sluit niet uit dat ze wel in staat zijn meer tijdspecifieke 
veranderingen in sociaal-politieke scheidslijnen te verklaren. Voor Nederland heb 
ik laten zien dat de totstandkoming van het CDA en de ChristenUnie religieusge-
bonden stemgedrag heeft beïnvloed, zelfs wanneer er rekening wordt gehouden 
met de desintegratie van religieuze groepen. Deze bevinding is belangrijk omdat 
de fusie van de KVP, ARP en CHU tot het CDA zelf een reactie was op de 
secularisering in Nederland en de teloorgang van de oude confessionele partijen. 
Het toont aan dat ‘bottom-up’-verklaringen los gezien kunnen worden van 
‘top-down’, maar niet andersom. Sociale veranderingen kunnen gradueel zijn van 
aard, maar ze kunnen plotselinge politieke reacties uitlokken die leiden tot abrupte 
verschuivingen van sociale groepen in het electoraat. 
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A.1 Data Sources
A.1.1 Data Archives: 
ANES  American National Election Studies: Center for Political Studies, 
Ann Arbor (MI), USA
ASSDA  Australian Social Science Data Archive: The Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia
CDSP Centre de Données Socio-Politiques, Paris, France
CSES Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Ann Arbor (MI), USA 
CIS Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, Madrid, Spain
DANS  Data Archiving and Networked Services, Den Haag, the 
Netherlands
DDA Danish Data Archive, Odense, Denmark
ESRC ESRC Data Archive, Essex, United Kingdom
FSD Finnish Social Science Data Archive, Tampere, Finland
ITANES  Italian National Election Survey, Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, Bologna, 
Italy
ICPSR  Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,  
Ann Arbor (MI), USA
NSD Norwegian Social Science Data Service, Bergen, Norway
SIDOS  Swiss Information and Data Archive Service for the Social 
Sciences, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
SSD Swedish Social Science Data Service, Göteborg, Sweden
ZA Zentral Archive, Köln, Germany
A.1.2 Data files by country
File  Archive:# Chapter
Australia   
AUS65 DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS67 DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS73 DANS:P1145 3
AUS79 DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS84 DANS:P1145 2,3
File  Archive:# Chapter
AUS85I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS86I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS87 DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS87I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS90E DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS93E ASSDA:0763 2,3
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AUS96E ASSDA:0943 2,3
AUS98E ASSDA:1001 2,3
AUS01E ASSDA:1048 2,3
AUS04E ASSDA:1079 2
   
Austria   
AUT74P DANS:P1145 2,3
AUT85I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUT88I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUT89I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS95I ZA:2280 2,3
AUS99I ZA:3430 2,3
AUS03I ZA:3910 2,3
   
Belgium    
BEL75 DANS:P1145 3
BEL91 DANS:P1228 2,3
BEL95 DANS:P1422 2,3
BEL99 CSES:1 2,3
BEL03 CSES:2 2,3
   
Denmark   
DEN71E DDA:0658 3
DEN72S DDA:0658 3
DEN75E DDA:0658 3
DEN77E DDA:0658 3
DEN79E DDA:0658 3
DEN81E DDA:0658 3
DEN84E DDA:0772 3
DEN87E DDA:1340 3
DEN88E DDA:1432 3
DEN90E DDA:1564 3
DEN94E DDA:2210 3
DEN98E DDA:4189 3
DEN01E DDA:12516 3
Finland   
FIN72S DANS:P1145 3
FIN75P DANS:P1145 3
FIN91E FSD:1018 3
FIN95E FSD:1031 3
FIN99E FSD:1042 3
FIN03E FSD:1260 3
   
France   
FRA67E ICPSR:2978 2,3
FRA68E ICPSR:7274 2,3
FRA78E DANS:P1145 3
FRA88E CDSP:PE88 2,3
FRA95E CDSP:PE95 2,3
FRA97E CDSP:PE97 2,3
FRA02E CDSP:PEFV 2,3
FRA06 CDSP:PE06 2
FRA07 CDSP:PE07 2
   
Germany   
GER69E DANS:P1145 2,3
GER69F DANS:P1145 2,3
GER75P DANS:P1145 2,3
GER76Z DANS:P1145 2,3
GER77Z DANS:P1145 2,3
GER78C DANS:P1145 2,3
GER78X DANS:P1145 2,3
GER79Z DANS:P1145 2,3
GER79X DANS:P1145 2,3
GER80A DANS:P1145 2,3
GER80C DANS:P1145 2,3
GER80P DANS:P1145 2,3
GER80Z DANS:P1145 2,3
GER82A DANS:P1145 3
GER84A DANS:P1145 2,3
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GER86A DANS:P1145 2,3
GER87I DANS:P1145 2,3
GER88A DANS:P1145 2,3
GER90A DANS:P1145 2,3
GER94E ZA:3911 2,3
GER98E ZA:3911 2,3
GER02E CSES:2 2,3
GER05E CSES:3 2
   
Italy   
ITA68E DANS:P1145 2,3
ITA75P DANS:P1145 2,3
ITA85 DANS:P1145 2,3
ITA90E ITANES:1990  2,3
ITA92E ITANES:1992 2,3
ITA94E ITANES:1994 2,3
ITA96E ITANES:1996 2,3
ITA01E ITANES:2001 2,3
ITA06E ITANES:2006 2
   
Netherlands   
NET70 DANS:P1145 2,3
NET71 DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5
NET72E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5
NET74P DANS:P1145 2,3
NET76 DANS:P1145 2,3
NET77E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5
NET77L DANS:P1145 2,3
NET79P DANS:P1145 2,3
NET81E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5
NET82E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5
NET85S DANS:P1145 2,3
NET86E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5
NET87 DANS:P1145 3
NET89M DANS:P1145 3
NET89E DANS:P1000  2,3,4,5
NET90S DANS:P1145 2,3
NET94E DANS:P1208 2,3,4,5
NET98E DANS:P1415 2,3,4,5
NET02E DANS:P1628 2,3,4,5
NET06E DANS:P1719 2,3,4,5
   
Norway   
NOR65E DANS:P1145 3
NOR72S DANS:P1145 3
NOR77E DANS:P1145 3
NOR81E DANS:P1145 2,3
NOR85E DANS:P1145 2,3
NOR89E DANS:P1145 2,3
NOR90I DANS:P1145 3
NOR93E ZA:3911 2,3
NOR97E ZA:3911 2,3
NOR01E CSES:2 3
   
Spain   
SPA79E CIS:1192 2,3
SPA82E CIS:1327 3
SPA86E CIS:1542 2,3
SPA89E CIS:1842 3
SPA93E CIS:2061 3
SPA96E CIS:2210 3
SPA00E CIS:2384 2,3
SPA04E CIS:2559 2,3
SPA08E CIS:2757 2
   
Sweden   
SWE72S DANS:P1145 3
SWE76E ZA:3911 3
SWE79E ZA:3911 3
SWE82E ZA:3911 3
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SWE85E ZA:3911 2,3
SWE88E ZA:3911 2,3
SWE91 DANS:P1145 3
SWE91E ZA:3911 2,3
SWE94E ZA:3911 2,3
SWE98E ZA:3911 2,3
SWE02E CSES:2 2,3
   
Switzerland   
SWI71E SIDOS:8862 2,3
SWI72 DANS :P1145 3
SWI75E SIDOS:8862 2,3
SWI76P DANS:P1145 3
SWI79E SIDOS:8862 2,3
SWI87E SIDOS:8862 3
SWI91E SIDOS:8862 3
SWI95E SIDOS:8862 2,3
SWI99E SIDOS:8862 2,3
SWI03E SIDOS:8862 2,3
   
United Kingdom   
ENG64E DANS:P1145 2,3
ENG66E DANS:P1145 2,3
ENG70E DANS:P1145 2,3
ENG74O DANS:P1145 3
ENG79E DANS:P1145 2,3
ENG83E DANS:P1145 2,3
ENG85I DANS:P1145 3
ENG86I DANS:P1145 3
ENG87E DANS:P1145 2,3
ENG87I DANS:P1145 3
ENG88I DANS:P1145 3
ENG89I DANS:P1145 3
ENG90I DANS:P1145 3
ENG92E ZA:3911 2,3
ENG97E ZA:3911 2,3
ENG01E ZA:3911 3
ENG05E ESRC:BES05 2,3
   
United States  
USA60E DANS:P1145 2,3
USA64E DANS:P1145 2,3
USA66E DANS:P1145 2,3
USA68E DANS:P1145 2,3
USA70E DANS:P1145 2,3
USA72E DANS:P1145 2,3
USA72G DANS:P1145 3
USA73G DANS:P1145 3
USA74G DANS:P1145 3
USA74P DANS:P1145 3
USA75G DANS:P1145 3
USA76E ANES:48-04 2,3
USA76G DANS:P1145 3
USA77G DANS:P1145 3
USA78G DANS:P1145 3
USA80E ANES:48-04 2,3
USA80G DANS:P1145 3
USA82G DANS:P1145 3
USA83G DANS:P1145 3
USA84E ANES:48-04 2,3
USA84G DANS:P1145 3
USA85G DANS:P1145 3
USA86G DANS:P1145 3
USA87G DANS:P1145 3
USA88E ANES:48-04 2,3
USA88G DANS:P1145 3
USA89G DANS:P1145 3
USA90G DANS:P1145 3
USA92E ANES:48-04 2,3
USA96E ANES:48-04 2,3
US00AE ANES:48-04 2,3
US04AE ANES:48-04 2,3
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A.1.3 Data references
ANES:48-04  American National Election Studies. The 1948-2004 release of the Time Series 
Cumulative Data File. 
ASSDA:763.  Jones, R., McAllister, I., Denemark, D. and Gow, D. Australian Election Study, 
1993.
ASSDA:0943.  Jones, R., McAllister, I. and Gow, D. Australian Election Study, 1996. 
ASSDA:1001.  Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. Australian Election Study, 1998. 
ASSDA:1048.  Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. Australian Election Study, 2001. 
ASSDA:1079.  Bean, C., McAllister, I., Gisbon, R and Gow, D. Australian Election Study, 2004.
CDSP:PE88  Mayer, N. et al. Enquête post-électorale française, 1988. 
CDSP:PE95  Mayer, N., Boy, D., and Lewis-Bec, M. Enquête post-électorale française, 1995
CDSP:PE97  CEVIPOF. Enquête post-électorale française, 1997. 
CDSP:PEFV  CEVIPOF. Panel Électoral Français, 2002.
CDSP:PE06  CEVIPOF. The Baromètre Politique Français, 2006-2007. 
CDSP:PE07  CEVIPOF. Panel Électoral Français, 2007. 
CIS:1192  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1979
CIS:1321  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1982
CIS:1542  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1986 
CIS:1842  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1989
CIS:2061  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1993
CIS:2210  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1996
CIS:2384  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 2000
CIS:2559  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 2004
CIS:2757  Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 2008
CSES:1  The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES Module 1 Full Release. 
August 4, 2003
CSES:2  The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES Module 2 Full Release. 
June 27, 2007.
CSES:3 T he Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES Module 3 First Advance 
Release. March 29, 2010.
DANS:P1000  Anker, H. and Oppenhuis, E.V. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 1989. 
DANS:P1145  Nieuwbeerta, P and Ganzeboom, H.B. International Social Mobility and 
Politics File. 
DANS:P1208  Anker, H. and Oppenhuis, E.V. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 1994.
DANS:P1415  Aarts, K., Kolk, H. van der, and Kamp, M. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 1998. 
DANS:P1628  Irwin, G.A., Holsteyn, J.J.M. and Ridder, J.M. den. Nationaal Kiezers -
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onderzoek, 2002/3. 
DANS:P1719  Aarts, K., Kolk, H., van der, Rosema, M., and Schmeets, H. Nationaal 
 Kiezersonderzoek, 2006. 
DDA:0658  Borre, Ole, et al. Danish Election Studies Continuity File, 1971-1981.
DDA:0772  Borre, O., G. A..J., et al. Danish Election Survey, 1984.
DDA:1340  Borre, O., J. Goul A., et al. Danish Election Survey, 1987.
DDA:1342  Nielsen, H.J., Sauerberg, S. and Worre, T. (1988). Danish Election Survey, 
1988.
DDA:1564  Andersen, J.G., Borre, O., Nielsen, H.J.S. Sauerberg, S. and Worre, T. Danish 
Election Survey, 1990.
DDA:2210  Andersen, J. and Borre,O. Danish elections study, 1994. 
DDA:4189  Andersen, J. G., Andersen, J., Borre, O. and H. J. Nielsen. Danish Election 
Survey, 1998.
DDA:12516  Andersen, J. G., Borre, O., Nielsen, H. J., Andersen J., Thomsen, S. R. and 
Elklit, J. Danish Election Survey, 2001.
ESRC:BES05  Sanders, D., Whiteley, P., Clarke, H. and Stewart, M. British National Election 
Study, 2005. 
FSD:1018 Finnish Voter Barometer, 1991. 
FSD:1031 Finnish Voter Barometer, 1995
FSD:1042 Finnish Voter Barometer, 1999 
FSD:1260 Finnish Voter Barometer, 2003 
ITANES:90  Parisi, A.M.L. and Schadee, H.M.A. Italian National Election Studies, 1990. 
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A.2 Party classifications in chapters 2 and 3
appendix a: data
Country Left-wing parties
(Socialist, Communist and Left-socialist parties) 
Right-wing parties
(liberal, conservative, agrarian, and other right parties)
Religious parties
(Christian Democratic, Catholic and other 
denominational parties)
Australia ALP Australian labor party; DLP Democratic labor party; QLP Queensland labor 
party
LPA Liberal party; NP National party - country party; CLP 
Country-liberal party; AD Australian democrats; ON One 
Nation
Austria SPO Socialist Party; KPO Communist party FPO Freedom party; LF Liberal Forum OVP Austrian peoples party
Belgium BSP - PSB - POB Belgian socialist party; PS Socialist Party Wallonia; SP-SPa 
Socialist Party Flanders
PVV - Party of liberty and progress; PLDP Brussels liberal 
party; PRL- Walloon Liberals; VLD - Flemish Liberals; 
VB Flemish Interest- Flemish Bloc; FN National Front – 
Wallonia; MR Reform Movement - Walloon Liberals
PSC - CVP Catholic party; CVP - CD&V, 
Flemish Christian Democrats; PSC - CDH 
Walloon Christian Democrats
Denmark SD Social Democratic Party; DKP Danish Communist Party; RF Justice party; SF 
Socialist Peoples Party; VS Left Socialists FK Common Course; EL Unity List
CD Centre Democrats; V Left – Liberals; RV Radical Left 
– Liberals; KF Conservative Peoples Party; FRP Progress 
Party; DF Danish Peoples Party 
KD Christian Democrats - KrF Christian 
Peoples Party
Finland SDP Social democrats; STP Socialist workers party; SKDL Finnish peoples 
democratic union; TPSL Social democratic league of workers & smallholders; VAS 
Left Alliance 
KESK Finnish Centre party; KOK National coalition; LKP 
Liberal peoples party; SMP Finnish rural party; PS True 
Finns; NUORS Young Finns
SKD Christian league - KD Christian 
Democrats
France SFIO-PS Socialist party; PCF Communist party; minor left; other extreme left RFP Rally for the French People; UNR Union for the New 
Republic; UDR Union for the Defense of the Republic; 
RPR Rally for the Republic; UMP Union for the Popular 
Movement; MRP Popular Republican Movement; CDS 
Democratic and Social Centre; UDF Union for French 
Democracy; NC New Centre
Germany SPD Social democrats; KPD-DKP Communist party; PDS- The Left  FDP Free democrats CDU Christian democratic union; CSU 
Christian social union
Italy PCI Commmunist party; PSI Socialist party; PSDI Social democrats; PDS 
Democratic Party of the Left; PSIUP Socialist party of proletarian unity; PDUP 
Manifesto-party proletarian communism; PSU United socialist party; DP Proletarian 
democracy; Progressives; RC Communist Refoundation Party; PdCI Party of Italian 
Communists; Centre left coalition (generic)
PLI Liberal Party; PRI; Republican Party; FI Forza Italia; 
AN National Alliance; LN Northern League; Radical party; 
centre right coalition (generic)
DC Christian democrats; CCD Christian 
Democratic Centre; PPI Italian Popular 
Party; CCD-CDU, Whiteflower-list
The Netherlands PVDA Labor party; CPN Communist party; SP Socialist party; PSP Pacifist socialist 
party; PPR Radical political party; DS70 Democratic socialist 70
VVD Liberal party ; D66 Democrats 66; New Middle Party; 
BP Farmers party;; CP Centre party; CD Centre Democrats; 
LPF List Pim Fortuyn
ARP Anti-revolutionary party; KVP Catholic 
party; CHU Christian Historicals; SGP 
Political reformed party; GPV Reformed 
political union; RKPN Roman catholic 
party; CDA Christian democratic appeal; 
RPF Reformed political federation; EVP 
Evangelical peoples party; CU Christian 
Union
Norway DNA Norwegian Labor Party; SV Socialist Left Party; RV Red Electoral alliance: NKP 
Communist Party
V Left – Liberals; H Right – Conservatives; DFL Liberal 
Peoples Party: ALP Anders langes party – FrP; FrP 
Progress party; SP Center party
KrF Christian Peoples Party
Spain PSOE Socialist Labor Party; PCE-U Communist Party /United Left; Left-wing 
Nationalists
PP Popular Party; Right-wing Nationalists; UCD-CDS, 
centrists
Sweden SAP Social Democratic Labour Party; VKP Swedish Communist Party - V Left Party M Moderate Free Traders; FP Peoples party – Liberals; 
Middle parties – CP Centre Party; ND New Democracy
Kd-former KDS, Christian Democracy 
Switzerland SPS - PSS Social Democratic Party of Switzerland; Pda - Pdt Labour Party; POCH 
Progressive organization of Switzerland; minor left
SVP- UDC Swiss Peoples Party; FDP - PRD Radical 
Democrats; LPS - PLS Liberal Party of Switzerland - Liberal 
conservatives; Independents; National action; SD - DS 
Swiss Democrats - former Nation Action; FPS - PSL 
Freedom Party of Switzerland 
CVP - PDC Christian Democratic Peoples 
Party – Catholic; EVP - PEP Protestant 
Peoples Party; CSP -PCS Christian Social 
Party; EDU - UDF - Federal Democratic 
Union
United Kingdom LAB Labour party CON Conservative party; LIB Liberal Party; LIBDEM Liberal 
Democrats – the alliance 
United States D Democratic Party R Republican Party
Source: primarily based upon the classification by Lane and Ersson (1997); other sources: Nieuwbeerta 
(1995); Knutsen (2004); and own additions
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Country Left-wing parties
(Socialist, Communist and Left-socialist parties) 
Right-wing parties
(liberal, conservative, agrarian, and other right parties)
Religious parties
(Christian Democratic, Catholic and other 
denominational parties)
Australia ALP Australian labor party; DLP Democratic labor party; QLP Queensland labor 
party
LPA Liberal party; NP National party - country party; CLP 
Country-liberal party; AD Australian democrats; ON One 
Nation
Austria SPO Socialist Party; KPO Communist party FPO Freedom party; LF Liberal Forum OVP Austrian peoples party
Belgium BSP - PSB - POB Belgian socialist party; PS Socialist Party Wallonia; SP-SPa 
Socialist Party Flanders
PVV - Party of liberty and progress; PLDP Brussels liberal 
party; PRL- Walloon Liberals; VLD - Flemish Liberals; 
VB Flemish Interest- Flemish Bloc; FN National Front – 
Wallonia; MR Reform Movement - Walloon Liberals
PSC - CVP Catholic party; CVP - CD&V, 
Flemish Christian Democrats; PSC - CDH 
Walloon Christian Democrats
Denmark SD Social Democratic Party; DKP Danish Communist Party; RF Justice party; SF 
Socialist Peoples Party; VS Left Socialists FK Common Course; EL Unity List
CD Centre Democrats; V Left – Liberals; RV Radical Left 
– Liberals; KF Conservative Peoples Party; FRP Progress 
Party; DF Danish Peoples Party 
KD Christian Democrats - KrF Christian 
Peoples Party
Finland SDP Social democrats; STP Socialist workers party; SKDL Finnish peoples 
democratic union; TPSL Social democratic league of workers & smallholders; VAS 
Left Alliance 
KESK Finnish Centre party; KOK National coalition; LKP 
Liberal peoples party; SMP Finnish rural party; PS True 
Finns; NUORS Young Finns
SKD Christian league - KD Christian 
Democrats
France SFIO-PS Socialist party; PCF Communist party; minor left; other extreme left RFP Rally for the French People; UNR Union for the New 
Republic; UDR Union for the Defense of the Republic; 
RPR Rally for the Republic; UMP Union for the Popular 
Movement; MRP Popular Republican Movement; CDS 
Democratic and Social Centre; UDF Union for French 
Democracy; NC New Centre
Germany SPD Social democrats; KPD-DKP Communist party; PDS- The Left  FDP Free democrats CDU Christian democratic union; CSU 
Christian social union
Italy PCI Commmunist party; PSI Socialist party; PSDI Social democrats; PDS 
Democratic Party of the Left; PSIUP Socialist party of proletarian unity; PDUP 
Manifesto-party proletarian communism; PSU United socialist party; DP Proletarian 
democracy; Progressives; RC Communist Refoundation Party; PdCI Party of Italian 
Communists; Centre left coalition (generic)
PLI Liberal Party; PRI; Republican Party; FI Forza Italia; 
AN National Alliance; LN Northern League; Radical party; 
centre right coalition (generic)
DC Christian democrats; CCD Christian 
Democratic Centre; PPI Italian Popular 
Party; CCD-CDU, Whiteflower-list
The Netherlands PVDA Labor party; CPN Communist party; SP Socialist party; PSP Pacifist socialist 
party; PPR Radical political party; DS70 Democratic socialist 70
VVD Liberal party ; D66 Democrats 66; New Middle Party; 
BP Farmers party;; CP Centre party; CD Centre Democrats; 
LPF List Pim Fortuyn
ARP Anti-revolutionary party; KVP Catholic 
party; CHU Christian Historicals; SGP 
Political reformed party; GPV Reformed 
political union; RKPN Roman catholic 
party; CDA Christian democratic appeal; 
RPF Reformed political federation; EVP 
Evangelical peoples party; CU Christian 
Union
Norway DNA Norwegian Labor Party; SV Socialist Left Party; RV Red Electoral alliance: NKP 
Communist Party
V Left – Liberals; H Right – Conservatives; DFL Liberal 
Peoples Party: ALP Anders langes party – FrP; FrP 
Progress party; SP Center party
KrF Christian Peoples Party
Spain PSOE Socialist Labor Party; PCE-U Communist Party /United Left; Left-wing 
Nationalists
PP Popular Party; Right-wing Nationalists; UCD-CDS, 
centrists
Sweden SAP Social Democratic Labour Party; VKP Swedish Communist Party - V Left Party M Moderate Free Traders; FP Peoples party – Liberals; 
Middle parties – CP Centre Party; ND New Democracy
Kd-former KDS, Christian Democracy 
Switzerland SPS - PSS Social Democratic Party of Switzerland; Pda - Pdt Labour Party; POCH 
Progressive organization of Switzerland; minor left
SVP- UDC Swiss Peoples Party; FDP - PRD Radical 
Democrats; LPS - PLS Liberal Party of Switzerland - Liberal 
conservatives; Independents; National action; SD - DS 
Swiss Democrats - former Nation Action; FPS - PSL 
Freedom Party of Switzerland 
CVP - PDC Christian Democratic Peoples 
Party – Catholic; EVP - PEP Protestant 
Peoples Party; CSP -PCS Christian Social 
Party; EDU - UDF - Federal Democratic 
Union
United Kingdom LAB Labour party CON Conservative party; LIB Liberal Party; LIBDEM Liberal 
Democrats – the alliance 
United States D Democratic Party R Republican Party
Source: primarily based upon the classification by Lane and Ersson (1997); other sources: Nieuwbeerta 
(1995); Knutsen (2004); and own additions
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A.3 Party classifications in chapters 4 and 5
Party group Party 
(Dutch abbreviation)
Party name 
(English translation)
Old Left PvdA Labor Party
DS70 Democratic Socialists ‘70
CPN Communist Party of the Netherlands
SP Socialist Party
New Left D66 Democrats ‘66
PPR Political Party Radicals
PSP Pacifist Socialist Party
EVP Evangelical People’s Party
GroenLinks GreenLeft
Liberal Right VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
BP Farmer’s Party
NMP New Middle Party
Religious ARP Anti Revolutionary Party
KVP Catholic People’s Party
CHU Christian Historical Union
CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
SGP Political Reformed Party
GPV Reformed Political Alliance
RPF Reformed Political Federation
CU ChristianUnion
RKPN Roman-Catholic Party of the Netherlands
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Appendix B: Chapter 2
B.1 Model selection
Australia: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models of 
cleavage change (N=20,645)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 1926851.2 27040.0 5
2 2026843.6 27042.3 6
3 2126844.1 27052.8 8
4 3026832.5 27130.6 11
5 4326794.4 27221.6 16
6 3226821.8 27139.7 12
7 4426784.4 27221.6 15
8 2226832.6 27051.2 7
9 5426779.4 27315.9 22
10 2226805.0 27023.5 1
11 2326798.9 27027.4 2
12 2426798.7 27037.2 3
13 3326786.9 27114.7 9
14 4626748.2 27205.2 13
15 3526777.4 27125.1 10
16 4726740.2 27207.2 14
17 2526789.2 27037.6 4
18 5726734.0 27300.3 21
19 5226764.3 27280.9 17
20 5326757.3 27283.9 18
21 5426758.2 27294.7 20
22 6326745.9 27371.8 23
23 7626709.3 27464.4 25
24 6526736.7 27382.4 24
25 7726700.3 27465.3 26
26 5526747.7 27294.1 19
27 8726694.8 27559.1 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
10 vs. 11 6.1 (1) p < 0.05
11 vs. 12 0.2 (1) n.s.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Austria: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of 
cleavage change (N=3,227)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 24 5014.9 5208.8 1 - - - - -
2 26 5012.2 5222.2 5 2b 25 5014.9 5216.9 3
3 26 5013.6 5223.6 6 3b 25 5014.0 5216.0 2
4 36 4988.9 5279.7 24 4b 30 5002.6 5245.0 13
5 36 4994.5 5285.4 26 5b 30 5003.7 5246.1 14
6 38 4986.6 5293.6 27 6b 31 5001.8 5252.2 15
7 38 4990.0 5297.0 29 7b 31 5003.5 5254.0 16
8 28 5009.6 5235.8 10 8b 26 5013.9 5224.0 7
9 48 4968.8 5356.6 42 9b 36 4993.6 5284.4 25
10 30 4999.4 5241.8 12 10b 27 5002.8 5220.9 4
11 32 4995.7 5254.2 17 11b 28 5002.8 5229.0 9
12 32 4998.4 5256.9 18 12b 28 5001.8 5228.0 8
13 42 4972.5 5311.8 31 13b 33 4990.6 5257.2 19
14 42 4980.1 5319.5 34 14b 33 4991.4 5258.1 20
15 44 4970.7 5326.2 36 15b 34 4989.7 5264.4 21
16 44 4975.0 5330.5 37 16b 34 4991.3 5266.0 22
17 34 4993.6 5268.3 23 17b 29 5001.7 5236.0 11
18 54 4953.7 5390.0 44 18b 39 4981.5 5296.5 28
19 58 4957.1 5425.7 45 19b 41 4977.9 5309.1 30
20 60 4953.3 5438.1 46 20b 42 4977.9 5317.2 33
21 60 4956.0 5440.8 47 21b 42 4977.0 5316.3 32
22 70 4931.5 5497.0 49 22b 46 4965.2 5336.9 38
23 70 4938.8 5504.4 50 23b 47 4966.6 5346.3 39
24 72 4929.7 5511.4 51 24b 48 4964.4 5352.2 40
25 72 4933.8 5515.5 52 25b 48 4966.5 5354.3 41
26 62 4951.3 5452.2 48 26b 43 4976.9 5324.3 35
27 82 4913.3 5575.8 53 27b 53 4956.1 5384.3 43
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
1.vs. 3b 0.9(1) n.s.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Belgium: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of 
cleavage change (N=6,776)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 18 13300.3 13459.1 2 - - - - -
2 20 13294.9 13471.3 7 2b 19 13297.5 13465.1 3
3 20 13290.7 13467.1 5 3b 19 13291.5 13459.0 1
4 24 13276.5 13488.1 20 4b 21 13291.9 13477.1 10
5 24 13276.3 13488.0 19 5b 21 13284.1 13469.3 6
6 26 13269.8 13499.1 29 6b 22 13285.6 13479.6 12
7 26 13274.0 13503.3 32 7b 22 13283.6 13477.6 11
8 22 13287.8 13481.9 15 8b 20 13290.6 13467.0 4
9 30 13262.0 13526.6 41 9b 24 13280.8 13492.5 25
10 24 13285.3 13497.0 28 10b 21 13288.8 13474.0 9
11 26 13280.0 13509.3 36 11b 22 13286.0 13480.0 13
12 26 13275.4 13504.8 34 12b 22 13279.5 13473.6 8
13 30 13261.3 13525.9 40 13b 24 13280.1 13491.8 23
14 30 13260.8 13525.4 39 14b 24 13272.1 13483.8 18
15 32 13254.3 13536.5 42 15b 25 13273.4 13493.9 27
16 32 13258.4 13540.7 43 16b 25 13271.6 13492.1 24
17 28 13272.6 13519.5 38 17b 23 13278.8 13481.6 14
18 36 13246.4 13563.9 46 18b 27 13268.7 13506.9 35
19 36 13235.5 13553.0 44 19b 27 13245.6 13483.7 17
20 38 13230.1 13565.3 47 20b 28 13242.5 13489.4 21
21 38 13225.5 13560.6 45 21b 28 13236.0 13482.9 16
22 42 13212.3 13582.7 50 22b 30 13236.8 13501.4 31
23 42 13211.1 13581.5 49 23b 30 13228.2 13492.8 26
24 44 13205.4 13593.5 51 24b 31 13230.0 13503.5 33
25 44 13208.8 13596.9 52 25b 31 13227.7 13501.1 30
26 40 13222.7 13575.5 48 26b 29 13235.1 13490.8 22
27 48 13197.7 13621.0 53 27b 33 13225.1 13516.2 37
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
3b vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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France: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models of cleavage 
change (N=17,872)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 13 22651.3 22778.6 5
2 14 22621.1 22758.2 1
3 14 22640.8 22777.9 4
4 20 22613.5 22809.3 10
5 20 22617.4 22813.2 11
6 21 22608.9 22814.5 12
7 21 22593.3 22798.9 9
8 15 22616.5 22763.4 2
9 27 22579.7 22844.1 17
10 16 22638.4 22795.0 8
11 17 22610.1 22776.6 3
12 17 22627.4 22793.9 7
13 23 22602.3 22827.5 14
14 23 22603.8 22829.0 15
15 24 22597.3 22832.3 16
16 24 22581.6 22816.6 13
17 18 22605.1 22781.3 6
18 30 22567.8 22861.5 18
19 34 22559.0 22891.8 22
20 35 22531.8 22874.5 19
21 35 22548.3 22891.0 21
22 41 22523.2 22924.6 24
23 41 22528.3 22929.8 26
24 42 22518.3 22929.5 25
25 42 22506.9 22918.1 23
26 36 22526.9 22879.3 20
27 48 22492.4 22962.4 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
2 vs.8 4.6(1) p<0.05
8 vs.11 6.4(2) p<0.05
11 vs. 3 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Germany: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of 
cleavage change (N= 25,244)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 44 44476.2 44922.2 3 - - - - -
2 46 44455.9 44922.2 2 2b 45 44459.7 44915.8 1
3 48 44442.3 44928.8 6 3b 46 44458.0 44924.3 4
4 74 44415.6 45165.7 20 4b 59 44443.5 45041.5 16
5 103 44368.9 45413.0 34 5b 74 44429.7 45179.8 21
6 78 44392.3 45183.0 23 6b 61 44432.5 45050.8 17
7 105 44359.6 45423.9 35 7b 75 44420.7 45180.9 22
8 50 44432.7 44939.6 9 8b 47 44448.9 44925.3 5
9 133 44325.6 45673.8 42 9b 89 44402.7 45304.9 28
10 50 44452.5 44959.3 12 10b 47 44462.2 44938.6 8
11 52 44433.2 44960.3 13 11b 48 44445.9 44932.4 7
12 54 44418.3 44965.7 14 12b 49 44443.8 44940.5 10
13 80 44393.3 45204.2 26 13b 62 44429.6 45058.1 18
14 109 44344.2 45449.1 37 14b 77 44415.6 45196.1 24
15 84 44369.5 45221.0 27 15b 64 44418.4 45067.1 19
16 111 44335.6 45460.7 39 16b 78 44406.8 45197.4 25
17 56 44409.4 44977.0 15 17b 50 44434.8 44941.7 11
18 139 44302.1 45711.0 44 18b 92 44388.9 45321.4 30
19 134 44370.2 45728.5 45 19b 90 44413.9 45326.2 31
20 136 44351.5 45730.0 46 20b 91 44397.8 45320.2 29
21 138 44336.9 45735.7 47 21b 92 44395.8 45328.3 32
22 164 44311.6 45973.9 49 22b 105 44381.7 45446.0 36
23 193 44262.9 46219.3 51 23b 120 44367.7 45584.1 40
24 168 44288.2 45991.2 50 24b 107 44370.5 45455.1 38
25 195 44254.3 46230.9 52 25b 121 44358.8 45585.4 41
26 140 44328.0 45747.1 48 26b 93 44386.8 45329.5 33
27 223 44220.7 46481.2 53 27b 135 44341.0 45709.4 43
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
2b vs. 2a 3.8 (1) n.s
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Italy: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 17 multinomial regression models of cleavage 
change (N=9,989)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 26 16660.4 16899.9 7 - - - - -
2 28 16654.8 16912.6 9 2b 27 16655.9 16904.5 8
3 - - - - 3b - - - -
4 41 16630.9 17008.5 14 4b 33 16637.6 16941.5 12
5 - - - - 5b - - - -
6 - - - - 6b - - - -
7 - - - - 7b - - - -
8 - - - - 8b - - - -
9 - - - - 9b - - - -
10 32 16490.9 16785.6 3 10b 29 16495.0 16762.1 1
11 34 16484.3 16797.5 4 11b 30 16490.3 16766.6 2
12 - - - - 12b - - - -
13 47 16461.2 16894.1 6 13b 36 16472.4 16803.9 5
14 - - - - 14b - - - -
15 - - - - 15b - - - -
16 - - - - 16b - - - -
17 - - - - 17b - - - -
18 - - - - 18b - - - -
19 74 16407.2 17088.7 15 19b 50 16461.7 16922.2 10
20 76 16401.3 17101.2 16 20b 51 16457.0 16926.7 11
21 - - - - 21b - - - -
22 89 16378.5 17198.1 17 22b 57 16439.0 16963.9 13
23 - - - - 23b - - - -
24 - - - - 24b - - - -
25 - - - - 25b - - - -
26 - - - - 26b - - - -
27 - - - - 27b - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
10b vs. 11b 4.7(1) p<0.05
11b vs.10 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
appendix b: chapter 2
263
Netherlands: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models of 
cleavage change (N=18,049)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 46 32516.2 32967.1 15 - - - - -
2 48 32434.2 32904.6 6 2b 47 32460.2 32920.8 10
3 50 32442.4 32932.4 11 3b 48 32450.2 32920.6 9
4 78 32354.3 33118.7 23 4b 62 32411.7 33019.3 18
5 110 32312.5 33390.6 39 5b 78 32377.6 33142.0 27
6 82 32314.0 33117.7 22 6b 64 32371.5 32998.7 17
7 112 32269.2 33366.9 36 7b 79 32351.1 33125.3 26
8 52 32394.3 32904.0 5 8b 49 32420.6 32900.8 2
9 142 32218.8 33610.5 43 9b 94 32317.5 33238.8 30
10 52 32456.6 32966.3 14 10b 49 32460.0 32940.2 13
11 54 32375.5 32904.8 7 11b 50 32402.8 32892.8 3
12 56 32383.7 32932.5 12 12b 51 32395.2 32895.1 4
13 84 32295.6 33118.8 24 13b 81 32298.7 33092.6 19
14 116 32252.6 33389.5 38 14b 81 32322.1 33116.0 21
15 88 32256.5 33119.0 25 15b 70 32312.5 32998.6 16
16 118 32210.8 33367.3 37 16b 82 32294.3 33097.9 20
17 58 32336.8 32905.3 8 17b 52 32364.3 32873.9 1
18 148 32160.0 33610.6 44 18b 97 32260.8 33211.4 28
19 142 32313.2 33705.0 48 19b 94 32378.2 33299.5 33
20 144 32233.7 33645.1 45 20b 95 32320.9 33252.0 31
21 146 32241.9 33672.8 47 21b 96 32313.8 33254.7 32
22 174 32157.3 33862.7 49 22b 110 32273.4 33351.5 35
23 206 32122.8 34141.8 52 23b 126 32241.1 33476.0 41
24 178 32119.3 33863.8 50 24b 112 32234.4 33332.1 34
25 208 32081.3 34119.9 51 25b 127 32213.1 33457.8 40
26 148 32196.1 33646.6 46 26b 97 32282.6 33233.3 29
27 238 32031.1 34363.7 53 27b 142 32180.3 33572.0 42
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
17b vs. 8b. n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Norway: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 17 multinomial regression models of 
cleavage change (N=7,563)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 18 13322.5 13483.3 4 - - - - -
2 20 13318.1 13496.7 8 2b 19 13318.3 13488.0 5
3 - - - - 3b - - - -
4 26 13306.6 13538.8 13 4b 22 13312.6 13509.0 9
5 - - - - 5b - - - -
6 - - - - 6b - - - -
7 - - - - 7b - - - -
8 - - - - 8b - - - -
9 - - - - 9b - - - -
10 24 13264.6 13479.0 3 10b 21 13281.3 13468.8 1
11 26 13261.0 13493.2 6 11b 22 13276.2 13472.7 2
12 - - - - 12b - - - -
13 32 13249.9 13535.7 12 13b 25 13270.7 13494.0 7
14 - - - - 14b - - - -
15 - - - - 15b - - - -
16 - - - - 16b - - - -
17 - - - - 17b - - - -
18 - - - - 18b - - - -
19 42 13235.7 13610.8 15 19b 30 13260.9 13528.9 10
20 44 13232.1 13625.0 16 20b 31 13256.0 13532.8 11
21 - - - - 21b - - - -
22 50 13221.2 13667.8 17 22b 34 13250.4 13554.1 14
23 - - - - 23b - - - -
24 - - - - 24b - - - -
25 - - - - 25b - - - -
26 - - - - 26b - - - -
27 - - - - 27b - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
10b vs. 11b 5.1(1) p<0.05
11b vs. 10 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
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Spain: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 9 multinomial regression models of cleavage 
change (N=12,725)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1* 9 15477.4 15562.5 1
2* 10 15474.2 15568.7 2
3 - - - -
4* 13 15462.4 15585.3 5
5 - - - -
6 - - - -
7 - - - -
8 - - - -
9 - - - -
10* 12 15463.2 15576.7 3
11* 13 15459.2 15582.1 4
12 - - - -
13* 16 15447.7 15598.9 6
14 - - - -
15 - - - -
16 - - - -
17 - - - -
18 - - - -
19* 21 15435.5 15634.0 7
20* 22 15430.6 15638.6 8
21 - - - -
22* 25 15420.4 15656.7 9
23 - - - -
24 - - - -
25 - - - -
26 - - - -
27 - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
1 vs. 2. 3.2 (1) n.s
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
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Sweden: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 7 multinomial regression models of 
cleavage change (N=9,958)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 20 14351.8 14536.0 2 - - - - -
2 22 14334.1 14536.6 3 2b 21 14337.5 14530.8 1
3 - - - - 3b - - - -
4 - - - - 4b - - - -
5 - - - - 5b - - - -
6 - - - - 6b - - - -
7 - - - - 7b - - - -
8 - - - - 8b - - - -
9 - - - - 9b - - - -
10 26 14337.5 14576.9 6 10b 23 14347.3 14559.1 5
11 28 14320.3 14578.0 7 11b 24 14333.0 14554.0 4
12 - - - - 12b - - - -
13 - - - - 13b - - - -
14 - - - - 14b - - - -
15 - - - - 15b - - - -
16 - - - - 16b - - - -
17 - - - - 17b - - - -
18 - - - - 18b - - - -
19 - - - - 19b - - - -
20 - - - - 20b - - - -
21 - - - - 21b - - - -
22 - - - - 22b - - - -
23 - - - - 23b - - - -
24 - - - - 24b - - - -
25 - - - - 25b - - - -
26 - - - - 26b - - - -
27 - - - - 27b - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
2b vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
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Switzerland: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 53 multinomial regression models 
of cleavage change (N=9,115)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 24 16755.8 16974.6 12 - - - - -
2 26 16755.7 16992.8 18 2b 25 16755.7 16983.7 16
3 28 16721.8 16977.1 14 3b 26 16732.2 16969.2 10
4 34 16748.5 17058.5 33 4b 29 16751.2 17015.6 23
5 43 16702.8 17094.9 40 5b 33 16716.7 17017.5 25
6 38 16714.5 17061.0 34 6b 31 16727.6 17010.3 22
7 45 16702.4 17112.7 41 7b 34 16716.5 17026.5 26
8 30 16721.2 16994.7 19 8b 27 16731.9 16978.1 15
9 53 16694.4 17177.7 48 9b 38 16711.9 17058.3 32
10 30 16648.6 16922.1 1 10b 27 16684.1 16930.3 4
11 32 16648.0 16939.8 7 11b 28 16684.1 16939.4 6
12 34 16615.8 16925.9 2 12b 29 16662.3 16926.7 3
13 40 16641.1 17005.8 20 13b 32 16679.7 16971.5 11
14 49 16597.6 17044.3 31 14b 36 16646.9 16975.2 13
15 44 16608.5 17009.6 21 15b 34 16657.8 16967.8 9
16 51 16596.7 17061.7 35 16b 37 16646.8 16984.1 17
17 36 16614.8 16943.1 8 17b 30 16662.0 16935.5 5
18 59 16588.8 17126.8 45 18b 41 16642.3 17016.1 24
19 54 16629.7 17122.0 43 19b 39 16676.1 17031.7 28
20 56 16629.0 17139.6 46 20b 40 16676.1 17040.8 30
21 58 16597.5 17126.3 44 21b 41 16654.3 17028.1 27
22 64 16621.6 17205.2 49 22b 44 16671.6 17072.8 37
23 73 16578.5 17244.1 51 23b 48 16638.7 17076.3 38
24 68 16589.5 17209.5 50 24b 46 16649.8 17069.2 36
25 75 16577.6 17261.4 52 25b 49 16638.5 17085.3 39
26 60 16596.4 17143.5 47 26b 42 16654.0 17036.9 29
27 83 16569.3 17326.1 53 27b 53 16634.0 17117.3 42
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
10 vs. 12 34.8(4) p<0.05
12 vs. 12b n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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United Kingdom: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models 
of cleavage change (N=16,564)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 15 19906.6 20052.3 2
2 16 19899.1 20054.5 3
3 17 19896.1 20061.3 6
4 23 19892.1 20115.6 9
5 31 19866.6 20167.8 14
6 25 19887.0 20129.9 12
7 32 19863.5 20174.3 15
8 18 19892.7 20067.6 8
9 39 19858.0 20236.9 20
10 18 19876.6 20051.5 1
11 19 19871.6 20056.2 4
12 20 19864.5 20058.8 5
13 26 19864.4 20117.0 10
14 34 19836.4 20166.7 13
15 28 19857.1 20129.1 11
16 35 19835.0 20175.0 16
17 21 19863.0 20067.0 7
18 42 19829.3 20237.3 21
19 39 19843.9 20222.8 17
20 40 19838.9 20227.5 18
21 41 19831.7 20230.0 19
22 47 19833.0 20289.6 23
23 55 19802.2 20336.5 25
24 49 19825.5 20301.6 24
25 56 19800.8 20344.8 26
26 42 19830.2 20238.2 22
27 63 19796.7 20408.7 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
10 vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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United States: Goodness-of-fit statistics of 27 multinomial regression models 
of cleavage change (N=10,585)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 18 13949.7 14116.5 6
2 19 13949.6 14125.7 8
3 20 13915.9 14101.3 2
4 29 13919.6 14188.3 12
5 40 13857.4 14228.1 14
6 31 13882.5 14169.8 10
7 41 13857.4 14237.4 16
8 21 13915.7 14110.4 4
9 51 13820.0 14292.6 18
10 21 13920.9 14115.5 5
11 22 13920.8 14124.6 7
12 23 13883.5 14096.6 1
13 32 13890.8 14187.3 11
14 43 13824.8 14223.2 13
15 34 13849.6 14164.7 9
16 44 13824.7 14232.5 15
17 24 13883.1 14105.5 3
18 54 13787.9 14288.4 17
19 51 13863.9 14336.5 21
20 52 13863.6 14345.5 22
21 53 13826.1 14317.2 19
22 62 13834.1 14408.6 24
23 73 13768.8 14445.3 25
24 64 13792.4 14385.5 23
25 74 13768.7 14454.5 26
26 54 13825.6 14326.0 20
27 84 13732.8 14511.2 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
10 vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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B.2 Preferred models of cleavage change
Australia: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right voting 
(N=20,645)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -1.496 0.086
1965 (ref.) - -
1967 0.095 0.089
1979 0.445 0.085
1984 0.152 0.083
1985 0.306 0.097
1986 0.075 0.098
1987 0.380 0.086
1990 0.895 0.096
1993 0.649 0.097
1996 1.101 0.109
1998 1.021 0.110
2001 1.179 0.116
2004 1.115 0.125
No/other religion (ref.) - -
Catholic -0.071 0.044
Protestant 0.482 0.039
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 0.626 0.072
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 1.348 0.089
Routine non-manaul class 0.908 0.103
Self-employed 1.449 0.106
Year*Service class -0.024 0.004
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.011 0.004
Year*Self-employed -0.007 0.004
Year*Church attendance -0.007 0.003
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Austria: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right vs. 
religion voting (N=3,227)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious Parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -3.21 0.24 -3.24 0.18
1974 (ref.) - - - -
1985 -0.31 0.43 0.72 0.16
1988 0.59 0.28 0.41 0.14
1989 1.36 0.23 0.35 0.13
1995 2.49 0.24 0.43 0.18
1999 2.05 0.26 0.37 0.19
2003 1.56 0.24 0.73 0.14
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.01 0.16 1.07 0.15
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)
Frequent church attendance 0.14 0.14 1.35 0.10
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 0.19 0.17 1.05 0.11
Routine non-manaul class 0.37 0.17 0.56 0.12
Self-employed 1.76 0.20 2.45 0.14
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Belgium: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs.  
right vs. religion voting (N=6,776)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious Parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -0.60 0.08 -1.91 0.12
1991 (ref.) - - - -
1995 0.19 0.09 0.23 0.11
1999 0.64 0.08 0.56 0.14
2003 0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.19
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.45 0.07 1.51 0.12
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.32 0.07 1.45 0.08
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 0.54 0.08 0.54 0.09
Routine non-manaul class 0.14 0.08 0.22 0.09
Self-employed 1.59 0.15 1.14 0.16
Year*Catholic __ a -0.05 0.02
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0. 
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France: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs.  
right voting (N=17,872)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -1.60 0.10
1967 - -
1968 0.66 0.10
1988 0.05 0.09
1995 0.66 0.10
1997 0.45 0.11
2002 0.57 0.11
2006 0.38 0.11
2007 0.64 0.11
No/other religion (ref.) - -
Catholic 0.84 0.04
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 1.25 0.09
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 0.65 0.12
Routine non-manaul class 0.44 0.11
Self-employed 1.18 0.12
Year*Service class -0.01 0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.01 0.00
Year*Self-employed -0.01 0.00
Year*Church attendance -0.02 0.00
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Germany: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right vs. 
religious voting (N=25,244)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -3.18 0.18 -1.77 0.13
1969 (ref.) - - - -
1975 1.17 0.19 0.12 0.10
1976 1.45 0.18 0.22 0.10
1977 0.91 0.19 0.34 0.10
1978 1.10 0.18 0.28 0.10
1979 0.88 0.18 0.36 0.10
1980 1.20 0.17 0.22 0.10
1984 0.56 0.20 0.62 0.12
1986 1.10 0.19 0.48 0.13
1987 0.72 0.23 0.51 0.15
1988 0.84 0.19 0.39 0.14
1990 1.01 0.19 0.45 0.14
1994 -0.31 0.29 0.30 0.17
1998 -0.06 0.21 0.06 0.17
2002 0.67 0.21 0.44 0.20
2005 1.05 0.20 0.47 0.20
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic -0.01 0.08 1.29 0.11
Protestant 0.04 0.07 0.31 0.11
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.14 0.05 0.75 0.03
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.08 0.06 0.55 0.04
Routine non-manaul class 0.74 0.06 0.46 0.04
Self-employed 1.38 0.09 1.45 0.06
Year*Catholic __ a -0.02 0.01
Year*Protestant __ a -0.01 0.01
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0. 
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Italy: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right voting 
(N=9,989)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e.
Intercept -3.53 0.20 -2.15 0.16
1968 (ref.) - -
1975 -0.35 0.19 -0.45 0.11
1985 0.83 0.17 0.02 0.17
1990 -0.56 0.35 -0.08 0.23
1992 1.80 0.22 0.10 0.24
1994 3.23 0.20 -1.51 0.28
1996 2.64 0.20 -2.39 0.29
2001 3.60 0.23 -2.00 0.37
2006 3.19 0.26 -1.43 0.38
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.79 0.08 2.24 0.16
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 2.77 0.23 0.47 0.09
Routine non-manaul class 1.63 0.22 0.40 0.07
Self-employed 0.71 0.23 0.71 0.07
Year*Service class -0.10 0.01 __ a
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.06 0.01 __ a
Year*Self-employed 0.00 0.01 __ a
Year*Church attendance __ a -0.02 0.01
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0. 
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Netherlands: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right vs. 
religious voting (N=18,049)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -2.04 0.14 -3.02 0.16
1970 (ref.) - - - -
1971 -0.01 0.18 0.13 0.18
1972 0.19 0.14 -0.32 0.15
1974 -0.08 0.15 -0.42 0.15
1976 0.57 0.16 -0.05 0.17
1977 0.33 0.13 0.09 0.13
1979 0.51 0.17 0.31 0.17
1981 0.90 0.15 0.57 0.15
1982 0.80 0.15 0.24 0.16
1985 0.72 0.14 0.21 0.16
1986 0.70 0.16 0.84 0.17
1989 0.73 0.16 1.00 0.17
1990 1.57 0.16 1.83 0.17
1994 1.88 0.17 0.91 0.20
1998 1.50 0.18 0.70 0.22
2002 1.83 0.20 1.44 0.23
2006 1.12 0.20 1.47 0.22
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.22 0.11 1.63 0.13
Protestant 0.21 0.11 1.46 0.12
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.58 0.10 2.45 0.10
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.73 0.09 0.49 0.10
Routine non-manaul class 1.38 0.10 0.43 0.10
Self-employed 2.07 0.14 1.50 0.14
Year*Catholic __ a -0.02 0.01
Year*Protestant __ a 0.01 0.01
Year*Church attendance __ a -0.04 0.01
Year*Service class -0.03 0.01 __ a
Year*Routine non-manaul class -0.03 0.01 __ a
Year*Self-employed -0.03 0.01 __ a 
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0. 
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Norway: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. Vs. right vs. 
religion voting (N=7,563)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious Parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -0.68 0.09 -2.61 0.15
1981 (ref.) - - - -
1985 -0.01 0.09 0.11 0.15
1989 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.16
1993 0.04 0.12 -0.21 0.18
1997 0.24 0.14 0.78 0.17
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.11 0.08 2.35 0.16
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.50 0.11 0.39 0.11
Routine non-manaul class 0.51 0.12 0.40 0.12
Self-employed 1.63 0.14 0.79 0.14
Year*Church attendance __ a -0.03 0.01
Year*Service class -0.07 0.01 __ a
Year*Routine non-manaul class -0.02 0.01 __ a
Year*Self-employed -0.03 0.01 __ a
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0. 
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Spain: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. vs. right voting 
(N=12,725)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -0.85 0.09
1979 - -
1986 -1.02 0.10
2000 0.38 0.09
2004 -0.56 0.09
2008 -0.54 0.09
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 1.08 0.04
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 0.66 0.05
Routine non-manaul class 0.43 0.06
Self-employed 0.83 0.06
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Sweden: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression for left. vs. right vs. 
religious voting (N=9,958)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -1.03 0.06 -6.44 0.43
1985 - - - -
1988 -0.14 0.07 -0.04 0.29
1991 -0.16 0.07 0.73 0.31
1994 0.15 0.07 2.13 0.36
1998 -0.16 0.08 3.04 0.43
2002 -0.67 0.10 3.10 0.50
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.53 0.05 3.69 0.39
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.74 0.06 1.09 0.18
Routine non-manaul class 0.85 0.05 0.80 0.15
Self-employed 2.19 0.08 1.65 0.20
Year*Church attendance __ a -0.11 0.03
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0. 
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Switzerland: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right vs. 
religious voting (N=9,115)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -1.08 0.31 -3.56 0.56
1971 - - - -
1975 -0.20 0.15 -0.06 0.21
1979 -0.07 0.19 0.47 0.26
1995 0.80 0.28 1.03 0.49
1999 1.19 0.32 1.71 0.56
2003 1.41 0.35 1.90 0.63
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.65 0.31 2.68 0.55
Protestant 0.98 0.30 0.48 0.56
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.28 0.05 1.69 0.08
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.51 0.16 1.13 0.22
Routine non-manaul class 0.52 0.20 0.34 0.26
Self-employed 2.19 0.24 2.16 0.28
Year*Catholic -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.02
Year*Protestant -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02
Year*Service class -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.01
Year*Routine non-manaul class -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Year*Self-employed -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.01
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United Kingdom: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. 
right voting (N=16,564)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -0.92 0.09
1964 (ref.) - -
1966 -0.37 0.10
1970 0.03 0.10
1979 0.55 0.10
1983 0.95 0.09
1987 0.88 0.09
1992 0.55 0.09
1997 -0.13 0.10
2005 0.32 0.12
No/other religion (ref.)
Catholic -0.50 0.06
Protestant 0.37 0.04
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 0.24 0.04
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 1.88 0.10
Routine non-manaul class 1.24 0.10
Self-employed 1.82 0.15
Year*Service class -0.02 0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.01 0.00
Year*Self-employed -0.01 0.01
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United States: Parameter estimations of multinomial regression of left vs. right 
voting (N=10,585)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -1.74 0.19
1960 (ref.) - -
1964 -0.65 0.12
1968 0.34 0.13
1972 0.92 0.13
1976 0.36 0.14
1980 0.85 0.17
1984 0.91 0.17
1988 0.76 0.19
1992 0.38 0.21
1996 0.42 0.23
2000 0.76 0.25
2004 0.96 0.27
No/other religion (ref.) - -
Catholic 0.56 0.19
Protestant 1.43 0.17
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 0.18 0.04
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 0.93 0.10
Routine non-manaul class 0.46 0.11
Self-employed 0.48 0.16
Year*Service class -0.02 0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class 0.00 0.00
Year*Self-employed 0.01 0.01
Year*Catholic 0.00 0.01
Year*Protestant -0.02 0.01
appendix b: chapter 2
283
Appendix C: Chapter 3
C.1 Model selection and additional analyses
Goodness-of-fit statistics of multilevel linear regression models of class voting1 
on year 
Model df Log Likelihood AIC BIC
Routine non-manual class
Null model 3 -32.77 71.54 81.25
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals) 7 -16.52 47.04 69.69
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals) 11 -11.86 45.72 81.32
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 4 -18.04 44.08 57.02
Random Slope (Linear Year) 6 -17.31 46.62 66.04
Service class
Null model 3 -81.44 168.88 178.58
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals) 7 -45.88 105.77 128.42
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals) 11 -43.43 108.86 144.46
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 4 -45.19 98.38 111.32
Random Slope (Linear Year) 6 -41.06 94.12 113.54
Self-employed
Null model 3 -102.89 211.77 221.48
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals) 7 -87.07 188.13 210.79
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals) 11 -83.77 189.53 225.13
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 4 -86.44 180.89 193.83
Random Slope (Linear Year) 6 -72.19 156.38 175.80
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)  
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Likelihood-ratio test of multilevel linear regression models of class voting1 on 
linear year 
Model LRχ² (df) Compared 
to 
P-value 
Routine non-manual class
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 29.46 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year) 1.46 (2) Random intercept 0.4819 n.s.
Service class
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 72.50 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year) 8.26 (2) Random intercept 0.0161 **
Self-employed
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 32.88 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year) 28.51 (2) Random intercept 0.0000 ***
* p. < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group) 
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Likelihood-ratio test of multilevel linear regression models of class voting1 on 
LR position of left-wing parties / LR party system polarization 
Model LRχ² (df) Compared 
to 
P-value 
Routine non-manual class
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties) 3.76 (1) Null model 0.0659 *
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties) 1.72 (2) Random 
intercept
0.4238 n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization) 8.08 (1) Null model 0.0045 ***
Random Slope (LR party system polarization) 2.23 (2) Random 
intercept
0.3271 n.s.
Service class
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties) 6.25 (1) Null model 0.0124 **
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties) 0.23 (2) Random 
intercept
0.8927 n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization) 10.53 (1) Null model 0.0012 ***
Random Slope (LR party system polarization) 3.57 (2) Random 
intercept
0.1679 n.s.
Self-employed
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties) 47.51 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties) 0.39 (2) Random 
intercept
0.8227 n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization) 48.96 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (LR party system polarization) 1.55 (2) Random 
intercept
0.4616 n.s.
* p. < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group) 
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Appendix D: Chapter 4
D.1. Test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) of multinomial logistic 
regression models in table 4.1 (Ho: Odds are independent of other alternatives)
Hausman test of IIA (N=11.832) Small and Hsiao Test of IIAb (N=11.832)
Omitted chi2 df P>chi2 evidence lnL(full) lnL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2 evidence
Model I
Old-Left 223.0 60 0.000 against Ho -3201.8 -3168.8 66.0 60 0.277 for Ho
New-Left 15.4 60 1.000 for Ho -4130.9 -4097.9 66.1 60 0.275 for Ho
Religious 10.0 59 1.000 for Ho -3780.1 -3759.1 41.9 60 0.963 for Ho
Liberal Right 38.9 60 0.984 for Ho (base)
Model II
Old-Left 17.3 62 1.000 for Ho -3075.2 -3043.3 63.8 64 0.482 for Ho
New-Left -77.2 62 --- ---a -3981.1 -3950.9 60.5 64 0.601 for Ho
Religious -72.0 62 --- ---a -3751.1 -3716.2 69.9 64 0.285 for Ho
Liberal Right 473.0 62 0.000 against Ho (base)
Model III
Old-Left 899.8 66 0.000 against Ho -2923.82 -2883.0 81.7 68.0 0.123 for Ho
New-Left -80.4 66 --- ---a  -3784.6 -3746.0 77.1 68.0 0.21 for Ho
Religious -270.2 65 --- ---a  -3396.93 -3355.1 83.6 68.0 0.096 for Ho
Liberal Right -1500.0 66 --- ---a (base)
Model IV
Old-Left -15.0 78 --- ---a  -3016.7 -2969.6 94.2 80 0.133 for Ho
New-Left -34.6 78 --- ---a  -3793.5 -3747.6 91.8 80 0.172 for Ho
Religious 123.6 76 0.000 against Ho -3450.0 -3413.0 74.1 80 0.664 for Ho
Liberal Right 177.1 78 0.000 against Ho (base)
a) Negative test statistic indicate that IIA has not been violated
b)  Because the Small and Hsiao Test requires randomly dividing the data into subpopulations,  
the results differ with each operation. Repeated tests on average suggest no violation of IIA   
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